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ABSTRACT 
 
A. Freya Thimsen: Corporations are Not People: 
Dissensual Democracy and the Movement Against Corporate Rights 
(Under the direction of Christian Lundberg and Carole Blair) 
 
 This dissertation describes the way that the movement against corporate rights employs 
democratic ideals and media technologies to present itself as “the people” who have a more 
legitimate claim to sovereignty than corporations. The movement’s use of rhetoric and 
technology demonstrate that democratic ideals do not necessarily represent actual democratic 
processes, but enacting them is still an effective way to produce a sense that a democratic event 
is occurring. Although different branches of the movement advocate different goals and use 
different rhetorical and technological strategies, they use similar techniques to demonstrate 
shared participation in the overall movement. These core shared techniques indicate that 
scholarship on democratic movements and their political issues has the opportunity to increase 
its effectiveness and relevance by integrating insights about how to produce dissensus based on 
studying movement techniques. Additionally, the history of the legal theoretical rhetoric of 
corporate rights relies on a sharp distinction between organic and technological collectives that 
shapes how the movement is able to selectively critique and enact democratic doxai. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
 Corporations Are Not People: This is a slogan for protest, a phrase to write on signs and 
banners, a short statement of disagreement and critique. Although the slogan has been around for 
at least a decade, it has come to be invoked more frequently since the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
2010 Citizens United v. FEC decision, mass underemployment, and international governmental 
support of financial institutions have contributed to a growing sense that widespread economic, 
political, and social dysfunction has been caused by corporations and financial institutions. 
Zuccotti Park aside, however, one won’t find this slogan on many placards. Although it is a 
protest slogan, the protests that it appears in most frequently are not of the type that draws 
crowds of people into a public space. Like many contemporary protest slogans, Corporations 
Are Not People circulates in books, websites, social media, and speeches. It does not propose the 
expansion of democratic rights to those who lack them. Instead, it argues that rights should be 
stripped from entities currently enjoying them. 
 This difference between claiming rights and revoking rights points toward a defining 
feature of the slogan: it is a critical proposition whose utterance involves analyzing from a 
distance rather than explicitly staking a claim to political subjectivity. Unlike “new social 
movements” that rely on identity categories to flesh out modes of participation and the very 
transformative goals of the movements themselves, the critique of corporate rights is an attempt 
to transform the accepted legal definition of joint-stock business corporations by re-describing 
them as entities that should be excluded from legal personhood. The critique is that corporations 
have been naturalized as legal entities deserving of certain rights such as freedom of speech, due 
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process, and equal protection, but that corporations are not persons and providing them with 
legal rights has had destructive social, environmental, and political results. One of the most 
egregious and frequently cited examples of the destructive effects of corporate personhood is the 
trajectory of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The amendment was passed in 
1868 with the ostensible goal of establishing legal protections for recently freed slaves. Many 
cases decided under the Fourteenth Amendment, however, have been attempts to leverage the 
rights, including property rights, of “corporate persons.” As early as 1937 it was noted that “less 
than one-half of one percent of the cases reaching the Supreme Court under the Fourteenth 
Amendment had anything to do with blacks or freed slaves, while more than fifty percent of 
cases reaching the Court were about corporations.”1 By claiming such rights, corporations 
continue to avoid paying certain taxes and are freed from many types of government regulation. 
Corporate claims to Bill of Rights protections have enabled, of course, massively increased 
spending on elections. Critics also allege that claims to corporate free speech rights have been 
used to: avoid placing safety warnings on various products (as “compelled” speech), gut 
disclosure requirements in new securities regulations, defend false advertising, avoid regulations 
requiring the disclosure of corporate stock positions over $100 million and payments to foreign 
governments, defend illegal communications surveillance, and push back against net-neutrality 
rules.2 In other words, it seems that Citizens United and corporate election politics are just the tip 
of a very large corporate-rights iceberg.  
 Critics of corporate rights claim that the root of these problems lies in the failure of 
existing law to adequately recognize what corporations actually are, both historically and 
contemporarily. To that extent, the movement acts on the assumption that the production of 
better knowledge about corporations can create democratic change. The movement’s modes of 
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critique reflect the accumulated influence of decades of academic humanistic style influenced by 
critical theory. In the books, web sites, petitions, resolutions, speeches, and ordinances that 
enunciate the critique of corporate rights, there is a consistent deployment of unmasking, 
debunking, historicizing, mapping linguistic effects, and revealing power structures. These 
gestures, of course, are performed differently than they would be in scholarly writing for an 
academic audience. I will argue, however, that these modes of critique enact the tension between 
doxa and epistēmē also found in scholarship that is critical of doxa. Like many rhetorical 
concepts derived from ancient Greek, doxa has sometimes been translated univocally as 
opinion.3 But by its ancient definition, doxa is not just opinion formed from subjective 
perception, it is also the objective appearance, ethos or impression that something gives of itself. 
This aspect of doxa is something like regard or reputation. As Eric Havelock says, “The noun 
correspondingly is both the ‘impression’ that may be in my mind and the ‘impression’ held by 
others of me. […] It is the ‘seeming show of things’, whether this panorama is thought of as 
within me or outside of me.”4 Within this most basic formulation of doxa, the movement against 
corporate rights could be described as attempting to “change people’s opinions” regarding the 
“appearance of corporations.” But is it “people’s opinions” that the movement tries to change, or 
is it “the appearance of corporations”? The indeterminacy of this question opens up several 
different ways of thinking about what it means to to critique doxai in an effort to create social 
and political change. The movement against corporate rights contains a variety of approaches to 
critiquing the way that democratic doxai such as “rights” have been appropriated by corporate 
entities. 
 Some of the most incisive and powerful works of contemporary rhetorical scholarship on 
doxa ultimately adopt this perspective that doxai are not “mere” appearances, but objectively 
 4 
existing materials that are highly effective. For these scholars, doxastic material is central to the 
production and reproduction of collective life, including the production of knowledge. If doxai 
exist objectively outside of the way subjects perceive or believe in them, they can be treated as a 
type of material to be drawn on, worked with, molded, revived, or transformed.5 Rhetorical 
scholarship by John Muckelbauer, Andreea Deciu Ritivoi, and J. Robert Cox carefully brackets 
doxa from ideology, but assumes the effectivity of both as unexamined material.6 They do this 
largely without performing the critical gesture that implicitly assumes a distinction between doxa 
and the production of critical knowledge about doxa that would “undo” or “dispel” it. For these 
rhetorical scholars, there is no real difference between doxa and knowledge, there are only 
specifically epistemic doxai. What these contemporary theorizations of doxa deemphasize is any 
sense of a tension or difference between doxa and epistēmē. In the rush to describe doxa as the 
material of all collective life, including knowledge, there has been little attention paid to how and 
why undemocratic doxai might be productively transformed by epistemic gestures.  
 However, in the movement against corporate rights, as with many other movements, there 
is an assumption that better knowledge can aid in the production of better, more democratic 
politics. The project of building and seeking knowledge that can contribute to social and political 
transformation has also been of interest to many critical scholars of epistemology. For instance, 
some critical, politically minded scholars embrace standpoint epistemologies that take everyday 
experiences of struggle as privileged knowledge.7 Standpoint epistemology often strategically 
collapses the distinction between doxa and epistēmē in order to explain more fully how 
embodied, local practices of everyday life are a type of knowledge with epistemic priority.8 
Certain rhetorical scholars such as Robert L. Scott have argued similarly that knowledge is 
fundamentally a function of experiential rhetorical processes involving common beliefs and 
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understandings.9 Although these approaches to the role of common experience in knowledge 
have contributed interesting and important additions to epistemology and the study of 
movements, my concern here is a bit different. I agree that common experiences and subjugated 
knowledges that affirm doxa by drawing on common topoi and everyday practices can be 
important to building transformative knowledge. I am also interested, however, in whether the 
process of enacting a sharp distinction (rather than claiming a similarity) between doxa and 
epistēmē can produce democratic events, especially when the enactment of the distinction 
between doxa and epistēmē is done in movement politics and through the techniques of academic 
scholarship.  
 This reconsideration of the significance of the tension between doxa and knowledge is in 
some ways in tension with the recent vitalist, immanentist ontological turn in humanities 
scholarship. Authors such as Jane Bennett and William Connolly have focused their recent work 
around generating ontological accounts of time, objects, assemblages, animals, affect and other 
ostensibly political ways of being and becoming.10 These and related efforts are part of a larger 
move to avoid making what many take to be increasingly unsupportable and ineffective claims 
that there is an important difference between reality and representation, language and things, 
surfaces and depths, or materiality and rhetoric. My study of the movement against corporate 
rights is sympathetic to these approaches in that I agree that we should not assume a fundamental 
or ontological distinction between reality and representation, rhetoric and materiality, or doxa 
and epistēmē. Some aspects of corporate rights and the movement against them require 
explanation in terms of technologies and the natural environment. I share, however, some of the 
hesitations of scholars such as Lawrence Grossberg and Jeremy Gilbert about the political 
significance of such work.11 As Peter Simonson has pointed out, “Ontology in the human world 
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plays out in fields of differential power and privilege,” which means, among other things, that 
ontology has political implications that it may not specifically avow.12 I also have two further 
hesitations. First, as this study will demonstrate, I am not yet convinced that there is no important 
role in democratic politics for critique, even if its various ontological assumptions are “faulty.” 
Even if there is no meaningful ontological distinction between reality and representation, for 
instance, that does not mean that enacting such a distinction cannot be extremely effective as part 
of democratic politics and even contribute to the production of assemblages that involve 
nonhuman actors, etc. To that extent, this study suggests that critique is a technique or even a 
mechanism by which democratic collectives appear. Critique is a technique that requires 
enacting the assumption of a difference between doxa and epistēmē. 
 My second hesitation with regard to the post-critical immanentist or vitalist turn in political 
theorizing is that its epistemic uses are likely to cause it to fall short of its ontological aspirations. 
While it is well and good to offer ontological speculation, such work has yet to translate itself 
into scholarly research except by way of re-establishing a commitment to understanding 
ontological concepts as part of what Gilles Deleuze might call the dogmatic image of thought.13 
In other words, the context and institutional imperatives within which such ontologies are 
disseminated and taken up seem to lead even the lightest and most carefree concepts down a path 
that pushes them into the laborious service of epistemic tasks. What can be done with a concept 
such as assemblage except attempt to describe empirically existing instances of such things? This 
difficulty leads me to conclude, for the time being, that the even the most speculative of 
ontologies continue to be made relevant through their capacity to operate as part of the 
performance of epistemic gestures. These epistemic gestures in turn require an other, some 
existing sense of things that they attempt to revise, improve, make more accurate, etc. Vitalist, 
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immanentist, geological, and materialist ontologies written by creative, eloquent scholars housed 
in modern research universities seem, in the end, to simply reproduce an epistemic gesture as 
they attempt to interrupt the inaccurate doxa that there is a difference between reality and 
representation. 
  Therefore, I take the tension between doxa and epistēmē as the basis for understanding not 
just dissensual democratic politics, but also as the basis for understanding the potential of 
scholarship to contribute to the flourishing of such politics. Substantial research has been done 
on movement-based rhetorical techniques for critiquing doxa.14 There is an equally large number 
of attempts to develop scholarly and philosophical methods of transforming doxai, some of 
which I will discuss in the section below on critique. I take up the task of contributing to both of 
these general projects: first, describing how movements critique doxai, and second, developing 
scholarly techniques, such as genealogy and articulation, by which research can itself critically 
and dissensually transform doxai. Moreover, I attempt to show how, if these two types of critique 
can be understood through a shared set of concepts, they can be brought into more robust and 
sustainable dialogue with one another. 
  Within this broad frame of attempting to bring movement and scholarly techniques for 
enacting and contesting doxa into conversation with one another, I specifically focus on political 
movements and scholarship based on the principle of democracy. Some types of scholarly 
critique demonstrate only implicitly the assumption that there is a difference between doxa and 
epistēmē by performing a distinction between their own critique and the stable sense of what has 
come before. I argue that the democratic political potentials of such critiques can be understood 
and developed more effectively and deliberately to mesh with (and hopefully contribute to) the 
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critical and performative goals of democracy movements if the commonalities between 
scholarship and movement contestations of undemocratic doxai are more clearly described.  
 The goal of theorizing the potentials of enacting the tension between doxa and epistēmē is 
not to establish the conditions of true or verifiable democratic knowledge. Instead, it is to build a 
set of techniques by which to perform dissensual democracy. Democracy, I will argue, requires 
the relatively unreflexive enactment of democratic doxai. Dissensus, on the other hand, requires 
enacting the tension between doxa and epistēmē. Dissensual democracy therefore requires the 
simultaneous performance of the doxastic subject position of the demos and the critique of doxai 
that produce undemocratic relations.  
Enacting Democratic Doxai 
 If doxa is understood not as opinion, but rather as the stable material that can be drawn on 
in the process of enacting a sensible position in the world, democratic doxai enable that 
enactment in the terms of the political principle of democracy. There are a number of important 
approaches to democratic doxai that help to explain the political acts of the movement against 
corporate rights. One of the most influential of these approaches for this study is Jacques 
Rancière’s account of democratic politics.15 Rancière’s approach to democracy is a strong 
defense of the democratic doxai of equality and freedom. Although Rancière has been rightly 
critiqued by Bruno Bosteels for his too-hasty dismissal of historical materialist approaches to 
politics, his account of the importance of everyday and longstanding doxai as the mode of 
democratic political performance is quite strong. I also think it is quite hopeful because it does 
not advocate an exodus from the common, accessible rhetorical resources available for enacting 
democratic politics.16 For Rancière, democracy does not require specialized language or critique; 
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it simply requires taking up the most accessible doxai of democratic traditions in the name of the 
part of the political whole that has no part while making a new world sensible. 
 Rancière does not dwell on the concept of doxa. Most of his discussions of the concept 
occur in the context of his critiques of Plato’s dismissal of doxa as mere appearance. There is 
nonetheless in his work a strong appreciation for the way that the enactment of the common 
material of democracy enables the appearance of the demos. Much like Chantal Mouffe, who 
argues that consensus is needed on “the ethico-political values that should inform political 
association,” Rancière argues that such values are doxastic, but they are not merely “‘forms’ 
belied by their contents or ‘appearances’ made to conceal reality. They are an effective mode of 
appearance of the people, the minimum of equality that is inscribed in the field of common 
experience.”17 For both Mouffe and Rancière, the importance of democratic doxai such as 
“equality” and “freedom” are agreed upon so that their meanings can be dissensually contested 
and enacted.  
 My primary concern is with a set of democratic doxai that are more specific than general 
ideals like equality or freedom. These doxai are the collective personae, such as “the people,” 
“the community,” or “the movement” that are enacted as the subject position of the demos in 
democratic politics. Any given dissensual democratic critique of doxa must be articulated 
through doxai by a collective that refers to itself as a specific collective persona and enacts that 
persona via specific technologies. Various theorists in rhetorical studies have taken up the project 
of analyzing the significance of collective personae and their rhetorical effects in support of 
different conclusions. For instance, Kenneth Burke and Michael Warner each find that “the 
people” operates as part of a circular and performative logic of sovereign legitimation in the 
written texts of constitutions; as Warner writes, “By constituting the government, the people’s 
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text literally constitutes the people.”18 Michael Calvin McGee and Maurice Charland, on the 
other hand, analyze the persona of “the people” as part of a critical theorization of rhetoric as 
ideological.19 Both McGee and Charland take “the people” as a sort of trope that generates 
effects on the audience of the texts they consider: Hitler’s speeches and books, and white papers 
produced by québécois separatists. Much like Mouffe’s account of agonism and Ernesto Laclau’s 
account of populism, McGee and Charland argue that collective personae generate identification 
with the collective subject named in the text as that persona.20  
 These various approaches point to two important dimensions of the rhetorical process that 
constitutes the specific nature of collective personae, dimensions that are clearly visible in the 
way that the movement against corporate rights demonstrates such doxai. McGee emphasizes 
how collective personae are imbricated in a dynamic of stability and change in doxai that echoes 
Warner and Burke’s emphasis on the performative dimensions of collective personae. Charland, 
on the other hand, describes in lucid detail how collective personae such as the peuple québécois 
are articulated against a presumed enemy or other, a facet of constitutional “dialectics” that 
Burke also emphasizes. Along with Laclau and Mouffe’s conviction that politics requires a 
“constitutive outside,” this is an important insight about the conditions under which the demos 
appears.21 I will argue below that in the case of the movement against corporate rights, its efforts 
to disarticulate the natural unity of the enemy “corporations” is a strategy that builds on and 
complicates this account.  
 I take a more Rancièrean approach than these theorists, however, by steering away from 
identification and toward demonstration as the core dynamic that constitutes democratic 
collectives. Demotic collective personae such as “the people” or “the movement” are the doxai 
through which collectivity is demonstrated; rather than assuming what John Durham Peters 
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might call a one-to-many “dissemination” structure of such personae, I describe the ways that 
such doxastic personae are demonstrated by multiple locations in concert with one another.22 
Although identification may very well be an element of how individuals come to participate in 
demonstrations of democratic doxai, I am less interested in explaining psychic processes than I 
am with establishing an account of the techniques and mechanisms by which horizontal 
demonstrations appear and how doxai are contested within them. My concern with how 
collective personae enable the demonstration of collective subjects leads me away from what 
Jeremy Gilbert would call the “vertical” texts analyzed by McGee, Charland, Burke, and even 
Warner (speeches and books of fascist leaders, constitutions, white papers) produced by a few 
for the many — and toward more cooperative, participatory and “horizontal” texts such as 
petitions, community ordinances, resolutions, and collaborative histories.23 One of the central 
dimensions of the democratic rhetoric of the movement against corporate rights is that its 
collective personae are often simultaneously referred to by both the first persona (the I or we) 
and the second persona (what Edwin Black called the implied auditor and what many more 
recent rhetorical theorists call the subject position offered by the text) of their enunciations.24 
When the first and second personae are presented as the same entity, a collective persona is 
positioned as the author, source, or origin of an enunciation for whom that same collective 
persona is presumed to be the “audience,” for instance “we the people will not stand for this 
injustice,” etc. In cases where the first person plural persona (the persona referred to by the we) 
of an enunciation and the second persona of the enunciation’s audience blend seamlessly, there is 
a unique type of rhetorical event taking place that has a specific role to play in democratic 
rhetoric. Blending first and second personae in such an enunciation will probably always be itself 
available as an object of criticism by highlighting some level of difference between author/rhetor 
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and audience. Increasingly, however, various digital media technologies are allowing for the 
production of innovative versions of the demonstrative we of collective personae. These rapidly 
changing technologies offer a new set of possibilities for the enactment of collective personae 
through the demonstrative we, and different branches of the movement against corporate rights 
build on these possibilities with varying results. 
 The collective personae referred to by many of the we statements analyzed in what follows 
refer to the collective persona of a movement. I’ve adopted this persona to describe the collective 
entity generated by the texts under consideration for two primary reasons. The first is simply that 
the movement describes itself as such, and with a few exceptions, nearly all the texts I describe 
as being part of the “movement” also describe themselves that way at one point or another. There 
is an additional reason, however, to refer to this collection of texts and events as a “movement,” 
which has been suggested by rhetorical scholarship on movements over the past forty years. 
Michael Calvin McGee’s 1980 re-orientation of rhetorical studies of movements argued 
effectively that “movements” are not properly social phenomena that exist before they are named 
as such. A “movement” is constituted by the rhetorical declaration of its existence and ancillary 
rhetorical events.25 Kevin Deluca’s insightful defense of this position in 1999 offers an important 
roadmap toward establishing the relationship between rhetorical production of a movement and 
Laclau and Mouffe’s theories of articulation and radical democracy.26 Laclau and Mouffe’s more 
recent work indicates additional fruitful avenues for thinking about how movements are 
rhetorically produced through dissensus, conflict, agonism, and opposition to an enemy or 
adversary.27 In these accounts, populist democratic politics involve the articulation of common 
collectivity through doxai over and against another rhetorically constituted collectivity. There is 
a certain overlap between Laclau, Mouffe, and Rancière on the question of whether democratic 
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movement politics require opposition to another collectivity or instituted power bloc. For 
Rancière, however, democracy is the movement of those without power against the political 
ruling order, not simply a competing collective. For all of these theorists, however, democratic 
political movement is rhetorically constituted in part by opposition to its outside or other. 
 The movement against corporate rights requires a refinement and expansion of these 
descriptive approaches. The movement against corporate rights is most certainly a movement 
against an “other” that constitutes the ruling political order: corporations. But the movement does 
not simply define itself as being against corporate rule. It also defines itself by questioning the 
coherence and existence of corporations as they are currently constituted culturally, politically, 
and legally. This means that the movement against corporate rights doesn’t simply perform a sort 
of democratic “movement doxa” of attempting to reclaim power from an adversary, enemy, or 
police order. It also offers an epistemic account of what corporations are, how they have come to 
be, and how they should be defined that cuts against the stable legal sense of corporate 
personhood that has accreted over the past 150 years. This deliberate use of epistemic (or anti-
doxastic) rhetoric by the movement against corporate rights indicates an important role for 
dissensual critique in the process of performing the democratic doxai of self-constitution through 
opposition. Opposition, it seems, may not simply be to an other, but can consist of establishing a 
distinction between that other, the way that it is named, and the doxai regarding its existence and 
importance. My argument is that unpacking the significance of this aspect of democratic 
movement doxai is aided by understanding how dissensual techniques of critiquing undemocratic 
doxai contribute to the demonstration of the subject position of the demos and acting out the 
doxai of democracy, which is the topic of the next section. 
Critiquing Doxa: Articulation and Genealogy 
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 Although there are many methods for enacting dissensus through critique, the movement 
against corporate rights often gravitates toward something like genealogy. This is, perhaps, the 
result of the movement’s consistent focus on United States law as a site of power, politics, and 
potential transformation. The common law tradition of the U.S. requires perpetual revisiting of 
past law as a resource for precedent in the name of both stability and change. Some elements of 
the movement adopt what Larry Kramer has called a “popular constitutionalist” stance by 
claiming that the most important source of Constitutional interpretation is the will of the 
people.28 Other elements of the movement see local legal sovereignty as the answer to the 
excesses of corporate influence at the national level.29 But the common focus on the law in the 
movement means that telling the history of how that law came to be is an important strategy for 
changing it. 
 As a result, the critical method of genealogy resonates with how the movement can and 
does contest the doxai of corporate rights. As one of the most well-traveled methods of critique 
in the past thirty years, genealogy can be briefly characterized as the practice of mapping the 
past to critique the present. Michel Foucault’s development of Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy 
has been the primary banner that such attempts to re-articulate doxa have marched under.30 
Genealogy has the potential to operate as a specific type of dissensual democratic re-articulation 
of doxai such as the ongoing, stable sense of corporations as natural, rights-bearing communities 
that exist prior to the law and are recognized by the law. 
 Genealogy is often understood as an alternative to the type of ideology critique that aims to 
“unmask” discourses that obscure relations of power. For instance, some theorists of doxa, such 
as Pierre Bourdieu and Roland Barthes, rely on a concept of doxa that is quite similar to 
“ideology.”31 For these theorists and their followers, the task of critique is much like “revealing” 
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the truth behind appearances. Genealogists position themselves not as revealing what doxa hides, 
but rather as mapping doxa and its effects on discourse, power, and institutions. The distinction 
between “revealing” and genealogically “mapping” is often posed rather starkly. 
 In practice, however, the distinction between genealogy and ideology critique is fairly fine-
grained. The approach of Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon to the concept of “dependency” in 
welfare policy is perhaps a typical expression of how genealogy has been practiced as a close 
companion of ideology critique.32 Fraser and Gordon describe how their own genealogical 
method results from combining the insights of Foucault and Bourdieu in such a way as to 
emphasize the critical potential of excavating “broad historical shifts in linguistic usage that can 
rarely be attributed to specific agents.”33 The genealogical method is founded on the premise that 
discussing otherwise undiscussed doxai is not a matter of achieving a “new” or more accurate 
account of the world. Instead, it bypasses the task of definitively theorizing doxa itself to operate 
from the premise that stable, doxastic material can be turned against other doxai in the interests 
of the present moment.  
 In addition to drawing generally on both Foucault and Bourdieu, Fraser and Gordon also 
point toward how an effort to unpack the history of a term like “dependency” requires an account 
of how and why such specific concepts are important sites of genealogical research. For Fraser 
and Gordon, Raymond Williams’ focus on “keywords” is a significant contribution to the project 
of accounting for the politics of fluctuating vocabularies. Fraser and Gordon seem to be 
interested in the Keywords project simply because it focuses attention on polysemous words. In 
Williams’ Keywords project, however, we find an approach to describing the articulations of 
doxai that differs substantially from the historicized ideology-critique of “dependency” 
conducted by Fraser and Gordon.34 Where Fraser and Gordon explicitly state their intention to 
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“dispel the doxa surrounding current U.S. discussions of dependency by reconstructing that 
term's genealogy,” Williams’ Keywords project does not attempt to “dispel” anything.35 Instead, 
Keywords and its updated companion, New Keywords: A Revised Vocabulary of Culture and 
Society attempt to affirm certain definitions of contested terms while simultaneously accounting 
for the contests, both popular and scholarly, that have shaped those articulations.36 The Keywords 
projects reflect an approach to critique developed out of a Birmingham-style cultural studies 
invested in the relationship between scholarship and popular culture as well as the institutions of 
knowledge-production that often receive attention from genealogists. Articulations of “the 
corporation” have undergone significant transformations in the past 200 years, and the 
contemporary movement against corporate rights seeks to further rearticulate corporations by 
critiquing the way that they have been articulated through democratic doxai such as “rights” and 
“community.” To that extent, genealogical and “keywords” approaches to “corporation” offer 
valuable insights into how dissensual critique is enacted at the level of the concept. 
 Scholarship in rhetorical studies also offers several ways to approach the enactments and 
rearticulations of conceptual doxai. Edward Schiappa, for instance, approaches defining 
philosophical and legal concepts as an activity that is part of politics and law and that should be 
investigated empirically according to the lexical parameters of existing usage.37 Alexander 
Lefebvre has developed a particularly forceful and generative model of specifically legal 
concepts and their perpetually transforming rearticulations. Lefebvre draws on Paul Patton and 
Gilles Deleuze’s accounts of philosophical concepts to clarify how the process of rearticulating 
concepts is fundamental to the structure of the common law.38 William Connolly similarly 
theorizes what he calls “essentially contested concepts.”39 One of the central themes of all of 
these approaches, as well as the technique demonstrated by Erik Doxtader’s virtuoso reading of 
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the terms “recognition” and “reconciliation” in human rights rhetoric, is the question of how 
social and political changes are expressed by conflicting articulations of doxai.40 This question 
goes far beyond theorizing the “ideological effects” of doxai on audiences. Rather, we find a 
deep and persistent question about stability and change in the doxa of concepts.41  
 Underlying these rhetorical approaches, as well as the Keywords projects, are various 
assumptions about why certain versions of concepts stabilize, and why they change. The 
genealogical answer to this question, if it is faithful to Foucault, is often “because of power.” At 
the level of political practice, however, this type of answer can be quite thin and unsatisfying. 
My concern, therefore, is not to compare and evaluate explanations for why definitions of 
concepts change, but rather to ask a question that takes such changes as the result of specific 
techniques: How can the dissensual gesture of establishing knowledge about articulations of 
doxai operate as part of democratic politics? Because my concern is specifically about the 
mechanisms for producing dissensus, critical approaches to doxai are more helpful than broad-
based explanations of the underlying causes for changes in articulations. In other words, the 
argument I pursue in several of the following chapters is that one of the ways to attempt to 
change what corporations are is through dissensual techniques that leverage knowledge against 
the legal doxa of what corporations are.  
 Cultural studies scholars of articulation following Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe and 
Stuart Hall have aspired to account for how knowledge enables various kinds of politics.42 While 
eschewing the most traditional forms of ideology critique, cultural studies theorists of 
articulation such as Lawrence Grossberg and Jennifer Daryl Slack argue that the concept of 
articulation bridges the gap between politics and the methods of cultural studies scholarship.43 
Chantal Mouffe, on the other hand, locates articulation specifically in relation to democracy 
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figured as the re-negotiation of hegemonies.44 Rather than describe dissensual democracy only as 
a type of hegemonic politics or only as a cultural studies method, however, I will argue that the 
dissensus in dissensual democracy is a type of articulation in that it is both a theory of how 
dissensus works and a method that can be adapted to produce dissensual politics.  
 While taking up the project of critiquing doxa shared by these theories of articulation, in 
the context of dissensual democracy I ask: what else can be demonstrated by efforts to re-
articulate reality? As a method, part of democratic articulation’s force is in its capacity to 
demonstrate the existence of the demos, the collective subject of democracy. Rhetorical scholars 
such as Barbara Biesecker, Christian O. Lundberg, and Nathan Stormer offer important insights 
about how critique and articulation demonstrate certain types of political subjects that are 
themselves articulated while disarticulating.45 When this rhetorical, performative perspective is 
reintroduced into the more general development of the cultural studies method of articulation, it 
provokes two important questions about critiquing doxa. First, what kind of collective subject 
position is demonstrated by critiques of the ways corporations have claimed democratic doxai 
such as rights? Secondly, what do scholarly critiques of articulated doxai need to demonstrate in 
order to engage in dissensual democracy? Dissensual democracy is not simply a matter of 
critiquing doxai, nor is it a matter of demonstrating a type of performative, sensible subject 
through doxai. It is both, together and simultaneously: critiquing undemocratic articulations of 
doxa while demonstrating the doxai of democracy in and as an emergent collective subject. 
 Building on these insights about the performativity of critique and its capacity to 
demonstrate an entity as it tells is how I develop genealogy as a dissensual democratic 
articulatory method. My overarching argument is that the critical disarticulatory techniques of 
the movement against corporate rights adopt the posture of attempting to critically disarticulate 
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democratic doxai from corporations in the law. This dissensual democratic critique and posture 
can be similarly undertaken by anyone who wishes to “join the movement,” including scholarly 
genealogies. 
 The chapters that follow describe how democratic doxai are both critiqued and performed, 
first, within the movement against corporate rights and second, in scholarly approaches to the 
movement. In the process of describing how doxai produce dissensual democracy, I will explore 
the tension between doxa and epistēmē in several registers of the critique of corporate rights. 
These registers include democratic theory, scholarly critiques of the movement’s use of 
democratic doxai, the relationship between critique and doxai within movement rhetoric, and the 
role of critique in the founding gesture of constituting new legal collectives. 
 In order to explain the relation of doxa and epistēmē in the movement against corporate 
rights and the methods of related scholarship, Chapter One establishes an account of how critical 
democratic theorists have approached the problem of democratic doxa. Critical theories of 
democracy, such as those in dialogue with Chantal Mouffe, Wendy Brown, and Jacques 
Rancière, tend to figure democratic doxa as the object of critique and/or as the material through 
which democracy is enacted. I compare these approaches by framing them in the context of the 
“paradox of politics” as described by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. This paradox is the problem of 
how democracy can be democratically established without democracy to bring it into being. 
Existing approaches to this long-standing political theoretical problem, I argue, can be 
augmented by considering the role of democratic doxai in the emergence of the demos, the 
collective subject of democracy. The emergence of the demos, I argue, requires both the critique 
of the representative failures of undemocratic doxai (which often pose as democratic) as well as 
the enactment of a specific class of democratic doxai called collective personae. The 
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combination of critiquing and enacting doxai is dissensual democracy, which requires that the 
tension between doxa and epistēmē be enacted through a collective persona that is itself doxastic. 
In other words, in order for critiques of undemocratic relations themselves to be democratic, they 
must come from “the people” or another subject that plausibly enacts the role of the demos. 
 Chapter Two analyzes a series of resolutions against corporate rights passed by local 
governments during 2012 as well as a timeline of rights and powers produced by the movement 
to map the history of corporate personhood. This analysis of movement rhetoric asks: what role 
does enacting the tension between doxa and epistēmē play in dissensual democratic events? How 
do enactments of democratic doxai demonstrate the demos? This chapter takes up the question of 
how the movement against corporate rights itself enacts critique in the process of demonstrating 
a collective subject through collective personae. Based on this analysis, I argue that the broad 
gesture of critiquing democratic doxai while enacting democratic doxai produces the sense that a 
democratic event is happening — the event of the appearance of the demos. This dissensual 
event is the collision of doxai through the enactment of the assumption that there is a tension 
between doxa and epistēmē. 
 Chapter Three examines the democratic importance of the tension between doxa and 
epistēmē in another register: the relationship between scholarly description and critique of 
democratic doxai such as ‘petitions of the people.’ During the 2012 election cycle, the movement 
against corporate rights circulated many online petitions that enacted several demotic collective 
personae. Chapter Three describes these petitions and the collective personae that enunciated the 
petitions as democratic doxai and asks whether these particular democratic doxai are an 
expression of democracy or an occlusion of undemocratic relations hidden by the liberal political 
technique of petitioning. In analyzing the features of various petitioning technologies and the 
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rhetorical culture they contribute to, this chapter demonstrates the difference between the distinct 
but interrelated approaches of critiquing and describing democratic doxai such as petitions of 
‘the people.’ The first approach is to enact a dissensual critique at the level of scholarship about 
such doxai, in this case, pointing out the ways that petitions fail to be actual democracy. The 
second is to identify and describe the democratic functions of such doxai, in this case, how 
petitions are actually a democratic technique. Each of these approaches, I argue, has something 
important to contribute to identifying the democratic potential of online petitions against 
corporate rights. Additionally, this analysis of online petitions against corporate rights illustrates 
the potentials and limitations of scholarly critique when dissensus is levied against the demos 
rather than in concert with the demos. 
 Chapter Four describes how six books that are part of the movement appeal to and critique 
specifically historical democratic doxai. These books demonstrate two important aspects of 
dissensual democracy. The first is the centrality of the first person plural we in the production of 
dissensual democratic collective subjectivity. The centrality of the we in these books 
demonstrates how collective personae can be performed by book-length written texts as they 
position themselves in relation to digital collectives. The second aspect of dissensual democracy 
demonstrated by the books against corporate rights is how they refine an even more specifically 
epistemic approach to critique. The books discussed in this chapter take on the task of telling the 
history of corporations as part of an effort to genealogically re-articulate democratic doxai. As 
such, they demonstrate the continuity in dissensual democracy between the protest techniques 
discussed in earlier chapters and more scholarly methods of research. The juxtaposition of the 
books’ two approaches to historical material — drawing on it to generate a sense of a 
transhistorical collective we and critiquing it as part of an effort to genealogically disarticulate 
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undemocratic doxai — suggests that scholarly genealogy may be an important critical strategy 
for co-enunciating democratic dissensus with the movement against corporate rights. 
Additionally, the democratic we in these books suggests that the critical theory and method of 
articulation needs a stronger emphasis on the performative elements of articulation and their 
relationship to making epistemic claims if it hopes to account for dissensual democratic types of 
articulation. 
 Chapter Five builds on these insights into dissensual democratic articulation to conduct a 
genealogy of the legal theory of the corporation. This chapter critiques the doxastic legal concept 
of the corporation by mapping a key historical moment in the history of the corporation when 
joint stock business corporations began to be theorized as natural entities that exist prior to the 
law. This historical event, around the turn of the twentieth century, was constituted by the 
importation of Otto von Gierke’s German organicist theory of corporation into Anglophone 
jurisprudence by Fredric Maitland. The genealogy conducted in this chapter reveals how the 
corporations came to be thought of as “communities” rather than as the legal tools to be used for 
the public good. The conceptual parameters of the contemporary legal definition of the 
corporation, demonstrated in the Citizens United decision, illustrate the significance of this legal 
theoretical history for the way that corporations operate through the law. It also suggests the 
potentials and drawbacks of using these legal theoretical doxai as part of democratic politics. In 
doing so, this chapter models a way of conducting scholarly critique as part of dissensual 
democracy that contrasts with and supplements the approach that is partially demonstrated in 
Chapter Three on petitions. One of the tasks this chapter on the genealogy of how corporations 
have come to claim democratic doxai is to demonstrate how dissensual critique may adopt the 
performative posture of mapping conceptual articulations to produce the rhetorical effect of 
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common participation in a collective persona – for instance, a “movement.” Instead of critiquing 
the doxai employed by movements (i.e., petitions of “the people”), the genealogy of this chapter 
takes on the project of attempting to genealogically re-articulate the same doxai as the movement 
(the political theoretical articulations of corporations as they have been codified in the law) by 
mapping the contingent production of their contemporary instantiations. 
 Chapter Six uses the genealogical framework of the doxastic legal concept of “the 
corporation” established in Chapter Five to take up the question of whether law, as an element of 
State-based governance, is an effective locus for genuinely democratic politics. I argue that 
describing the institutionalization of democratic doxai in the law helps to see the potential of the 
law as a site for the emergence of the demos as the founding event of democratic order. This 
chapter describes the efforts of the Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund (CELDF) to 
democratically found the legal authority of local place-based communities over and against the 
rights of corporations by passing local ordinances that codify the rights of humans and natural 
entities. CELDF’s community rights ordinances demonstrate two things: first, how the 
conceptual parameters of corporate legal personality provide doxai that are enacted in dissensual 
democratic politics; and second, how the gesture of claiming to rightfully be the entity that 
founds the State opens up a new way of thinking about State-oriented democratic politics. 
Returning to Rousseau’s “paradox of politics” from the first chapter, I argue that CELDF’s 
efforts show how the event of the emergence of the demos, without democracy to guide it, is an 
act of pure critique that attempts to found a new State through existing doxai. 
Conclusion 
 Corporate rights are an important example of how and why dissensual democracy’s 
attention to both demonstration and critique can be productive. Because many versions of the 
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critique of corporate rights rely so heavily on the most traditional doxai of “American 
democracy” (the intent of the Founders, the words of the Constitution, the colors of the flag, and 
the sanctity of the law, for instance), it is difficult to grasp how deeply disruptive to the fabric of 
economic activity and politics the critique would be if its goals were realized. The most centrist 
versions of the critique, of course, focus only on Citizens United and campaign finance issues. 
But the bulk of the critique lies far to the left of the campaign finance issue – a leftism that is 
belied by the nationalist doxai it demonstrates. The strength of the theory of dissensual 
democracy and its techniques of demonstration is that they can account for the dissonance 
between these liberal nationalist doxai and the goal of the critique without dismissing the 
importance of both.  
 The critique of corporate rights demonstrates how contesting the doxai of corporate legal 
rights enables the demonstration of other collective personae such as “the people,” “the 
movement,” or “the community.” Although these demonstrations are sometimes weak in that 
they don’t articulate a very powerful demos, analyzing their specific techniques contributes to a 
more thorough discussion of how the simultaneous enactment of demonstrating and critiquing 
doxai contributes to dissensual democracy. The result, I hope, is a way of conducting scholarship 
on democracy that does not reduce democracy to either a question of inclusion/procedure or 
whether it accurately describes power. 
 Dissensual democracy, because it relies on demonstrating collectivity through common 
critique, is a type of politics that can grow along with the techniques that enable demonstration. 
This is not to say, as overly optimistic scholars like Manuel Castells do, that new technologies 
offer protest movements “a process of autonomous communication, free from the control of 
those holding institutional power.”46 But as Jeremy Gilbert has argued, new media technologies 
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have a democratic potential that has yet to be realized.47 Part of developing this potential is 
exploring how the affordances of these technologies relate to the most ancient and productive of 
critical gestures. As these technologies make questions of membership and participation more 
complex, critical scholarship will have proliferating opportunities to join in with techniques of 
critique that, as Bruno Latour points out in an unintentionally ironic performative contradiction, 
are themselves becoming doxastic.48 The doxasticity of critique is not, as Latour so critically 
argues, a justification for a scholarly dismissal of critique. As scholars of political doxa can see, 
critique is only just beginning to gather steam. 
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Chapter 1 
Dissensual Democracy: When a Body Politic Just Isn’t Itself 
 
 Democracy is one of the central political ideals animating the movement against corporate 
rights. Denying corporations the rights of persons, according to the movement, is a crucial first 
step toward achieving greater democracy in the United States. Some versions of this critique 
identify corporate rights as the expression of the fundamentally undemocratic legal apparatus of 
the United States. As one organization puts it, “The structure of federal and state law – both 
statutory and constitutional – empowers corporations to override local democratic decision 
making.”49 Other elements of the movement hold out the hope that currently existing state and 
federal government structures are, at their core, expressions of a healthy set of liberal democratic 
principles. These more centrist critiques tend to focus on the goal of amending the U.S. 
Constitution so as to deny corporations rights. But for all variations on the critique, corporate 
rights violate democratic principles and must be revoked. As one book about the impact of 
corporate rights asks rhetorically, “Is it possible that what’s really incompatible with democracy 
isn’t socialism or a regulated marketplace but, instead, is the ultimate manifestation of corporate 
power – corporate personhood?”50  
 In order to explain what it means for the movement to position itself as the defender of 
democracy itself, this chapter attempts to clarify the general logic of ‘democracy’ and its 
relationship to State institutions. Can democracy inhere in institutions, or is it necessarily the 
ephemeral event of the appearance of the people? As part of that clarification, I argue that, when 
critique is an element of democratic politics, as it is in the movement against corporate rights, 
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democracy can be specifically dissensual. Dissensual democracy is an event that happens when 
the demos enunciates a critique that enacts the tension between doxa and epistēmē. While 
corporate rights are themselves the target of anti-doxastic critique, those critiques are almost 
always themselves enunciated in the name of other doxastic collective personae. For instance, 
the persona of ‘the people’ is often forwarded by the centrist branch of the movement as being 
the entity that should play the role of the demos. As one of the movement’s statements declares, 
they are “committed to social and economic justice, ending corporate rule, and building a vibrant 
democracy that is genuinely accountable to the people, not corporate interests.”51 At the same 
time, however, there is a tacit recognition within the movement that defining democracy and the 
identity of the real demos might not always be a straightforward endeavor. A book that positions 
itself as part of the movement begins its critique of corporate rights with an overt 
acknowledgment that both ‘democracy’ and ‘the people’ are contested terms that must be given 
shape and weight in the context of the contemporary political controversy: “Citizens United 
confronts us again with the basic question of American democracy – what do we mean when we 
say, as we do in the opening words of the Constitution, ‘We, the People’?”52 
 The flexible referentiality of collective personae such as ‘the people’ are what allows them 
to be theorized as ideological in the works of rhetoricians such as Michael Calvin McGee and 
Maurice Charland.53 Ernesto Laclau has provided tools for refining this rhetorical perspective by 
arguing that the function of such rhetorical personae is not so much ideological as part of the 
populist logic of politics that happens in hegemony.54 This is because such personae are empty 
signifiers that can be linked to an articulated chain of demands that are unmet by the existing 
political order. Laclau describes the formal logic of such articulations as populist reason.  
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 Unlike “populism” (and certainly unlike “ideology”) however, “democracy” has a more 
positive or idealistic political valence that shapes its logic. Although “democracy” comes under 
fire because it lacks a clear and specific referent, its status as what Kenneth Burke might call a 
god-term means that it is flexibly used to validate a startling array of practices. At the same time 
the concept is used to critique some of the very same practices and the way they merely pose as 
democratic; online chat rooms, local Occupy insurgencies, military invasions, American Idol, 
corporate campaign advertisements and full-scale governmental revolutions have all been both 
valorized as democratic and critiqued for their failure to be genuinely democratic. This tensely 
ambivalent dual occupation of “democracy” as validator and the basis for invalidation has led 
some critics, like Jodi Dean, to recommend that it be abandoned.55 The ambiguity of 
“democracy,” however, is a deeply productive source of critical political action – not only in 
opposition to corporate rights, but in a wide variety of contemporary politics that justify 
themselves in its name.  
 Seyla Benhabib reminds us that this ambivalence is not incidental because democracy, like 
justice or freedom, is an essentially contested concept.56 William Connolly suggests that this 
means that if we were to settle the meaning of such a normative concept once and for all, “we 
would be at a loss as to how to clarify or refine its boundaries when new and unforeseen 
situations arose. We would find eventually that a concept so cleansed would lay idle.”57 This is 
because, Connolly argues, the specific definitional criteria of a normative concept like 
democracy are precisely what is always in dispute when the concept comes into play. The fact 
that there are only temporary and partial agreements on the definition of democracy is what 
allows it to perform the normative function of generating evaluations of new political activities. 
Endless appearances of the contingent are one of the things politics must be equipped to deal 
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with, often in the form of evaluative judgments that draw on comparisons with past events. 
Neologisms such as deterritorialization lack the normative force of long-standing concepts like 
democracy and therefore can’t as powerfully enable claims about practices or forms of 
collectivity. The potential in the normative force of the concept of democracy means that 
defining democracy is a demonstration of democracy in the sense that it enacts a vision of 
democratic politics even as the specific definition attempts to explicitly articulate a relationship 
between rhetoric and democracy. The movement against corporate rights, for instance, defines 
democracy often and in direct opposition to undemocratic political conditions. Take, for 
instance, the definition of democracy articulated in the book Dollarocracy: How Money and 
Media Election Complex is Destroying America: “Dollarocracy is the antithesis of democracy. 
Whereas democracy has as its purpose the redistribution of power from elites to the great mass of 
people, Dollarocracy seeks to take the power back for the elites.”58 Similar definitions, carefully 
crafted to critique various social and political conditions, proliferate. They depend on the values 
the critique and collective subject articulate to demonstrate that sense of democracy. This 
suggests that attention to the relationship between critique and demonstration, especially as it is 
done through concepts that supplement the concept of democracy itself, may shed light on the 
technique that unifies democratic prescription and democratic critiques of doxa. The concept of 
democracy requires the perpetual re-posing of the questions of what democracy is and who the 
demos is, which are the questions that enable the enactment of the tension between doxa and 
epistēmē as part of attempts to make claims about what practices are “really” democratic and 
which ones only “appear” to be democratic.  
 A number of contemporary theorists of democracy take the relationship between 
democracy and critique seriously, although not all of them agree on a vision of precisely what 
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critique is or how it relates to democracy. Part of the task of this chapter is to sort out these 
differences and posit a way forward by defining dissensual democracy as a type of democracy 
that specifically integrates critique by presuming a tension between doxa and epistēmē. Jacques 
Rancière’s work on dissensus is an important beginning for thinking about dissensual 
democracy, but, I will argue, his account of dissensus must be supplemented with a fuller 
consideration of the potential of critiques of undemocratic relations.59 While Rancière offers a 
powerful way to explain the significance of performing democratic doxai, other theorists remind 
us that critiques of undemocratic doxai are just as important an element of democratic politics. 
Although theorists such as Rancière and Laclau emphasize the way that democracy happens in 
opposition to existing political order, such opposition is often strongly posed in and as a critique 
of the pretensions of such an order to be democratic and represent the true demos. Critique is also 
commonly used by scholars making arguments about democratic “fantasies” or “ideologies,” and 
can also demonstrate a collective subject that is performing the role of the demos when the 
critique is enunciated in concert as a demotic collective persona. The movement against 
corporate rights critiques those rights as it demonstrates its own status as the proper demos, and 
in doing so, it is an example of dissensual democracy.  
 The first section of this chapter describes how democracy has a fraught relationship to 
institutionalized political order. After describing Rousseau’s formulation of the paradox resulting 
from understanding democracy as both institution and event, I argue that Rancière’s approach to 
the paradox is an important innovation in the context of existing approaches because it provides 
a fuller account of the evental elements of democracy and the role of doxai in producing such 
events. After describing what Rancière contributes to this problem in the first section, the second 
section argues that he misses the mark when it comes to the potential of critique to contribute to 
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democratic events. Critique is not simply opposed to the democratic doxai Rancière favors; in 
fact, it also relies on such doxai and is central to democratic events. Dissensual democracy, I 
conclude, consists of both the performance of democratic doxai in events as well as critiques of 
the doxai that produce undemocratic relations through ossified institutions. The collision of 
doxai in the critique of failed political representation is the event of dissensual democracy. 
Democracy: Institution or Event? 
 The most precise formulation of democracy is to say that it is the rule of the demos by 
itself. This formula, however, begs for additional definitions of “the demos” and “rule,” while 
also suggesting that a difference between “the demos” and “itself” can be introduced by “ruling.” 
Democratic rule, therefore, consists in the techniques for introducing a democratic difference 
between the demos and itself. The question that has preoccupied many democratic theorists of 
late is whether “rule” that differentiates the demos and itself is comprised of institutions or 
events, and whether such articulated difference should be fixed or fluid. My argument in what 
follows will be that democracy should be primarily understood as an event that involves the 
critique of existing political institutions — in the hope that those institutions can be made more 
democratic. The result of this critique is that the demos appears through the demonstration of 
democratic doxai. Producing a sense that the demos is appearing in opposition to existing 
political order is what therefore constitutes democratic “rule.” 
 The earliest and most widely read modern philosopher to take up the question of how the 
demos can rule itself was Rousseau, who concerned himself specifically with the difficulties 
posed by the non-identity of the ruling relation between the demos and itself. Rousseau asks how 
a body politic can act to govern itself when government and the body politic are not the same 
thing. It is at this point that the deep and productive tension in modern democratic theory is born, 
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as Rousseau struggles with the question of how to theorize the establishment of a collective 
entity that he simultaneously presumes always already to have existed.60 How can a body politic 
that is natural, essential, and immanent to politics exist before it is made through proper forms of 
rule? Rousseau’s own words capture this paradoxical tension, which has preoccupied many 
political philosophers:61  
 
For an emerging people to be capable of appreciating the sound maxims of politics and to 
follow the fundamental rules of statecraft, the effect would have to become the cause. 
The social spirit which ought to be the work of that institution, would have to preside 
over the institution itself. And men would be, prior to the advent of laws, what they ought 
to become by means of laws. Since, therefore, the legislator is incapable of using either 
force or reasoning, he must of necessity have recourse to an authority of a different order, 
which can compel without violence and persuade without convincing.62 
 
The difficulty with democracy, in other words, is that it would need democratic procedures to be 
established as democratic. Another way of putting this would be to say that democracy both 
presupposes a demos and creates it; which comes first, the demos or the institution establishing 
its rule? Rousseau’s “legislator,” in the above passage, stands in for such processes, procedures, 
or events and is roughly equivalent to “democratic rule.” This means that the figure of the 
legislator represents the demos, not as a governmental institution, but as the way in which 
representation itself can happen. If democracy is merely a form of state-based governance, it is 
easiest to interpret the legislator as a literal law-maker – one who writes and interprets the letter 
of the law. Rousseau appeals to the “authority of a different order,” however, leaving open a 
provocative range of possibilities for understanding the role and nature of what mediates 
between the body politic and itself as legitimate rule. 
 This central problem of democratic political theory – how properly democratic politics can 
come into being without properly democratic politics to structure the way politics comes into 
being – is most easily addressed pragmatically by saying that the ongoing process of politics 
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should be self-critical according to the regulative democratic ideal, and the ideal itself is the 
legislator. But this provisionally satisfying answer fails philosophically on two fronts. First, it 
does not account for how it is precisely the foundational identity of the demos that is at stake in 
the development of ruling procedures for a demos. The identity of the demos cannot be thought 
of as an “ideal” in order to function as it should in the democratic process; it must be “given” as 
a real and proper identity. This argument, for instance, is made quite lucidly by Bonnie Honig as 
she discusses Jacques Derrida’s treatment of declarations of independence: such a foundation 
may be rhetorical but nonetheless must be enacted as essentially and incontrovertibly given, even 
if from “an authority of a different order.”63  
 Second, the pragmatic solution to the paradox does not account for the problems that result 
from how the democratic ideal can be interpreted in hugely disparate ways. In Rousseau, the 
persona of the legislator stands in for the entire massive and opaque set of epistemic, ethical, or 
rhetorical procedures through which democratic ideals might be enacted. The lack of specificity 
means that the “democratic ideal” is so empty that it would fail to be a productively functioning 
ideal – a failure that some claim is now upon us. The pragmatic answer is therefore unsatisfying 
and it begs for a more nuanced explanation of how the “legislator” constitutes the difference 
between the demos and itself. 
 Several types of democratic theory have taken up the project of describing more 
specifically what Rousseau’s legislator – the normative ideal of democratic rule – can be. These 
theories of democracy reject what Chantal Mouffe refers to as the “aggregative” model of 
democracy that simply presumes to count opinions; for these normative models of democracy, 
democratic politics must be based on the oscillation between prescribing more democracy and 
critiquing undemocratic relations.64 These theories, such as Jacques Rancière’s description of 
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democratic demonstration, Chantal Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism, Wendy Brown’s critique of 
liberalism, Jürgen Habermas’s deliberative democracy and Seyla Benhabib’s refinement of it, 
argue that “real” democratic rule is opposed to the dominant doxa of contemporary politics. For 
these theorists, democratic doxai have not already been established in existing institutions. 
Current doxastic state-based governance, they argue, only poses rhetorically as truly democratic 
and in reality continues to produce inequality and unfreedom. 
 For these theorists, collective consensus and collective will do not pre-exist politics but 
rather result (temporarily for Rancière and Brown, longer for Mouffe, or quasi-permanently for 
Habermas and Benhabib) from political activity. They all, however, oppose defining democracy 
as the self-expression of a functioning and holistic social body. Instead, democratic rule results 
from the way political principles like equality and justice structure and justify political actions. 
To that extent, they agree that the institutionalized democratic doxai must be intervened upon 
and they ostensibly oppose identifying the source of democracy in an existing and specific social 
collective (such as, for instance, the working class).  
 Rancière calls a presumed social origin of political order – like wealth, virtue, or identity – 
an arkhê and argues that a consensual collective body founded on such an arkhê lends itself to 
the formation of a functionalist community without democratic politics.65 Any presumption of a 
social origin for the political order is a form of domination, for Rancière, and he argues that 
“politics exists when the natural order of domination is interrupted by the institution of a part of 
those who have no part.”66 This ‘part that has no part’ in the dominating political order is the 
demos, which appears as it describes itself as not having a part. Jürgen Habermas similarly 
argues that democratic politics can’t simply be a matter of expressing a pre-existing community. 
He brackets the ethicalization of politics via collective identity expression as “republicanism” 
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and argues that the legitimacy of deliberative democratic procedures lies in the communicative 
rationality that governs their form rather than the way they express any particular nature of the 
social whole.67 The State cannot be the pure expression of the people, “constituted either by a 
sovereign citizenry or by a constitution.”68 The social whole, for Habermas, can only be centered 
apart from the State. Mouffe goes a step further than Habermas and argues that even attempts to 
constitute a non-State-based consensual whole should be abandoned.69 She argues that 
“circumscribing a domain that would not be subject to the pluralism of values and where a 
consensus without exclusion could be established” is simply impossible.70 All of these theories 
articulate a fundamental conviction that there can be no unified political whole that functions 
democratically within itself as a State.  
 The broad outline of what is shared by these theorists is a conviction that democracy is a 
normative project that must be exercised against the way that political institutions currently 
function as presumptive representations of the unified political whole. In this seed of shared 
commonality lies an important approach to Rousseau’s democratic paradox. Rousseau’s 
statement of the paradox arises out of assumption that founding a unified democratic people and 
its institutions happens ex nihilo. Democracy, however — both conceptually and historically — 
has always been a project that involves founding a people and its institutions in opposition to 
already an existing political order. Democracy is at its core a reaction to its absence that calls 
into question the capacities of institutions, processes, and governments to represent the demos. 
Laclau’s theory of populism comes close to describing this dynamic, but Laclau’s apparent 
conviction that material demands exist prior to their collection in political movements obviates 
the significance of the political ideal itself as a structuring logic of opposition to existing political 
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order.71 The event of the appearance of the demos can happen as the call for “rule” itself to be 
democratic: a correct representation of that demos, not just any affectively powerful signifier.  
 This is a claim that theorists who themselves attempt to create a collective persona of “a 
demos” must make in some version, especially when they reject the State or government 
institutions as the proper mediator between the demos and itself, as critics like Brown do.72 Other 
theorists of democracy, such as Paulina Ochoa Espejo, attempt to recover a vision of a 
legitimately democratic State by arguing that the demos is a “process” that includes state 
institutions.73 Chantal Mouffe’s recent work on agonism similarly articulates a hope somewhat 
similar to Espejo’s that state-based institutions can be made flexible and responsive enough to 
capture the dynamic ongoing contest of agonistic democracy.74 Habermas and other proponents 
of deliberative democracy clearly hope for the establishment of more democratic non-State 
institutions.75 Jacques Rancière, on the other hand, falls closer to Brown while arguing that 
democratic politics “doesn’t always happen – it actually happens very little or rarely.”76 To the 
extent that democracy is rare, it is an event of the self-assertion of the demos, rather than the 
State or other institutions. 
 When democratic theories critique static, corrupted institutions for their inability to 
represent the actual demos, they turn to describing “democratic rule” as various civil procedures, 
processes, or events. These attempts to rethink the democratic capacities of both institutions and 
events often search for replacements for the political concept of representation, which as Hannah 
Pitkin so aptly demonstrated, was never simple to begin with.77 Into the vacuum left in the wake 
of “representation” enter a variety of rhetorical concepts: deliberation, process, agonism, 
critique, dissent, agency, resistance, discourse, protest, demonstration, etc. These concepts 
attempt to re-figure “rule” as something that is not wholly determined by problematic and 
 37 
undemocratic existing mechanisms and that can therefore be a way in which the demos can rule 
itself. 
 Although all of these theories of democracy agree that democracy cannot and does not 
inhere in a unified totality corresponding to a single State, they diverge from each other when it 
comes to the question of the extent to which democratic processes can be institutionalized. 
Habermas and Benhabib offer the most institutional vision of democratic rule, while Rancière’s 
description of democratic rule as the event of enacting the role of the demos is the least 
institutionalized of the theorists mentioned above. Wendy Brown’s democratic critique of 
liberalism, derived from the work of Sheldon Wolin, echoes Rancière’s conviction that 
democracy is the event of a performed action.78 Chantal Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism, on the 
other hand, more closely resembles deliberative democracy’s search for institutionalized 
procedures or formalized and consistently repeated practices.79 Her vision of agonistic pluralism 
requires an ongoing commitment to principles of adversarial engagement, much like deliberative 
democracy. For Habermas, democratic rule requires a-subjective rationality institutionalized in 
certain argumentative procedures.80 The specifics of these procedures are themselves open to 
rational debate and their mutual acceptance by free and equal participants. Deliberative 
democratic procedures are semi-permanent techniques of representation that enable the perpetual 
re-contestation of doxa and the identity of the demos. Habermas declares: “The “self” of the self-
organizing legal community here disappears in the subjectless forms of communication that 
regulate the flow of deliberations in such a way that their fallible results enjoy the presumption 
of rationality.”81 This means that while “the demos” is present only as a conceptual category, 
“itself” is assumed to result, quasi-permanently, from the techniques of democratic “rule,” 
producing “the people” or “a/the public.”  
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 Mouffe similarly argues that democratic politics are fostered by encouraging practices and 
forms of life that allow for the passionate expression of democratic principles. While enemies 
engage through antagonism, which can be violent, adversaries agree on certain ground rules that 
foster passionate but respectful agonism. Agonistic pluralism’s representational “channels” 
might differ substantially from deliberative democracy’s “procedures,” but in both theories 
democracy generally inheres in a set of ongoing, quasi-permanent or habitual practices of 
political representation. In spite of their shared commitment to a theory of democracy that 
privileges semi-institutional procedures, both Mouffe and Habermas nonetheless theorize a space 
for the event of democracy within such procedures or institutions. While Habermas’s deliberative 
procedures and Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism advocate for more permanent democratic 
agreements, they also make provisions for the importance of the democratic event of the demos 
asserting itself as the proper subject of politics. Various theorists who have revised Habermas’ 
account of deliberative democratic procedures have emphasized how the assertion of exclusion 
and inclusion in the demos must be enabled by the regulative ideals of deliberative democracy. 
Benhabib, for instance, argues that “There are no prima facie rules limiting […] the identity of 
the participants, as long as each excluded person or group can justifiably show that they are 
relevantly affected by the proposed norm under question.”82 Feminist revisions of deliberative 
democracy such as those of Nancy Fraser and Iris Marion Young have gone further to argue that 
deliberative democratic theory requires substantial rethinking in order to deepen its ability to 
foster the inclusion of those who do not speak according to its norms of rational rule.83 These 
emphases on the question of who is included in procedures demonstrate how deliberative 
democracy can foster the event of the appearance of the demos through the codification and re-
negotiation of the doxastic boundaries of the demos. Although this “event” is only one element 
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of deliberative democracy, it is a necessary corrective to the unavoidable partiality of any 
political institution.  
 Agonistic pluralism also attempts to recognize that contestation of the identity of the demos 
is central to democratic politics. Mouffe says that democratic politics cannot be entirely 
institutionalized because, “The moment of rule is indissociable from the very struggle about the 
definition of the people, about the constitution of its identity.”84 For Mouffe, the ultimate 
undecidability of the identity of the demos means that agonism must be codified so that the 
identity of the demos can be perpetually and affectively contested. The event of such struggle is 
what agonistic pluralism is designed to preserve, albeit within the boundaries of certain 
agreements about how the event should take place (for instance, without violence). 
 Both Brown and Rancière assign the event of the self-assertion of the demos an even more 
central role in democracy. Brown takes the position that democracy is the event of the people 
directly taking up the reins of power rather than a set of institutional procedures. She draws on 
Sheldon Wolin to argue against a vision of institutionalized liberal democracy in which 
“Participation depends upon a preexisting political venue or activity that endures whether or not 
citizens participate in it.”85 She goes on to argue that instead, “By contrast, direct experience 
with power literally brings the democratic potential into being and when this experience 
subsides, as it inevitably will, democracy vanishes.”86 For Brown, democracy does not have the 
capacity to wholly transform politics or be instituted. Instead it occurs in “episodes.”87 
Democracy has a “restorative” function such that it is characterized by “occasional eruptions, 
limited sway, and inability to be a governing form.”88  
 Although Brown clearly understands democracy to be an event rather than institutionalized 
procedures, she does not provide a thorough elucidation of what democratic events consist of; 
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this is where Rancière’s vision of democracy has the most to contribute. For all of these theories 
of democracy, the gesture of enacting “the demos” through a doxastic collective persona such as 
“the people” is central to democratic rule – in other words, Rousseau’s legislator is the enactment 
of a demotic collective persona. Rancière, however, actually develops a robust account of how 
such enactment occurs and its stakes in the logic of democracy. He argues that democracy is 
purely the event of the interruption of domination by the part that has no part. He argues that 
democracy is  
 
The gap between a place where the demos exists and a place where it does not, where 
there are only populations, individuals, employers and employees, heads of households 
and spouses, and so on. Politics consists in interpreting this relationship, which means 
first setting it up as theater, inventing the argument, in the double logical and dramatic 
sense of the term, connecting the unconnected.89  
 
For Rancière, Rousseau’s legislator would be world-making poetics that happen as democratic 
action. Deliberative democracy assumes that the boundaries of the demos can be institutionalized 
and agreed upon and that a consensus produced in the form of democratic procedures can 
continue over time to be democratic once the consensus is no longer the object of deliberation 
and action. For Habermas and Mouffe, the legislator is a procedural agreement that democracy 
can reliably represent pluralism. In contrast, for Rancière democracy is a performative event, and 
when its result is institutionally fixed, even in semi-permanent representational procedures, it is 
no longer properly democratic. Rancièrean democracy is opposition to the unavoidable failure of 
already-instituted claims to democratic rule that have ossified in the wake of a previous 
democratic event. For Rancière, Rousseau’s legislator is an instance of speech that expressively 
demonstrates a new distribution of sense about the demos. For Rancière, democracy has an 
evental quality, where the event is the emergence of a demos that seizes power and expresses 
itself through existing doxai as the proper subject of politics opposed to the failure of the 
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dominant regime to include that demos. Although both Mouffe and deliberative democracy 
advocate for the institutionalization of democratic procedures, they still maintain an important 
place within such institutional mechanisms for the event of a demos asserting itself as the proper 
subject of politics. Rancière’s account of that event helps to flesh out what the role of doxai in 
the evental demonstration of the demos can look like.  
 Rancière’s account of this demonstrative event, however, comes at the expense of 
explaining how critique plays a role in dissensus. Rancière is quite skeptical of critique, 
especially when it is based on the assumption that there is a difference between doxa and 
epistēmē. In the next section I will explain Rancière’s account of the performative democratic 
event and why dissensual democracy should embrace the performative assumption of critique to 
act as if there is a distinction between doxa and epistēmē. 
Dissensual Democracy and Critique of Doxa 
 Habermas’s deliberative ideals, Brown’s critique of liberalism, and Mouffe’s agonistic 
pluralism differ in important respects but they demonstrate some common features as a result of 
their interest in critiquing existing political practices and structures. This legacy posits a central 
role for dissensus in democracy; democracy is not simply the event of “the people” appearing, as 
it might be in fascism or populism; democracy is dissensual in that it is a political principle that 
fosters a critique of the sense of the world as expressed by existing political norms and 
representations. Rancière’s theory of democracy is also dissensual and positions itself as a partial 
heir to a marxist political legacy, but it departs significantly from some of the assumptions of 
Frankfurt School critical theory that strongly shape the theories of Habermas, Brown, and 
Mouffe. Most simply, Rancière rejects the premise of a division between doxa and epistēmē, a 
premise that defines the critical theoretical legacy. He rejects the division between doxa and 
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epistēmē in order to attend more carefully to the aesthetic dimensions of how democratic doxai 
such as the principle of equality are performed in democratic events. After describing Rancière’s 
approach to doxa and dissensus in democratic events, I will argue that the performative 
assumption of a difference between doxa and epistēmē in critique is an important mechanism that 
can foster the democratic event of the appearance of the demos. If we take Rancière’s account of 
doxa and performance as the frame in which a sort of “doxa of critique” operates, we can see 
how the epistemic assumptions of Brown, Mouffe, and deliberative democrats can facilitate 
democratic performance — as well as what must be left behind from those accounts. The result 
will be an account of how dissensual democracy must encompass and deploy the force of the 
critical epistemic techniques while simultaneously demonstrating the event of the appearance of 
the demos. Critiquing doxa and demonstrating the demos through doxai are the elements of the 
event of dissensual democracy. 
 One of the problems that concerns Rancière about critical or “metapolitical” approaches to 
democracy is that they amount to little more than “interpreting the difference between one people 
and another according to some kind of symptomology.”90 Rancière wants to do away with the 
assumption, shared by critical theorists, that democracy requires leveraging knowledge against 
doxa to describe what it might mean to be free of ideology. Instead, he argues, doxai must simply 
be inhabited and performed for democracy to happen. Performing democratic doxai re-distributes 
the sensible and manifests an alternative world present in the background of any given claim 
about the nature of a demos.91 For Rancière, this re-distribution does not require a critique of 
doxa based on contrasting it with epistēmē. For Rancière, arguments and concepts are primarily 
expressive.  
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 Rancière explicitly disavows the distinction between information and metaphor; he argues 
that “political invention operates in acts that are at once argumentative and poetic, shows of 
strength that open again and again, as often as necessary, worlds in which such acts of 
community are acts of community. This is why the “poetic” is not opposed here to argument.”92 
For Rancière, arguments are not the epistemic transmission of information about a world and a 
demos that pre-exists the framing of the argument. The demos and its world are made sensible by 
the demonstration of a way of arguing that could and would make sense in a certain type of 
community, hence creating the community where those arguments obtain. The democratic event 
of making an argument allows the demonstration of a political actor through the theatricalization 
of the perpetual and unavoidable gap between the doxa of demos and the event of its appearance, 
a gap that Jean-Luc Nancy instructively calls the inoperativity of the demos.93 Instead of 
information, there is expression, which involves not the expression of a pre-existing subject, but 
subjectification through “constituting a kind of community of sense experience that works on the 
world of assumption, of the as if that includes those who are not included by revealing a mode of 
existence of sense experience that has eluded the allocation of parties and lots.”94  
 For Rancière the demos is retroactively defined post-rule by the techniques that generate 
the event of its appearance, an event that simultaneously interrupts the stable sense that the 
police order adequately represents a political whole. Rancière defines “the demos” as those that 
have no part in the ruling order until they put equality in dispute. The examples of democratic 
action that pepper his work suggest provocative possibilities for understanding how the position 
of the demos is demonstrated as doxa but against doxa. These examples, however, operate 
primarily as illustrations of the possibilities for enacting the role of “those who have no part” by 
calling for recognition as such by opposing the ruling order.95 This means that for Rancière, the 
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identity of a democratic actor and the ontological forces such as power or antagonism that bring 
it into being are ostensibly (although he is inconsistent and occasionally self-contradictory on 
this issue) irrelevant to the question of whether the event is itself democratic.  
 Rancière argues that epistemic strategies of critiquing doxa, especially those that critique 
subjectivity and ideology, do not and cannot demonstrate the demos. This is why Rancière’s 
position on “metapolitical” critical philosophy makes him an uneasy ally of critical and radical 
democratic theorists, in spite of interest in his work amongst those who see critique as a remedy 
to the absence of democracy.96 Rancière explicitly disavows the intellectual project of 
“describing power” along with rejecting the distinction between information and metaphor.97 He 
works outward from the assumption that democracy does not require self-reflexive critique of the 
conditions of determination of the collective entity enunciating the role of the demos. For 
Rancière, actors need not critique or understand their own conditions of subjectification in order 
to act democratically, and the boundaries of the public need not be determined empirically by 
tracing the consequences of policy or norms. Instead, democracy “cannot be defined on the basis 
of any pre-existing subject. The ‘difference’ specific to politics, that which makes it possible to 
think its subject, must be sought in the form of its relation.”98 The form of relation of politics is 
the form of “rule” or the doxai, such as the persona of ‘the people,’ that enable the acting out of 
the part that has no part. 
 Rancière’s account of democracy and his skepticism about knowledge-based techniques of 
critiquing doxai suggest a fruitful way of understanding the performative dimensions of the event 
of democratic demonstration. This is because he offers a very specific and robust account of how 
democratic doxai can be mobilized to produced the event of democracy, which is the appearance 
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of the demos. While other theorists explain why the demos does not appear because of ossified 
institutional doxai, Rancière points at the spaces where doxai are mobilized and enacted. 
 While embracing the democratic potential of doxai, however, Rancière neglects to 
recognize the potential of a specific type of doxai: those that enable the making of critical 
epistemic claims. Deliberative theorists influenced by Habermas, for instance, have produced a 
large body of work about the role of knowledge-production in democracy. While Mouffe and 
Brown depart significantly from many of Habermas’s assumptions about the rationality of 
knowledge, their work also demonstrates the tension between doxa and epistēmē that animates 
critique. All of these variations on critical democratic theory pose the question, in one form or 
another, of how knowledge production (especially as it is opposed to doxa) can be a democratic 
technique; they simply differ on the question of what knowledge is. Dissensual democratic 
critique, because it turns on the contrast between doxa and epistēmē, requires epistemic 
techniques to produce that contrast. Such epistemic techniques are themselves built out of doxai 
and accomplish the dissensual task of demonstrating the demos. The following account of the 
role that epistemic techniques play in defining who the demos is suggests the potentials and 
pitfalls of existing approaches to the relationship between doxa and epistēmē in the 
demonstration of the demos. If we take Rancière at his word that there is no real difference 
between metaphor and information, doxa and epistēmē, then we must evaluate and develop the 
epistemic techniques as effective doxai and take seriously the intuition that critique can 
contribute to fostering democratic events. While Habermas and Benhabib theorize the demos qua 
public, Brown and Mouffe theorize the demos qua subject. Both of these approaches fail to live 
up to the force of Rancière’s theory of the demos as a position that can be enacted via any 
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number of doxastic collective personae. Rancière, however, does not provide a theory of 
knowledge adequate to accounting for the dissensual quality of such demonstrations. 
 Habermas, and his key advocates such as Benhabib, embrace the democratic potential of 
knowledge in the most full-throated way. In its classical form, deliberative democracy advocates 
the establishment of structured institutional procedures that allow rational consideration of 
information. Because these semi-permanent representational procedures must generate 
epistemically valid accounts of states of affairs, they can also generate critiques of epistemically 
invalid accounts of “who the demos is” by positioning such accounts as mere doxa. In other 
words, they must employ an anti-doxastic critique. Rhetorically nuanced theorists of deliberative 
democracy like Thomas Farrell and Thomas Goodnight caution us, in concert with Rancière, to 
remember that any anti-doxastic epistemic claims must themselves also deploy other doxai and 
that deliberative rhetorical forms are not infallibly epistemic or rational99.  
 Deliberative doxai present themselves as rationally epistemic, however, as part of the way 
they pragmatically obtain rhetorical purchase. Deliberative democrats differ about whether 
knowledge should be a ‘truth’ claim that imparts information about a state of affairs that 
encompasses the demos and other aspects of the natural world or whether it might also be a 
Habermasian ‘truthfulness’ claim that involves the demos expressing itself about its own inner 
condition. Even a “truthfulness” claim is about an interior attitude or mood, so the claim is still 
an effort to knowledgeably represent the attitude or mood about which claims are being made.100 
In either case, however, claims are in an epistemic relationship to the inner condition of the 
subject or state of affairs that precedes them. The epistemic quality of truth claims and 
truthfulness claims means that those claims embrace doxastic techniques for attempting to 
accurately represent a subject’s beliefs or a state of affairs. As we saw in the last section, for 
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Benhabib the epistemic contestation of who the demos is must be done by establishing how 
“each excluded person or group can justifiably show that they are relevantly affected by the 
proposed norm under question.”101 Claims about a public are epistemic even if the “correctness” 
of the representation of the public is constituted by a doxastic, contingent set of assumptions and 
discursive conventions. This sort of pragmatic approach to establishing the consequences of 
norms and policies requires an empirical account of effects.102 Deliberative procedures are 
designed to permanently enable the perpetual re-establishing of the demos qua affected public, 
who it is, and who should be included in it. Techniques of critique, in other words, are built in to 
the procedures of deliberation in hopes that the procedures will foster the the ongoing 
reappearance of the demos in serial events. 
 For both Mouffe and Brown, critiquing the discursive powers that produce subjects, rather 
than publics, is deeply important to establishing a democratic account of the demos. The theories 
of subjectivity offered by these theorists are themselves the epistemic techniques that are 
essential to real democracy. Describing “the demos” qua the persona of “the subject” enables 
Mouffe and Brown to make recommendations about how properly democratic rule should 
mediate between “the demos qua subject” and “itself.”  
 Brown argues that subjects exist before democracy and that they have been constituted by 
discursive powers that exclude some parts of the whole from collective self-rule. To that end, she 
argues that “Encomiums from left philosophers and activists to ‘deepen democracy,’ […] will 
only be helpful to the extent that they reckon directly with these powers.”103 The important 
question for Brown’s account of truly democratic politics then becomes what it would be to 
“reckon with” such powers. It seems that for Brown, democratic reckoning would mean 
convening and mobilizing social subjects to self-reflexively transform themselves in opposition 
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to how they have been shaped by the discursively constituted powers of capital and religion.104 
This means, in other words, that for Brown democracy requires critiques of their own doxai by 
specific pre-existing and self-reflexive social subjects. Brown argues that a manifestation of full-
fledged democratic action would mean that the demos qua subject would have to possess a level 
of collective knowledge about the processes of its own pre-democratic subjectification that was 
sufficient to effectively reconstitute itself as a demos:  
 
Popular assent to laws and representatives is insufficient to fulfill democracy’s promise 
of self-legislation. Instead, we would have to seek knowledge and control of the multiple 
forces that construct us as subjects, produce the norms through which we conceive reality 
and deliberate about the good, and present the choices we face when voting or even 
legislating. Power understood as making the world and not simply dominating it – or, 
better, domination understood as fabrication and not only rule or repression of the subject 
– requires that democrats reach deep into polyvalent orders as powers for the grounds of 
freedom. […] And yet the notion of democratically ruling all the powers constructing us 
is absurd […] so democracy, to be meaningful, must reach further into the fabrics of 
power than it ever has.105 
 
If democratic “rule” requires a specific and knowledgable intervention by “the demos” in the pre-
existing discursive powers that it is undemocratically constituted by, this means that democratic 
rule also requires an accurate conceptual account of those powers. Unlike Rancière, for Brown 
this power is not just a formally defined police order that presents a whole which excludes some 
of its parts. Unlike Habermas, democratic rule would not just be setting up quasi-permanent 
procedures to properly describe pre-existing powers, but rather seizing those already-existing 
powers directly. For Brown, discursive power already exists and can either dominate or be 
harnessed by the demos to create itself rhetorically in a new discursive world. Because this is 
such a difficult task to achieve, it happens only rarely and is a significant event which is not 
governance but momentary resistance. When it happens, however, the event seems to have a 
significant epistemic dimension for Brown; critique is central to the event of the demos 
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appearing. Habermas leaves open the question of what specifically may be deliberated about 
democratically and Rancière leaves open how democratic action might redistribute the sensible. 
But for Brown it must be power that is deliberated about and described for democracy to occur. 
So she herself makes conceptual arguments about the modes of existence of discursive power 
and the ways that power constitutes the demos in and as a subject; the persona of the subject is a 
central, even crucial, dimension of much of her critical work and subjectivity is one of the 
objects of critical knowledge. 
 Mouffe, like Brown, joins Rancière in eschewing the idea that democracy is undertaken 
only by certain social subjects like classes, and Mouffe additionally seems to agree with 
Rancière that specifying the “social objectivity” of such entities is itself “the political.”106 
Mouffe, however, dances along the edge of this position by taking on the task of objectively 
specifying a great deal about the underlying conditions that constitute collective entities. Mouffe 
advocates for agonistic pluralism on the grounds that it is different than the antagonism that 
precedes it. In agonistic pluralism, the “enemies” of antagonistic relations would be transformed 
into agonistic “adversaries” through mutual acknowledgement of the shared desire to transcend 
antagonism. In other words, Mouffe argues that a pre-condition for democracy is consensus on 
the existence of antagonism as the founding dimension of subjectivity – so as to then agree on the 
desirability of moving beyond it. Adversaries are “persons who are friends because they share a 
common symbolic space but also enemies because they want to organize this common symbolic 
space in a different way.”107 This formulation of the structure of agonism indicates that a certain 
level of rational consensus is necessary on the basic epistemic procedures of argument-making, 
the existence of antagonistic subjectification, and which democratic doxai are most important. In 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau and Mouffe argue that democracy requires a common 
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“terrain upon which there operates a logic of displacement supported by an egalitarian 
imaginary,” and that this egalitarian imaginary is in part constituted by a shared discursive 
field.108 Agonistic pluralism seems to be the elaboration of the specific dimensions of the shared 
egalitarian imaginary as the consensual mutual refusal of the expression of a pre-democratic 
antagonism as combat. 
 Mouffe goes to great lengths to make a distinction between agonistic pluralism and 
deliberative democracy based on her supposed rejection of “rationality” as the legitimate basis of 
consensus that should precede democratic engagement. But there is a more substantial difference 
between agonistic pluralism, or what Robert Ivie has identified as a dissenting vernacular type of 
rhetoric, and Habermasian deliberative democracy.109 The deeper difference is Mouffe’s 
Schmittian commitment to antagonism as the ineradicable, even foundational, basis of all 
politics, including both democratic and non-democratic politics.110 She locates a threat to 
democracy in the failure to recognize the existence of antagonism prior to all attempts to 
describe it: “Alas, it is not enough to eliminate the political in its dimension of antagonism and 
exclusion from one’s theory to make it vanish from the real world. It does come back, with a 
vengeance.”111 The differences and conflicts that constitute the pre-political field are 
homologous, for Mouffe, with the differences and conflicts that split the collective subject itself, 
“an ensemble of subject positions linked through inscription in social relations, hitherto 
considered as apolitical, have become loci of conflict and antagonism and have led to political 
mobilization.”112 This means that the subject is the homology and the expression of pre-political 
antagonism, and the structure of that antagonism is the structure of the total demos that all 
political participants must recognize and agree upon in order to participate in agonistic pluralism.  
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 Mouffe performs elaborate theoretical gymnastics to continue Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy’s disavowal of a pre-political social as an objective basis for theorizing the political. But 
her complete dedication to defining the foundation of the political as “antagonistic” slips an 
epistemic vision of social objectivity in through agonistic pluralism’s back door. In Mouffe’s 
democratic philosophy, antagonism is the foundational logic of the demos. This means that for 
Mouffe the antagonistic demos is democratically different from its agonistic self only when 
“rule” epistemically recognizes the real foundations of political identity. Part of the task of 
democracy is to develop an adequately representational collective persona of the demos qua 
subject constituted by the antagonistic social and to disavow all rhetorical attempts to hide or 
mask the true nature of that subject. For Mouffe, antagonism is the result of power relations 
being expressed through accounts of the social which rhetorically pose as objective. Power does 
not happen between pre-constituted identities; it is instead the very process of constituting those 
identities in opposition to one another through affective attachments. From this assumption about 
the underlying foundation of the demos as constitutive antagonistic power relations, Mouffe 
concludes that  
 
To acknowledge the existence of relations of power and the need to transform them, 
while renouncing the illusion that we could free ourselves completely from power – this 
is what is specific to the project that we have called ‘radical and plural democracy’. Such 
a project recognizes that the specificity of modern pluralist democracy – even a well-
ordered one – does not reside in the absence of domination and of violence but in the 
establishment of a set of institutions through which they can be limited and contested. To 
negate the ineradicable character of antagonism and to aim at a universal rational 
consensus – this is the real threat to democracy.113 
 
This means that agonistic plural democracy has to know the existence of discursively constituted 
power relations in order to establish the proper common symbolic space for the agonistic 
sublimation of antagonism. It would seem that, although Mouffe has been at points deeply 
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critical of deliberative democracy’s advocacy of rational procedures for the resolution of 
difference, she would like to make an exception in the case of a consensus on the existence of 
antagonism as the foundation of the political and subjects. Because agonistic pluralism requires 
this consensus as the precondition for democracy, Mouffe’s vision of democratic rule requires 
that the difference between the demos qua subject and “its democratic self” have an epistemic 
dimension; the reality of antagonism must be known for agonism to take root. Her epistemology 
of conversion through the mobilization of political passion relies on the correct recognition of 
the antagonistic demos and the illusory doxa of political unity. To that extent, critiques of doxa 
are a central dimension of agonistic counter-hegemony: “What is at a given moment accepted as 
the ‘natural’ order jointly with the common sense that accompanies it, is the result of sedimented 
hegemonic practices. […] Every order is therefore susceptible to being challenged by counter-
hegemonic practices that attempt to disarticulate it in an effort to install another form of 
hegemony.”114 
 For Mouffe and Brown, differences and power are expressed in and as articulated subjects 
prior to democracy. Although these two theorists differ on a number of key points, they seem to 
agree that democratic rule must acknowledge doxastic difference and power by describing how 
subjects are discursively constituted. For these theories, the role of properly democratic “rule” is 
to critically conceptualize the operations of discursive power in subjects, thus epistemically 
mediating between the demos (structured by antagonistic social differences and discursive 
power) and itself (the image of that subject accurately described as constituted by discursive 
power).  
 The concept of the subject, in these descriptions, implicitly assumes that the task of a 
collective persona like “the subject” would be to accurately represent those pre-existing entities. 
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The event of democratic “rule” must involve techniques for describing how power functions to 
constitute subjects, and that process of describing is part of an effort to express the perpetually 
unfinished principle of those subjects ruling themselves rather than being ruled as subjects. This 
assumption that the task of concepts like “the subject” is to accurately represent pre-existing 
entities means that radical democratic theorists partake of some of the same epistemic 
assumptions as Habermas and Benhabib, at least insofar as they demonstrate a conviction that 
doxastic power and difference can be accurately represented.  
 Both Brown and Mouffe, working out of a critical tradition shared by Habermas, assume 
that knowledge of how discursive power constitutes the demos qua subject is a precondition for 
democracy. Explanations such as these tend to assume, or even explicitly argue, that politics 
cannot be democratic unless it is anti-doxastic – in other words, unless it confronts rhetorical 
forces like biopower,115 myth,116 capitalism,117 alienation,118 neoliberalism,119 fantasy,120 or 
antagonisms that constitute existing practices and subjects undemocratically. In sum, these 
positions seem to assume that democracy requires the critique of powerful discourses so as to 
reveal the real, material or institutional doxai of dominance and inequality that produce and are 
produced by those discourses. Much of this critical work assumes that the action of mapping how 
doxastic discourse produces subjects and social relations is important for democratic politics, and 
some even go so far as to argue that democracy can’t happen without such “deeper” knowledge 
of doxa.  
 Establishing this anti-doxastic description of subjectivity is much like a deliberative 
procedure by which knowledge of the proper boundaries of “the public” affected by doxai are 
established. Another way of putting this might be to argue that scholarship about subjects 
performs its Habermasian convictions all the time. But this call for knowledge about 
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subjectification does not necessarily translate into prescriptions for deliberative procedures for 
democratically establishing descriptions of subjects. Instead, Brown, Mouffe and the rhetorical 
scholars mentioned above take on the task of philosophically developing an account of “the 
subject” as what Deleuze and Guattari would call an antipathetic collective persona – a 
collective persona that produces bad feelings and that is the target of the philosopher’s 
criticisms.121 Critiques of undemocratic doxai often focus on how doxai produce antipathetic, 
dominated subjects – a focus that is common to many types of Bourdieusian, Foucauldian, 
Althusserian, and psychoanalytic theories of subjectivity. 
 For Brown and Mouffe, the antipathetic qualities of the collective persona of the demos 
qua subject are linked to the doxastic operations of discursive power. Their conviction is that the 
epistemic conceptualization of the operations of the doxastic subject-power-discourse cluster will 
enable the transformation of the demos qua subject from an antipathetic to a sympathetic 
collective persona. This attempt at transforming the affective valence of a collective persona 
through critique is a demonstration of a democratic sensibility as Rancière might describe it. For 
although Mouffe and Brown assume the representational or epistemic adequacy of their concepts 
of power, antagonism, and subjectivity, Mouffe and Brown’s demand for accurate descriptions 
of doxastic power enables the demonstration of a democratic sensibility regardless of whether 
power, antagonism or subjects exist. The part of the demos that is excluded by the ruling order, 
they argue, must be included, and reconceptualizing the demos qua subject enables a 
redistribution of sensibilities about that subject. Enacting dissensual critique in Brown and 
Mouffe involves making critical propositions about the doxastic powers that constitute the 
demos qua subject, while prescriptively enacting a subjects-knowing-themselves as the “ruling” 
that makes the democratic difference between the demos and itself. Just as when the boundaries 
 55 
of “the public” are re-established by contesting the existing boundaries as merely doxastic, the 
theory of subjectivity is re-established by deploying knowledge of power against the existing 
doxa of who political subjects are. 
 This self-reflexive democratic subject prescribed by theorists of subjectivity, however, has 
some significant political weaknesses. First, unlike the public, it is often individualistic and thus 
gives little impression of co-enunciating with other subjects. More important, however, is the 
difficulty of resolving the deep tension between the warring anti-pathetic and sympathetic 
components of the collective persona of the demos qua subject — as Rancière argues, it is 
difficult for such a tension to manifest in politics that go beyond a type of “symptomology.”122 
This deep tension between the subject-of-power and the self-knowing-subject almost always 
requires co-enunciative efforts to involve simultaneously critiquing other subjects. When 
democratic theorists attempt to re-conceptualize the demos qua subject, however, they are in a 
sense attempting to include the part of that subject that has no part in the ruling order and re-
distribute our sensibilities about the world. Dissensual critiques of doxastic undemocratic 
rhetorics or ideologies can potentially have important and deeply practical political functions 
precisely as poetic demonstrations of democratic doxai and their potential.  
 Critique need not focus on the manifestations of power in the constitution of subjects; it 
can be of other elements of the police order and its effects. Rancière assumes that dissensus must 
be aesthetic to the exclusion of epistemic techniques. As a result, he too easily dismisses the 
performative, poetic potential of contrasting doxa and epistēmē. His theory of democracy 
struggles to account for a movement such as the opposition to corporate rights that is based not 
simply on demonstrating the subject position of the demos (which it does), but that it does so by 
attempting to establish knowledge of how the legal rights of corporations have effects and have 
 56 
become institutionalized and doxastic. Embracing dissensual epistemic techniques for turning 
doxa against itself is the only way to understand the dynamic of stability and change that is so 
central to the concept of doxa and to the event of demonstrating the demos. When the critical 
techniques outlined above are not used to diagnose subjects but are instead used to diagnose 
inequality, for instance, they can easily and clearly contribute to dissensual democracy. 
 Rancière’s account contributes an important insight about how democratic events are 
produced – they happen through the enactment of doxastic collective personae such as “the 
people” or “the community.” But Rancière’s account of dissensus is limited by his rejection of 
epistemic forms of dissensus that can accomplish the re-distribution of the sensible. By so 
thoroughly dismissing the role of critique in democratic action, Rancière may be throwing the 
baby out with the bathwater. Dissensual democracy is not simply democracy — it also must be 
dissensual, and the substance of the critique of existing doxai is a necessary component of that 
dissensus. The enunciation of critique is a crucial technique by which the part that has no part is 
able to dissensually demonstrate its own existence and political priority. Although the collective 
personae of “the public” and “the subject” may not always be effective personae through which 
to enunciate such critiques, the core critical gesture of opposing doxa with knowledge is 
precisely what enables the demonstration of the position of the demos in dissensual democracy. 
The dynamic tension between doxa and epistēmē produces a crucial opportunity for 
demonstrating the demos. 
 Dissensual democracy must integrate Rancière’s account of demonstration in democracy 
with Habermas, Mouffe, and Brown’s insights about the importance of epistemic critique to 
dissensus. Rancière’s theory of democracy fails to account adequately for the role of critique in 
democracy, while other versions fail to adequately theorize the role of demonstration in the event 
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of the demos asserting its role in the political order. Dissensual democracy is the event of the 
appearance of the demos through the enunciation of critique based on turning doxa against itself 
through epistemic techniques.  
Conclusion 
 The critique of corporate rights is enunciated through a variety of collective personae. For 
the most part, however, I refer to the critique’s enunciating entity as a movement, which is a 
collective persona that has effectively spanned a variety of different types of discourse, including 
many types of scholarly and popular discourse. Demotic collective personae such as “the 
movement,” “the public” or “the community” are the personae that enact the role of the demos 
during the event of democracy. When claims are made that not all of the demos is being included 
in governance, deliberation, power-sharing, or other types of politics, it is a demotic collective 
persona that is presented as being excluded from political representation. These collective 
personae are demotic in two senses; first, in the sense that they play a specific role according the 
to logic of democracy, and second, in the sense that they are common, doxastic terms rather than 
specialized, innovative language.  
 The selection and analysis of these personae that follows builds on Rancière’s claim, 
discussed above, that doxastic personae are the material through which democratic politics are 
enacted.123 One of the weaknesses of “the subject” as a demotic collective personae is its lack of 
common currency. As a term of scholarly art, the way that “the subject” (individual or collective) 
is most often theorized is as being split against itself; if a subject must critique itself in order to 
act democratically, its ability to critique undemocratic actors and institutions may be weakened. 
Think, for instance of the claim, “We the people must begin to question how we have been 
constituted as the subjects of corporate rule.” Although this gesture is widespread in social 
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movements, it may not be a call to action so much as a call to inflict a practice of navel-gazing 
upon oneself and one’s allies. In order to demonstrate the demos, anti-doxastic critique may be 
better served by not being weakened as it is enunciated in and through a collective persona 
antipathetically divided against itself. Critiques of doxa need not focus on the constitution of the 
enunciative subject itself. Instead, re-making collective personae can be divided more clearly 
between the anti-pathetic and sympathetically demotic collective personae. By using a less 
divided or ambivalent collective persona than “the subject,” the oscillation between dissensual 
critique and democratic performance can be done by critiquing undemocratic doxai rather than 
fellow members of the demos. This would mean that the demos could appear by articulating a 
critique that did not require democratic speech to turn against the very entity that it would 
ostensibly be in the business of participating in and advocating for. 
 This leaves the the question of how dissensual democracy – opposing doxa with the 
techniques of knowledge-production while demonstrating the demos – can be developed in its 
strong version. The strong version of dissensual democracy recognizes the limitations of 
techniques of ideology critique while also acknowledging that critiques of undemocratic doxai 
can be quite effective.  
 The next two chapters take up two different registers in which the tension between doxa 
and epistēmē can be relevant to scholarship about the movement against corporate rights. In 
Chapter Two I describe several of the movement’s techniques, including passing local 
resolutions and disseminating historical timelines of corporate rights. These techniques both 
critique and deploy democratic doxai in order to generate a sense of a democratic event. These 
techniques show how dissensual democracy is the event of the collision of doxai as critiques are 
made and the demos is enacted. I argue that Gilles Deleuze’s account of sense-events is an 
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important supplement to Rancière’s theory of democratic demonstration and helps to build a 
concept of sense that can effectively account for the dual doxastic/anti-doxastic character of 
dissensual democracy, especially as it is enacted through critique. Chapter Three compares two 
ways of explaining the significance of one of the techniques of the movement against corporate 
rights — online petitions. Are such petitions simply a way of subjecting individuals to the 
mechanisms of corporate power, or are they democratic technologies that enable the 
demonstration of the demos? While making this comparison, I demonstrate how critiques of 
undemocratic subjectivization are important but limited and how the enactment of doxai such as 
petitions of the people retain their democratic potential.  
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Chapter 2 
Dissensual Critique in Demonstrations of Democratic Doxai:  
Move the Amend and the Event of Democracy 
 
 Corporations Are Not People: Not all protest slogans follow the same critical, 
propositional structure as this slogan. The slogan, which is the core statement endorsed by 
supporters of the organization Move to Amend, is a critique in miniature that fits clearly into a 
larger goal: changing the law that enables corporate personhood.124 Consider by comparison a 
slogan popularized on Facebook during the time of the Tahrir Square protests: We Are All 
Khaled Said.125 This slogan operates through the image of a specific individual – Khaled Said, a 
young man who was beaten to death by the Egyptian police. The statement We Are All Khaled 
Said can express a sense of the injustice of being subject to repressive force. The we of the 
Khaled Said slogan is enacted by those who are critical of power and how it is exercised. The 
immediate message of the Khaled Said slogan, however, is not a message of critique – it is an 
utterance of solidarity and common identity. Corporations Are Not People does not directly and 
immediately enunciate any we or sense of solidarity. Just because there is no we in Corporations 
Are Not People, however, does not mean that the enactment of a we is not crucial to how the 
slogan enables the demonstration of democratic collectivity. Corporations Are Not People is an 
explicit critique as well as a practice of demonstrating the collective entity that utters the 
critique. Enunciating the slogan allows for the expression of a sense of the common position of a 
critical, unspecific observer pronouncing judgment on the failure of a word, “people,” to 
adequately represent the entities that lay claim to it. Corporations Are Not People identifies 
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strategic and inaccurate difference between two types of entities and the language used to 
represent them: joint-stock business companies and flesh and blood humans with rights. 
 Techniques of critique are employed in the movement against corporate rights in an effort 
to alter a the way that the liberal democratic doxa of personhood has been institutionalized to 
include corporations. By describing the relatively static set of legal meanings that allow 
corporations to claim the rights of persons under law, these legal definitions are positioned as the 
unexamined appearance of things. One of the central claims of the movement against corporate 
rights is that corporations have claimed such doxai undemocratically—and against the common-
sense will of the people, who have a “sovereign right to self-governance.”126  
 The doxasticity of “corporate personhood,” I argue, is not a matter of the extent to which it 
is commonsensical or represents widespread public opinion. Corporate claims to the liberal 
democratic doxai such as personhood and rights have produced a sense of the stability, fixity, 
and inherence their own claims that have accreted over time. Critiques of such claims to 
democratic doxai, in turn, reinforce the sense that such claims are mere doxa and distinct from 
epistēmē. The movement against corporate rights argues that the legal doxa of “personhood” 
needs to be transformed according to democratic principles and uses critique to present 
corporations as not being properly democratic political subjects while demonstrating that the 
movement itself is a properly democratic political subject. The performance of the democratic 
collective subject is animated by the tension between doxa and epistēmē—which in this case, 
flips the assumptions that is typically made about how doxa is “common sense” and knowledge 
is “expert” or specialized. Instead, democratic doxai contribute to the static appearance and fixity 
of the law, while knowledge becomes the people’s technique of critique in the name of 
transformation. 
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 Corporations Are Not People. This slogan, however, also undeniably employs doxa. It 
exhibits a sedimented, naturalistic conception of “people” drawn in part from the historical and 
governmental articulations. In the public rhetoric of political activism, “People” quickly becomes 
“We, The People,” the national subject of the U.S. Constitution.127 The liberal doxa of 
constitutional democracy is the basis for the critique of the institutionalized doxa of corporate 
personhood: what does this enable us to coherently say about the role of doxa in dissensual 
democracy? 
 There are two important approaches to doxa in contemporary scholarship relating to 
democracy and critique. The first is the position that such doxai are necessary components of 
democratic politics. This position, common among rhetoricians and strongly advocated by 
Jacques Rancière, is that doxai are the material that politics, especially democratic politics, draws 
on to attempt to change the political order. The second position, advocated by critics such as 
Pierre Bourdieu, Roland Barthes and rhetoricians who take up their work, is that doxai, 
especially when they are complicit with power, should be critiqued in an effort to create change. 
These two positions on doxa and democracy echo the tension in the democratic movement 
against corporate personhood—on the one hand, it animates and enacts the doxa of democracy, 
and on the other, it critiques the way doxai reproduce power and misrepresent what corporations 
actually are: tools of capitalism rather than persons. This suggests that democratic doxa must be 
both what is critiqued and how it is critiqued as well as suggesting that a slightly broader 
perspective on “doxa” as part of a larger dynamic is required to unpack its role in the democratic 
movement against corporate personhood. The political activities of Move to Amend demonstrate 
how these two theoretical approaches to doxa are both required to explain the appearance of the 
demos, the collective subject of dissensual democratic politics. After distilling the core elements 
 63 
of the concept of doxa that are foundational to these two positions, I will argue that Move to 
Amend’s opposition to corporate personhood demonstrates why dissensual democracy requires 
both the demonstration and the critique of doxa in the event of the appearance of a democratic 
collective subject. In the final section I will argue that dissensual democratic events are produced 
through the dynamic tension at the heart of doxa, a dynamic that is helpfully clarified by Gilles 
Deleuze’s early work on sense-events.  
Doxa: Material of Democracy or Undemocratic Appearance? 
 Among rhetorical critics and theorists who focus on the democratic potential of doxa, 
there is a shared commitment to the position that doxai, including collective personae such as 
“the people,” are the a-subjective stuff out of which public discourse, utopian imagination, and 
relations of collective identification are made. J. Robert Cox’s 1987 Van Zelst lecture, for 
instance, argues that critical scholarship should use traditional material as part of an effort to 
create political change.128 Prefiguring decades of memory studies scholarship on how specific 
groups make political use of the past, Cox suggests that doxa is the material of the past—
traditions—whether they are currently “widely known” or not.129 As Carole Blair, Greg 
Dickinson, and Brian Ott argue, “understandings of and investments in the past change as our 
present conditions and needs change.”130 Andreea Deciu Ritivoi similarly positions doxa in the 
problematic of tradition and innovation and argues, based on Ricœur’s work, that imagination 
based on past doxai is central to transformation.131 She argues that Ricœur’s doxa, “the 
sedimented universe of conventional ideas,”132 is similar to ideology but without the pejorative 
connotations ideology has been given by suspicious hermeneutics. Doxa, in this Ricœurian 
explanation, enables change by allowing for the construction of an imaginative, utopian vision of 
the possible.  
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 For these theorists and critics, doxastic collective personae such as “the people” are the 
cultural resources deployed to generate change and conduct democratic politics. As discussed in 
Chapter One, Jacques Rancière’s account of democracy also treats doxai as the material required 
by democratic politics.133 Rancière draws on Plato’s equation of democracy and doxa while 
joining the rhetorical scholars mentioned above in rejecting Plato’s disdain for appearances.134 
Rancière, however, even more specifically accounts for the production of collective subjects 
according to the logic of democracy—a logic that is, as we will see below, central to the rhetoric 
of Move to Amend. Rancière argues that doxai such as the persona of “the people” can be 
enacted as versions of the subject position of the demos, the part that has no part in the ruling 
order.135 As discussed in the last chapter, for Rancière doxai such as the people are the material 
that enables the production of subjects; they are an enunciative position that can be enacted to 
produce a collective subject. His account of the role of performative language in democracy 
resonates with ongoing calls from poststructuralist rhetorical theorists to move beyond a 
representationalist conception of ideology.136 Rancière’s approach to theorizing the demos as a 
subject position ostensibly operates on some of the same general assumptions as Michael 
McGee, Maurice Charland, and other rhetorical theorists working out of a critical or 
poststructuralist tradition, most notably the general claim that collective subjects are discursively 
constituted.137 More specifically, Rancière’s collective democratic subject is like the individual 
rhetorical subject Christian Lundberg describes as “a retroactive process that both names and 
organizes the experience of an individual in discourse in the presence of others; as a result, 
practices of subjectivization are split between one’s lived experience and external semantic 
referents….”138 Democratic demonstration is an evental performance of the doxa of political 
equality. For Rancière, the “torsion or twist” of employing democratic doxa to demonstrate the 
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demos is the theatricalization of the perpetual and unavoidable gap between the demos and 
itself.139 Collective democratic speech does not come from a pre-existing collective subject, but 
instead is subjectification through “constituting a kind of community of sense experience that 
works on the world of assumption, of the as if that includes those who are not included by 
revealing a mode of existence of sense experience that has eluded the allocation of parties and 
lots.”140  
 The primary strength of Rancière’s democratic theory is in its contribution to accounts of 
collective subject positions rather than models of individual subjectivity. Rancière’s concern is 
with a specific type of collective entity – one that appears according to the logic of democracy. 
He argues that doxai such as “equality” and “the people” are enacted in such a way as to create 
subjects “by transforming identities defined in the natural order of the allocation of functions and 
places into instances of experience of a dispute.”141 As doxastic identities in the political order 
are enacted, “‘Speaking out’ is not awareness and expression of a self asserting what belongs to 
it. It is the occupation of space…”142 Such doxastic spaces are “the inscriptions of equality that 
figure in the Declaration of the Rights of Man or the preambles to the Codes and 
Constitutions….”143 These doxastic positions “are not ‘forms’ belied by their contests of 
‘appearances’ made to conceal reality. They are an effective mode of appearance of the people, 
the minimum of equality that is inscribed in the field of common experience. The problem is not 
to accentuate the difference between this existing equality and all that belies it. It is not to 
contradict appearances but, on the contrary, to confirm them.”144 Rancière’s position on 
demonstrating doxa is similar to what Robert Ivie has argued about dissent, which is that 
democracy requires a sort of “challenge [to] conventional wisdom on its own terms.”145  
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 Rancière adds to the existing rhetorical literature on doxa and politics a greater sensitivity 
to how specifically democratic doxai such as ‘the people’ generate a sense of the appearance of a 
collective subject. What he shares with many of the rhetorical theorists and critics mentioned 
above is the fundamental position that there is no foundational difference between doxa and 
knowledge. For Ritivoi, the doxastic material of this sedimented universe of convention is “a 
community-shared background against which arguments are formed,” political arguments that 
are never properly epistemic because they are always rhetorical in the sense that they are about 
the probable rather than the certain.146 For Cox, knowing involves remembering. But for Cox, 
and other scholars of public memory, this knowing is a collective remembering in order to 
generate changes in “our” doxa, and “arguments must be grounded in cultural interpretations 
(doxa) that in turn underly current practices.”147 This position on the indeterminacy between 
doxa and epistēmē unites these rhetorical theorists with Rancière, and understandably so. If 
“doxa” encompasses all the rhetorical resources of democracy, it also encompasses knowledge 
formations and epistemic claims. 
 The second broad approach to democracy and doxa is to critique doxai that mask 
undemocratic relations. The distinction between enacting doxastic appearances and unmasking 
what lies behind doxa iterates the broader strokes of the difference between Rancière’s approach 
and strategies of critiquing doxai. Rancière explicitly disavows the intellectual project of 
“describing power” along with rejecting the distinction between doxa and knowledge.148 His 
position on what he calls ideology critique makes engaging his work complicated for critical 
rhetoricians and others invested in marxist intellectual traditions, in spite of interest in his work 
in such quarters.149 In his justifiably enthusiastic drive to liberate democratic demonstration from 
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the necessity of accurately accounting for power, he puts aside the role that specific, contextual 
critiques have played in the dissensual demonstration of democratic subjectivity.   
 “Critique” is a very general term. Even in the narrower realm of critical intellectual 
methods that Rancière identifies as “metapolitical,” there are many different techniques for 
critiquing ideology and power. Nearly all of them, however, involve an attempt to produce an 
“interruptive” effect by leveraging epistemic or aesthetic novelty against the static, unexamined 
appearance of things.150 When these critical techniques are performed epistemically, they often 
involve establishing an account of the representational failures of doxai and how those 
representational failures obscure a deeper reality. Doxai, in many of these formulations, are 
appearances that cloud the vision of subjects. Rather than being the material that enables the 
enactment of collective subjects, doxai are posited as masking the true realities of how power 
and social differences are produced. 
 These accounts often differ most substantially on the question of where doxastic 
structures end and where subjects begin. The indeterminate zone between objective structures 
(say, for instance, ideologies) and subjective beliefs in these critical accounts replicates a well-
established ambiguity in the classical concept of doxa. It is precisely the way “doxa” straddles 
subjective perception and objective appearance that has enabled the concept to be adapted to 
critical intellectual methods. One of the most influential adopters is Pierre Bourdieu, who 
theorizes doxa as it relates to objectively existing structures and subjective practices of belief.151 
The Bourdieusian concept of doxa and its corollary concepts of orthodoxy and heterodoxy have 
been taken up by rhetoricians such as Dana Cloud to explain the capacities of images to shape 
the perceptions and beliefs of citizens.152 Raymie McKerrow, writing about the potentials and 
procedures of a scholarly practice of “critical rhetoric,” also draws on Bourdieu to argue that 
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doxa is the realm of the undiscussed — a realm that McKerrow, departing from Bourdieu, 
presumes can be counter-effectuated through discussion of its content.153 For these critical 
theorists, doxa is something close to ideology or myth but is distinct from it in important 
ways.154 Although there are key differences between Bourdieu and other contemporary variations 
on critique, in many of these treatments doxai have objective existences that can be described 
and analyzed as they appear in texts and practices that constitute subjects and their investments. 
 This focus on doxa’s effects on the subject, however, is precisely what the movement 
against corporate rights avoids in its critiques of corporate rights. Unlike “new social 
movements” that rely heavily on theories of identity-formation to craft their critiques and tactics, 
the movement against corporate rights has been more concerned with changing the law than with 
changing what subjects believe.155 Instead of describing the constitution of individual 
subjectivity, the movement focuses on what truths are hidden by doxai and the institutional 
formations enabled by corporations’ claims to the democratic doxai of rights.  
 This avoidance of questions of belief and focus on questions of truth points back toward 
the tension between doxa and epistēmē. The critical approach exemplified by Bourdieu, for 
instance, seems to enact the tension between doxa and epistēmē that is so central to the rhetorical 
tradition. Enacting this tension via critique is a gesture that strives to produce what is variously 
called novelty, innovation, rupture, change, or becoming. As we can recall from Chapter One, 
this is the core difference between critique and Rancière’s approach to doxa: Rancière advocates 
for enacting doxastic personae such as “the people” whereas critique attempts to interrupt such 
doxai where they have already established themselves—for instance, in the law of corporate 
personhood. Clearly, doxa is both what democratic politics attempts to change as well as the 
material it enacts to create those changes; both the Rancièrean and the critical approaches to 
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doxa help to explain the dual role of doxastic material in Move to Amend’s anti-corporate 
critiques. 
 The critiques of the legal history and social effects of corporate personhood gain 
rhetorical traction by relying on a distinction between their own epistemic validity and the 
illegitimacy of doxastic appearances. As Bruno Bosteels notes, Rancière’s dismissal of the 
democratic potential of critique pays lip service to, but ultimately glosses over, the ways that 
democratic dissensus may actually be produced in and through complex and mutually 
implicative “historical” or representational claims about the nature of power, entities, dominance, 
and other objects.156 Critiques of undemocratic claims to political equality that attempt to 
epistemically represent such relations, such as the sedimented institutional doxa of corporate 
legal rights do not declare a distinction between doxa and knowledge; instead, they perform it.  
 If doxa can be both the material of democratic traditions and undemocratic illusions that 
are critiqued, then democracy itself is the event of such doxai colliding. The contemporary 
rhetorical theorist who has perhaps come closest to capturing the dynamics of this type of 
collision of doxai is John Mucklebauer, whose theorization of doxa draws heavily on Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s What is Philosophy?.157 Mucklebauer argues that the rhythm of 
“opinion” is the structure of identification between the individual and the collective.158 
Mucklebauer joins Ritivoi, Cox, and Rancière in positing a fundamental continuity between doxa 
and knowledge, because knowledge is simply doxa that is turned against itself in the movement 
of becoming. Doxa is more or less the rhythm of common identification in Muckelbauer’s 
reading of Deleuze and Guattari. The question that remains after Mucklebauer’s analysis, 
however, is this: How can the punctual moments in the rhythm of becoming be accounted for? 
While there is an extensive Deleuzian vocabulary available to answer this question, it is often 
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difficult to identify how and where this vocabulary resonates with the vocabulary of critique.159 
Mucklebauer avoids this task while more or less disavowing the project of scholarly critique, 
which he characterizes as a “commitment to a dialectical image of change and to the movement 
of negation that engineers it.”160 Although Mucklebauer’s Deleuzian pursuit of an affirmative 
model of change is provocative and fruitful, it results in a model of doxa that is incomplete. In 
the final section of this essay I will argue that anti-doxastic critique is a necessary component of 
the “rhythm of the common” as Mucklebauer describes it. If doxa is conceptualized as being in 
dynamic tension with epistēmē, the collision between democratic doxai is the event of 
democratic sense. 
 Critique is the attempt to produce an event that cannot be reduced to changing what 
people’s “opinions” are. Within the logic of democracy that Rancière identifies, an event in 
democratic doxa is the inhabiting of one doxastic position in order to interrupt another. Enacting 
personae such as “the people” allows for critical enunciations against doxa to demonstrate the 
event of democracy. To that extent, it is possible for a critique that assumes the 
representativeness or the constitutive effects of discourse to contribute to dissensual 
democracy— if it demonstrates the event of the appearance of a democratic subject of 
enunciation.  
 Various ways of critiquing doxai would then be techniques for producing the larger event 
of democratic demonstration. Techniques for critiquing doxa are epistemic primarily in the sense 
that they are anti-doxastic. The “epistemic” or anti-doxastic gesture in dissensual democracy is 
less about implementing particular procedures for establishing empirically verifiable knowledge 
than it is about calling for change in static representations. In the course of acting out the tension 
between doxa and epistēmē in the context of the logic of democracy, an emergent collective 
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subject appears as the event of change in the political order. This is why the relationship between 
doxa and democratic collectivity is not a matter of how subjective opinions interact with 
discursive structures. Opposing doxa with epistemic critique is the only way to cause the 
collision between doxai that enables the sense of the appearance of a democratic collective 
subject. 
  The next section describes the operations of such anti-doxastic techniques and provides 
examples of how they are used by Move to Amend, an organization opposed to corporate 
personhood rights. I argue that Move to Amend’s anti-doxastic critique enables the 
demonstration of a democratic subject of enunciation, or in Rancière’s terms, a demos. The 
subsequent section describes how Deleuze’s work on sense-events helps to draw out how the 
“sense” in “dissensus” is evental. I will then conclude that dissensual democratic events such as 
appearance of Move to Amend happen by enacting doxai while critiquing doxai. 
Critiquing the Doxa of Corporate “Personhood” 
 The scare quotes in the title of this section proceed from a recognition of the contested 
nature of legal personhood that is centuries-old in trans-Atlantic jurisprudence.161 This long-
standing debate over whether corporations should receive rights as legal persons has reached its 
current level of visibility as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens 
United vs. The Federal Election Commission.162 The slogan, “Corporations Are Not People, 
Money Is Not Speech” spread widely in the wake of that decision.163 The movement against 
corporate personhood rights strenuously argues that the word “person” should be reserved for 
“natural human” persons, not corporations. This claim is made in opposition to the doxastic legal 
interpretation of “person” as a useful fiction that need not correspond to a set class of existing 
entities.164 In Western jurisprudence, legal personhood has been attributed to various entities in 
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order to accomplish practical goals.165 As such, it is generally accepted by the legal community 
as having no necessary correspondence to any qualities of actually existing entities.166 In other 
words, the movement leverages an essentialist, or what Edward Schiappa would call a “real 
definition,” of the word person against the doxastic legal term of art “person,” which has 
admittedly been defined pragmatically according to its contextual articulations.167  
 The critique of corporate personhood articulated by the movement does two things: First, it 
describes how corporations have claimed the democratic doxai of rights and personhood. 
Second, it embraces the doxastic democratic persona of ‘the people’ while enacting the role of 
the part that has no part against a ruling order. The parts of the movement vary in the extent to 
which they embrace specific doxai of democracy; for instance, some of the more liberal elements 
of the movement seek to redefine “corporate personhood” in and through an amendment to the 
United States Constitution.168 Move To Amend (MtA), an organization that has individual and 
group members, forwards one of the most extreme anti-corporate versions of the amendment. 
MtA’s amendment would strip corporations of all constitutional rights.169 Not all amendment 
proposals are as extensive as this MtA’s; some only propose to deny corporations free speech 
rights or to increase the authority of Congress to regulate campaign expenditures and 
contributions.170  
 By performing a critique of undemocratic relations wrought by corporate claims to the 
doxai of personhood, MtA performs two of the most popular techniques of critique: revealing the 
truth behind doxastic illusion and mapping the effects of doxastic discourse. The activists 
identify the concept of “corporate personhood” as itself being an illusion that masks the interests 
at stake in competing definitions of the term and argue that through new histories of the 
corporation “a vital hidden US history has returned to light.”171 Additionally, they map the 
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negative effects of corporate claims to personhood doxai as they have produced a variety of 
social and political problems, not the least of which is the exclusion of “natural” human beings 
from politics.172  
 Both of these modes of critique require a certain investment in the gesture of demonstrating 
the difference between doxa and the reality that underlies or results from it. In other words, the 
critique relies on performing the tension between doxa and epistēmē, with the assumption that 
the critique itself is more accurate representation of reality than the doxai it targets. Move To 
Amend’s anti-doxastic techniques provide precisely the opportunity for a demonstration of a 
doxastic democratic subject position. MtA’s critique of corporate personhood generally does not 
cite or mimic the specific theories of discourse developed in detail by scholarship concerned with 
the finer points of the relationship between subjects, institutions, and discourse. The critique 
does, however, enact the general tension between doxa and epistēmē in order to produce a sense 
that ‘the people’ are the proper democratic subject, not corporations.  
 Move To Amend’s critique of doxa demonstrates characteristics that are quite similar to 
what Paul Ricœur describes as being the core features of a critical hermeneutics of suspicion.173 
First, a doxastic illusion is marked as figurative rather than literal; second, the doxastic illusion is 
attributed to a causal source; third, secret artifices of the figurative and illusory doxa are 
revealed; and fourth, the subject enunciating the critique of doxa reconnects literal reference to 
the sense-event of its own appearance. The primary slogan of MtA and other activists, 
Corporations are Not People, Money is Not Speech, contains within it the central gesture that 
critiques of doxastic illusion relies on: distinguishing the literal from the figurative. MtA works 
in a number of ways that employ the characteristics of suspicious critique, but here I will focus 
on two rich examples: The first is MtA’s campaign to pass local resolutions against corporate 
 74 
personhood and the second is a historical Timeline of personhood rights and powers available on 
the MtA website for reproduction at MtA house parties, convergences, or rallies.174 
 As of the summer of 2012, approximately 240 municipal governments, states, city 
councils, townships, and other small-scale legislative bodies had self-reported on the MtA 
website that they passed or were attempting to pass ordinances or non-binding resolutions 
declaring that corporations are not persons.175 MtA was one of several organizations that 
campaigned during this time for municipalities and organizations to pass such resolutions.176 As 
part of the campaign, MtA offered a model resolution on its website that could be taken and 
modified freely by those who wish to join their critique of corporate personhood.177 The model 
resolution begins by declaring that persons are human beings and then enumerates the 
fundamental differences between human beings and corporations. Human beings require “clean 
air, clean water, safe and secure food,” while corporations “can exist in perpetuity, can exist 
simultaneously in many nations at once, need only profit for survival, exist solely though the 
legal charter imposed by the government,” and have “great wealth” that “allows them to wield 
coercive force of law to overpower human beings and communities.”178 This gesture marks the 
literal definition of “person” as synonymous with “human being” and distinguishes it from a 
figurative doxastic definition of “person,” which would include corporations: “corporations are 
not and have never been human beings.”179 The model resolution then goes on to identify the 
source of this misappropriation of democratic doxa as the Supreme Court, an unelected entity: 
“Interpretation of the US Constitution by appointed Supreme Court justices to include 
corporations in the term ‘persons’ has long denied We The Peoples’ exercise of self-governance 
by endowing corporations with Constitutional protections intended for We The People.”180  
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 After marking the distinction between literal and figural language and then attributing the 
doxastic illusion to an undemocratic, appointed judicial source, the model resolution goes on to 
refer to its own subject of enunciation as the demos. It does this by connecting the enunciation of 
the critique with a series of democratic collective actors, including MtA. After declaring that tens 
of thousands have already joined the movement, it offers a script for additional entities to 
demonstrate their participation in the collective critique of the institutional doxa of corporate 
personhood:  
 
Therefore be it resolved that (the City of, County of, etc. or organization ) ___________ 
hereby calls on our (legislators, elected officials, mayor, commissioners, etc.) 
___________ to join the tens of thousands of citizens, grassroots organizations and local 
governments across the country in the Move to Amend campaign to call for an 
Amendment to the Constitution to Abolish Corporate Personhood and the doctrine of 
Money as Speech and return our democracy, our elections, our communities to America’s 
human persons and to thus claim our sovereign right to self-governance.181  
 
 The self-referential demonstration of a collective subject of enunciation, however, extends 
beyond the text of the model resolution and its extravagant use of first-person plural shifters. The 
model resolution appears on the MtA website embedded within a variety of markers of collective 
enunciation. These include a banner that offers the opportunity to sign an online petition in favor 
of amending the constitution as well as a counter that tracks the number of signatures.182 A click 
on the “MTA Campaign Map” link in the “Get Involved” drop-down menu calls up an embedded 
Custom Google Map of the continental U.S. that toggled between pins marking Move to Amend 
Affiliate Groups, Endorsing Organizations, Events, and Resolutions and Ordinances.183 The 
dense array of pins generates a visual demonstration of the collective we enunciating the anti-
doxastic critique. Under the map is a link to a list of the groups, organizations, or municipalities 
that correspond to the pins on the map. Each listed name links to a page that contains contact 
information for that group. The “MTA Coalition” drop-down menu, accessible from all parts of 
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the site, contains links to additional information about involved parties like the National 
Leadership Team, a comprehensive list of local affiliates and links to their dates of establishment 
and a list of endorsing activist organizations and their sites.  
 The demonstration that constitutes the we of Move to Amend is the democratic subject that 
enunciates a critique of how democratic doxai have been misappropriated to produce the legal 
illusion that corporations have rights. The model resolution’s own enactment of the 
Constitutional doxa “We The People” is the entirety of this demonstration, and it is this 
collective we that is critiquing the undemocratic institutionalization of corporate personhood. 
The resolution enacts democratic doxa through its presentation of organizational plurality, a 
petition, and a visual representation of collectivity that occupies the position of Rancière’s 
democratic subject of enunciation, or ‘the people’ who are the part that has no part in the ruling 
order.  
 Move to Amend also critiques doxai by mapping the sense of corporate personhood 
directly in relation to a sense of the persona of ‘the people.’ These efforts are more concerned 
with the effects of corporate claims to democratic doxai rather than what such doxai mask. 
Mapping the effects of doxa is part of what Paul Patton, following Deleuze and Guattari, might 
call an effort to “counter-effectuate” corporate personhood.184 This type of critique involves first 
identifying the sense of a propositional statement in context in order to produce continuous 
variations in languages. For instance, the model resolution discussed above incorporates 
elements of an anti-doxastic critique of effects as it contextualizes the negative economic, social, 
and environmental impacts of defining corporations as persons.  
 Other documents produced by Move To Amend engage even more explicitly and 
thoroughly in this type of critique. Part of Move To Amend’s “Action Toolkit,” an extensive set 
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of documents offering instruction in how to translate Move To Amend’s agenda into local 
activities, is a “Timeline of Personhood Rights and Powers.”185 This document contextualizes 
corporate claims to personhood doxai with quotations from relevant Supreme Court cases, 
textual summaries of those cases, quasi-aphoristic commentary, and the dates of major events in 
U.S. history. These textual nuggets are scattered in graphic blocks along a timeline that stretches 
from 1772 to 2011. The timeline organizes various events along a horizontally split axis. Above 
the line are the gains and losses of rights and powers of “Corporations” and below are the gains 
and losses in rights and powers of “the People.”  
 On the most basic level, the timeline is an effort to define “corporation” and “the people” 
as collective personae that are inherently opposed to one another, and to that extent it 
demonstrates many of the most basic insights offered by theorists of populism about the 
bifurcated rhetorical field required of such rhetoric.186 More specifically, however, the Timeline 
describes claims of “the people” and “corporations” to democratic doxai within the context of 
historical events such as wars and strikes. This means that the timeline identifies the sense of 
such claims to democratic doxai by locating the sense of such doxai as the boundary, or as 
Deleuze would say, the film, between propositions about claims to doxai and the state of affairs 
that those proposition occurred in and affected.187 For instance, in its summary of the 1882 case 
San Mateo County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, the timeline states: 
 
It was argued that corporations were persons and that the committee drafting the 14th 
Amendment had intended the word person to mean corporations as well as natural 
persons. Senator Roscoe Conklin waved an unknown document in the air and then read 
from it in an attempt to prove that the intent of the Joint Committee was for corporate 
personhood.188 
 
This analysis of the way that the democratic doxai of the 14th Amendment—which declares the 
right of persons to equal protection of the laws—attempts to describe how such doxai were 
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illegitimately claimed for corporations in the Southern Pacific case. Additionally, however, in 
emphasizing the claim as a sort of erratic irruption and the original intent of the 14th 
Amendment, this description of the sense of the doxai in context also attempts to produce its own 
sense of the Southern Pacific case as the boundary with another state of affairs. The description 
of this is located close to descriptions of other court cases and floating, a-temporal aphoristic 
statements such as “Judge made law is not democracy” and “Three words not found in the 
Constitution: Slavery, Democracy, Corporation.”189  
 The Timeline’s effort to critique the way that democratic doxai have been attributed to 
corporations is accompanied by the demonstration of a collective entity that includes the textual 
and graphic features of the Timeline itself. For instance, the position of “The People” contains 
blocks of text referencing a variety of rebellions, insurrections, suffrage activists, strikes, and 
protests. The historical doxa of these movements and actions are the material that is drawn on by 
the Timeline to generate a sense of itself and its position. This graphic subject position of the 
People “below the line” also contains propositions about the Move to Amend coalition, a series 
of organizations in the movement, and a list of proper names that approximate authors of the 
Timeline. The web page that contains the downloadable Timeline PDF explains how the 
Timeline has been and can be used to demonstrate the context and goals of the movement.190 
This explanation occurs, in part, in the voice of Jan Edwards, who describes exactly what must 
be done to effectively print the full length of the Timeline at your local print shop. The page also 
contains two photographs of the full Timeline on display in a living room or informal office 
space with people gathered around it, smiling, reading and socializing. 
 This entity enunciating the anti-doxastic critique of the effects of corporate personhood 
demonstrates what Rancière might describe as the enactment of the demos through democratic 
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doxai. The Timeline and the model resolution generate a critical sense of the doxai of corporate 
personhood by mapping their effects and producing a fresh sense of this mapping activity as an 
enunciation of the People, those who are excluded from the corporate political order and are 
speaking in and as an event in the long history of the Timeline. In doing so, the Timeline takes 
an epistemic position toward corporate claims to the doxai of personhood that demonstrates how 
making sense of doxai relies on a gesture of representation to produce a new sense. By 
establishing historical knowledge of how democratic doxai have been institutionalized to favor 
corporations, the Timeline is able to juxtapose doxa and knowledge to produce a sense of itself 
as the democratic event of the appearance of the people. Both of these examples of how MtA 
critiques the doxa of corporate personhood suggest that dissensual democracy involves the event 
of the appearance of a subject who enunciates an anti-doxastic critique.  
A Sense of Democracy: The Dissensual Event  
 Move to Amend’s techniques of critique are ways of enacting dissensual democracy; they 
critique how “personhood” doxai have been undemocratically claimed by corporations while 
demonstrating a democratic subject of enunciation, “the people.” These critiques produce the 
event of a sense of democracy. Dissensual democracy occurs during the demonstration of the 
difference in sense between the appearance of the enunciative we of “the people” or “the 
community” and the critique of doxa articulated by that entity. It is not enough to critique 
doxastic rhetoric as illusory or having bad effects — the critique must be enunciated through a 
doxastic persona that plausibly occupies the role of the demos, the part that has no qualification 
to rule and yet is equal to the whole. This dissensual collision of doxai between anti-doxastic 
critique and demonstrating democratic doxai is what produces a sense of a democratic event. 
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 As discussed in Chapter One and above, Rancière’s account of this dissensual event 
emphasizes the appearance of the demos but neglects the role of critique in dissensus. Although 
the appearance of a collective subject such as MtA claiming to have no part in the ruling order 
and yet also claiming to be the totality of the collective subject that should rightfully occupy that 
position is to a certain extent dissensual in itself, without a specific critique of the ruling order it 
is difficult for such a claim to gain traction or advocate any specific change in institutional doxai. 
As the rhetorical theorists mentioned above have rightfully argued, and as Rancière certainly 
assumes, there may be no fundamental difference between doxa and epistēmē; epistēmē may be 
simply another form of doxa. But this insight does not then immediately explain the potential 
and effects of enacting forms of dissensus that are epistemic. 
 What is needed in order to explain the dissensual potential of such epistemic critique is an 
account of dissensus that does justice to the epistemic strategies of critiques like MtA’s while 
acknowledging the fundamental continuity between doxa and epistēmē posited by rhetorical 
theorists and Rancière. The concept of sense developed by Gilles Deleuze in The Logic of Sense 
is well-suited to the task; Deleuze’s concept of sense emphasizes how sense is part of a dynamic 
tension that produces events as the sense of states of affairs is described as part of producing a 
new sense. Mucklebauer, for instance, draws on Deleuze to argue that the distinction between 
doxa and epistēmē is itself doxastic; it is doxa all the way down.191 The result is that, for 
Mucklebauer, “doxa simply becomes the singular rhythm that structures the insistent (and quite 
real) distinction between the appearance of doxa and the reality of epistēmē.”192  
 This approach to sense offers a way to understand dissensus as the moments of 
differentiation within doxa that do not require recourse to Rancière’s exclusion of critique from 
dissensus. Democratic dissensus acts into and according to the sense of doxai (like the doxai of 
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“personhood”). If we retain the larger, more complex version of the concept of doxa in which the 
gesture of its critique is about attempting to change the articulations of doxai and not just 
subjective beliefs, anti-doxastic democratic dissensus produces the event of the appearance of a 
democratic subject through doxai while critiquing doxai. In an effort to re-build the concept of 
“sense” in light of the more complex concept of doxa developed above, this section will do two 
things: First, it will flesh out Deleuze’s notions of sense and event.193 Conceptualizing sense as 
event helps to explain how doxa is the material that is enacted in dissensual democracy as well as 
the material that is critiqued. Second, it will more specifically suggest how this revised definition 
of sense-event helps to further specify practical anti-doxastic critical techniques for enacting 
dissensual democracy. 
  Dissensual critique can be understood as a set of techniques that are dissensual based on 
how they alter or perturb the sense of doxa, in this case the legal doxa related to “person” or 
“corporation.” Deleuze’s conceptualization of sense offers an important expansion of Rancière’s 
approach to dissensus because of the way that Deleuze develops the concept in close proximity 
to the concept of event. If sense is an event that is not dependent on perceptual experience, as in 
a sense of the appearance of the people, the production of a sense-event will depend in part on 
the effective deployment of critical methods that target the fixed appearance of things that the 
speaking subject opposes. That would mean that dissensual democracy could be enhanced by the 
refinement and prescription of techniques such as the anti-doxastic critiques deployed by Move 
To Amend.  
 Rather than locating sense in the perceptions of a subject, Deleuze describes sense as the 
counterpart of something like stasis.194 This suggests the possibility of a sense-event in doxa 
without requiring a theory of a subject whose opinions are being perturbed. For Deleuze, sense-
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events involve bringing together two discursive series in a paradox or problematic. I argued 
above that enunciating the sense of doxa in context, as Move to Amend does in the context of the 
opposition between “the people” and “corporations,” is central to an anti-doxastic critique. 
Deleuze calls this type of action paradoxically regressive because any given statement about the 
sense of another statement can never denote its own sense.195 Jean-Jacques Lecercle’s discussion 
of the Deleuzian concept of sense and its relation to Deleuze’s concept of the event suggests a 
way of understanding the regressively paradoxical relation between the sense-event and 
enunciation.196 Lecercle argues that a paradox brings together two series, “it operates a 
distribution, if not of truth and opinion, at least of creative thought and common sense; paradox 
is the element in which sense qua nonsense emerges from common sense.”197 This means that 
the sense produced in the way the paradox circulates through the two series is not a Badiouian 
type of temporal event that marks a break in a linear sequence (e.g. Paul’s conversion on the 
road to Damascus).198 Instead, it is an event like “the battle” that hovers over a field and 
retroactively gives it an atemporal sense in multiple directions both inside and outside of linear 
time. The Deleuzian sense-event, or in the later terms of Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand 
Plateaus, the incorporeal transformation, is an attribute of bodies as well as the expressed of a 
proposition. Lecercle and others argue that this means for Deleuze (unlike Badiou), events are 
everywhere, all the time, impersonal, and infinitive.199 But even though they are a-subjective and 
a-temporal they are nonetheless attributed to states of affairs (for instance, to court cases). In the 
instance of dissensual democratic events this means that a sense-event, or incorporeal event, is 
also an attribute of the enunciative act of critique. Once an event is abstracted from a state of 
affairs, Deleuze says that it is counter-effectuated.200 This counter-effectuation of the doxastic 
sense of corporate personhood is performed by the speaker of the anti-doxastic critique (for 
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instance, the movement against corporate rights) who abstracts the event, describes it as a 
doxastic part of a state of affairs, and identifies its undemocratic sense. In the case of democratic 
dissensus, this enunciating subject effectuates the event of its own appearance while counter-
effectuating undemocratic doxai. So in the case of Move To Amend’s “Timeline,” the rights and 
powers of corporations qua the doxai of legal personhood are counter-effectuated by the 
enunciations of “The People,” who are both subject and object of the Timeline’s dissensual effort 
to generate a sense of the relationship between doxai and historical events. The passage of the 
local resolutions and ordinances, on the other hand, similarly counter-effectuates the rhetoric of 
personhood through the presentation of a collective subject enunciating the critique of how 
democratic doxai have been claimed by corporations. 
 In democratic, anti-doxastic critiques, the event of enunciation must be attributed to 
doxastic personae such as “the people,” “the movement,” or “the community.” The attribution of 
the enunciation to collective personae happens through techniques such as the first person plural 
pronoun we that Emile Benveniste argues is the signal of the act of enunciation itself and hence 
the enunciator: “This sign [I] is thus linked to the exercise of language and announces the 
speaker as speaker.”201 If this is the case, the event of the enunciation can be produced as the 
bringing together of two series or fields — democratic doxa (such as “the people”) and the 
techniques corresponding to the first person plural pronoun we. Critical methods are central to 
producing a sense of dissensual democracy because they demonstrate the event of a subject of 
enunciation that is anti-doxastic. Another way of putting this is to say that because a self-
referential enunciation critiques undemocratic doxai, it attempts to set its own self up as a 
democratic event in sense. This demonstration of the subject of enunciation is a way of acting 
out the part that has no part in the predominant sensible order — it is dissensual democracy. But 
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because the collective persona demonstrated need not have any pre-existing perceptual capacities 
or experiences, the demonstration itself is the crucial feature of dissensual democracy. Therefore, 
dissensual democracy requires critiquing doxai and the demonstrative event of a doxastic 
collective persona referring to itself as the enunciator of that critique.  
Conclusion 
 Although various parts of the movement against corporate personhood rights demonstrate 
differing levels of engagement with the doxai of liberal democracy, there is a strong tendency in 
the movement to embrace such doxai. What is remarkable about this is that it is done in concert 
with such a trenchant critique of contemporary liberal state capitalism; most such critiques 
eschew the doxai of liberal democracy.202 If Move to Amend realized its ultimate goals, it could 
mean a significant disassembling of the legal edifice that supports capitalism as we know it. And 
yet the stars-and-stripes persona of ‘the people’ leveraged against this edifice is just as doxastic 
as the target of their critique. The difficulty provoked by this tension suggests that it is the event 
of demonstrating the demos itself that is more fundamental to democracy than the specific 
articulations of democratic doxai.  
 Without the gesture of critical interruption, however, enacting doxai can simply be an 
affirmation of the existing political order. This is the risk of Rancière’s account of democracy; 
without identifying the role of critique in dissensus, democracy can simply be any fascist 
articulation of ‘the people.’ For democracy to be dissensual it must generate an alteration in our 
sense of doxa, the appearance of things that are unspoken and taken for granted. If critique is 
central to dissensus, it means that dissensual democracy only occurs when the role of the demos 
is enunciated through a doxastic democratic persona while critiquing undemocratic doxai. In 
other words, doxastic collective personae such as ‘the people’ can and do perform regularizing, 
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obfuscating, and ideological functions in the ways described by critics. But as doxai, collective 
personae are not simply subjectively held opinions or ideological appearances. They are also 
material that is available to be enacted in democratic events.  
 Dissensual democracy requires the collision of doxai through the enactment of the 
tension between doxa and epistemic critiques of representations. Anti-doxastic critique derived 
from strongly critical intellectual traditions can enable the appearance of the demos. What is 
hopeful about anti-doxastic techniques of critique is that they can be adapted to various contexts 
in concert with plural and shifting democratic subjects of enunciation. Critique, however, can be 
of democratic dissensus just as easily as it can participate in democratic dissensus. The next 
chapter shifts to a different register of critique to begin to establish an account of how scholarly 
critique can mesh with other registers of dissensual democracy. 
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Chapter 3 
Critiquing Democratic Doxai?: Petitions Against Corporate Rights 
 
On January 21, 2010, with its ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 
the Supreme Court ruled that corporations are persons, entitled by the U.S. Constitution 
to buy elections and run our government. Human beings are people; corporations are 
legal fictions. 
 
We, the People of the United States of America, reject the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in 
Citizens United and other related cases, and move to amend our Constitution to firmly 
establish that money is not speech, and that human beings, not corporations, are persons 
entitled to constitutional rights. 
 
The Supreme Court is misguided in principle, and wrong on the law. In a democracy, the 
people rule. 
 
We Move to Amend. 
        —Petition of Move to Amend203 
 This text is one of dozens of digital petitions against corporate legal rights that have 
circulated in the wake of the 2010 Citizens United ruling. Although some of the signatures on the 
Move to Amend petition have been gathered on paper and entered into the online bank, the 
petition is primarily a digital phenomenon displayed on the Move to Amend website. These 
petitions against the corporate rights codified in Citizens United and other court cases critique the 
fundamental legal bases of the economic and political dominance of joint-stock business 
corporations. This critique is presented in the name of ‘the people’ who are sovereign in 
democracy. But is clicking against capitalism meaningfully democratic or is it simply a 
consolidation and diversion of political impulses into “slacktivism”? In the terms of the last 
chapter, are the democratic doxai performed in petitions against corporate rights part of an 
ossified institutional structure that itself needs to be critiqued and transformed, or are petitions 
against corporate rights part of the demonstration of the demos in a democratic event?  
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 This chapter integrates two approaches to building knowledge about petitions. The first 
approach is to critique petitions as being merely liberal democratic doxai that bolster 
undemocratic relations. According to this argument, petitions shoehorn subjects into politically 
ineffective “slacktivism” and exploit them through digital surveillance. The second approach is 
to treat petitions against corporate rights as democratic expressions of ‘the people’ and to build 
knowledge about how and why they are effective critical contributions to democratic rhetorical 
culture. In the first approach, critique is enacted by scholarship. In the second, critique is 
described as an element of democratic movement rhetoric. In addition to describing some of the 
important variations in petitioning technologies and their potential to contribute to democracy by 
enacting a tension between doxa and epistēmē, I hope to demonstrate how the tension between 
doxa and epistēmē can be enacted by scholarship that is critical of the liberal doxa of petitioning 
as ‘the people.’ I conclude that scholarly critiques of the doxa of petitions against corporate 
rights are justified if the petitions fail to demonstrate participation in a specific democratic 
collective. 
 The ease of participation in digital petitions has led many to conclude that they are a 
relatively passive and inconsequential way to “express opinions” and reinforce the doxai of 
neoliberal state institutions. Stuart Schulman, for instance, analyzes environmental appeals to 
U.S. regulatory agencies to argue that mass email campaigns, a form of digital petitioning, are a 
low-effort, non-deliberative and ineffective way to participate in politics.204 Evgeny Morozov, a 
reliable skeptic of the political potential of new media technologies, argues that “slacktivist” 
techniques such as digital petitions may simply steer potential activists away from actually 
effective forms of political action.205 Underlying these skepticisms seems to be a conviction that 
petitions are too liberal, too easy, and do not sufficiently call into question the dominant doxai of 
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national politics. According to this perspective, petitions against corporate rights do not, as 
Wendy Brown would say, “seek knowledge and control of the multiple forces that construct us 
as subjects, produce the norms through which we conceive reality and deliberate about the good, 
and present the choices we face when voting or even legislating.”206 Petitions may not go far 
enough, get real enough, hit the mark enough, question liberalism enough, or smash capitalism 
enough. 
 The long history and persistence of petitioning should give us pause before we too quickly 
conclude that digital petitions simply reproduce powerful undemocratic institutions. Petitions 
may or may not accomplish narrow short-term goals, but they have the potential to fit into a 
larger sense of a political culture that facilitates political engagement through democratic doxai. 
Susan Zaeske’s history of abolitionism, for instance, argues that petitioning was the mechanism 
by which women took on the role of political subjects that eventually led to them attaining the 
vote for themselves.207 Such history suggests that both physical and digital petitioning, while 
requiring little time of those who sign and even failing to have immediate measurable results, 
have a certain kind of democratic potential. Much of this potential remains constant over the 
transition from quill and parchment to keyboard and app. 
 Petitioning is not just a matter of aggregating pre-existing opinions and attempting to 
effectively persuade an audience of the importance of a specific goal. It is also a technology “that 
enables the reformulation of the political subjectivity of the rhetors themselves.”208 It is, 
however, very difficult to get a sense of the democratic potential of digital petitions against 
corporate rights if we restrict our analysis to the level of individual behavior and psychology. 
David Karpf, for instance, argues that digital petitioning is used by advocacy groups because 
“they believe it to be an effective means of converting the resources they possess (an 
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attentive/motivated issue public) into power….”209 Petitions are part of larger networks and long-
term movement building. Any consideration of the democratic potential of digital petitions needs 
to take into account how they can demonstrate something more than the individual opinions and 
levels of investment of those who sign them. Their democratic character also can’t quite be 
reduced to the question of whether they accomplish the specific persuasive intentions of their 
composers. As Laura Gurak and John Logie have argued, digital petitions can “serve as 
community-centered documents, in much the same way that paper-based petitions might have 
grown out of collective discussion.”210 The petitions of the movement against corporate rights re-
direct concern with the role of petitions in individual citizenly subjectivity toward investigating 
how petitions enable the appearance of a democratic collective subject; the demos.  
 Concerns about the ease and context of digital petitions, however, are not completely 
misplaced; along with their doxasticity comes an easy integration into institutional politics. 
There are, for instance, plenty of indications that digital petitions are little more than a data-
gathering technique for political marketing firms. Recent research on “youth engagement” 
through petitions poses serious questions about the significance of petitions about popular culture 
and celebrities.211 Jodi Dean offers a more theoretically elaborate version of Morozov’s core 
argument that digital forms of low-effort opinion-aggregation distract people from actual, 
effective political action. The result is what Dean calls “communicative capitalism,” which 
consists of “a multiplication of resistances and assertions so extensive that it hinders the 
formation of strong counterhegemonies.”212 According to this logic, rebellious forms of opinion-
aggregation (such as signing a digital petition) provide just enough of a “safety valve” to keep 
people from getting more involved in strong political efforts that might make an actual difference 
and transform political institutions.  
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 Part of the basis for Dean’s critique is the observation that “political campaigns are 
indistinguishable from advertising or marketing campaigns.”213 Following this logic, petitions 
are little more than a sort of doxastic market-research survey or technique for building loyal 
customer base for institutions that occasionally make requests to purchase/donate/sign. Mark 
Andrejevic argues, echoing Dean, that “the goal of these strategies is not to become increasingly 
responsible to the public will, but to find ways of managing it more effectively before it 
expresses itself in action.”214 Another way of articulating this critique would be to say that digital 
petitions are not a vehicle for expressing the will of a pre-existing public or people; they are 
ways of managing political opinion by gathering data about consumer preferences so as to better 
sell political positions in exchange for donations. Because petitions are fundamentally marketing 
strategies, according to this critique, petitions are simply expressions of the general doxai of 
capitalist management techniques underwriting contemporary politics. The passivity and failure 
of subjects to more deeply engage is read as a symptom of the general dominance of doxastic 
capitalist communicative practices. 
 The role of the political consumer in this model is to perform the labor of clicking through 
petitions and asserting dislike of various phenomena without ever really engaging in substantial 
collective action. Signing petitions is not just ineffective; for Andrejevic or autonomist Marxist 
theorists such as Tiziana Terranova, “participatory” self-disclosure through new media 
technologies should also be understood as labor.215 Andrejevic argues that the labor of asserting 
one’s opinions generates a certain amount of monetary value for political organizations and 
campaigns.216 Data harvested from entries into digital petitions could, for instance, be bought and 
sold whether the petitioners donate or not. When conceptualized as labor, the simple, repetitive 
gestures of signing and commenting are merely another way to use new media to extract value. 
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Petitioners would not be ‘the people,’ the ‘working class’ or any such collective subject of 
meaningful political transformation. The mode in which petitioners “participate” in politics 
would not be real democracy; as Andrejevic argues, real “democratic politics, by contrast, 
promise public participation all the way up, as it were, to the goal-setting process itself.”217 The 
collective laboring population’s real interests and goals could not be expressed through petitions, 
which ultimately serve other purposes. 
 Rhetorical scholars of social movements such as Michael McGee and Kevin DeLuca argue 
that this type of approach misses the mark because it begins with the assumption that collective 
interests and opinions pre-exist political action.218 Much like Robert Hariman and other 
rhetorically nuanced theorists of doxa, they work from the assumption that “public opinion” does 
not necessarily precede its expression and articulation.219 Instead, they argue, an acting collective 
subject is the result of doxastic political rhetoric rather than the entity that possesses opinions 
and interests prior to their expression. This more rhetorical perspective on doxa avoids 
simplifying doxa as mere opinion and embraces a more nuanced appreciation of the role of 
articulations of doxastic material like the form of petitioning in the activities and events of 
politics. The question is not whether digital petitions correspond to the a “real” movement of the 
people that is protesting in the streets, building organizational structures or expressing its true 
will and goals. Instead, the question is whether petitions can generate a sense of such a subject 
and help to create it. McGee argues that in every case, not just certain instances of “good” 
collective action, “the whole notion of ‘movement’ is mythical, a trick-of-the-mind which must 
be understood as an illusion and not as a fact.”220 This means, he goes on, that “the rhetorical 
artifacts which warrant claims of ‘movement’ also give us concrete objects of study, for we can 
point to changes in patterns of discourse directly.”221 Petitions are clearly one of the doxai which 
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help constitute the movement against corporate rights. DeLuca argues even more specifically 
that this rhetorical creation of new ‘movement’ collectives is made by re-articulating doxai to act 
out antagonisms.222 The movement against corporate rights certainly describes and presents itself 
as a people’s movement, and in doing so, it attempts to call itself into being.  
 ‘Movement’ is not the only demotic collective persona that is articulated in the petitions 
against corporate rights. As I will describe below, the intense rhetoric of democratic ideals in 
these petitions frequently also articulates the collective persona of ‘the people’ as the petitioning 
antagonist of corporations. Digital petitions against corporate rights claim to be precisely the 
expression of the will of the people contra the will of corporations. Even more than most types of 
digital petitions, petitions against corporate rights adopt the rhetoric of democracy as the 
collective self-assertion of the people against the powers of capital. Additionally, the stated goal 
of petitions against corporate rights is the dismantling of the most effective linkages between the 
State and the primary tools of capital accumulation: joint-stock business corporations. This 
suggests that although the concerns of anti-techno-utopians and critics of liberal doxai like 
Brown are justified in many cases, they may not be accounting fully for the significance and 
democratic rhetorical potential of the more robust versions of digital petitions. Should a petition 
that aims to express the support of ‘the people’ for the democratic project of dismantling the core 
legal basis of capitalist institutions still be dismissed as a mere tool of capitalism? Is the only 
thing we can say about such petitions that they present a false image of a democratic action that 
merely conforms to the basic techniques of contemporary capitalist practice? 
 Answering these questions requires a clearer definition of how ‘the people’ and other 
collective personae operate specifically as democratic doxai. For Jacques Rancière, for instance, 
democracy does not require a lucid and thorough exposition of capitalist power relations, labor 
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practices, and communication techniques.223 For Rancière, democracy is simply the enactment of 
the position of those who are excluded from the ruling order. In other words, democracy happens 
when the collective persona of ‘the people’ (or some similar collective persona) is taken up in the 
name of righting a wrong and demanding equality or liberty. Rancière explains:  
 
Politics exists wherever the count of parts and parties of society is disturbed by the 
inscription of a part of those who have no part. It begins when the equality of anyone and 
everyone is inscribed in the liberty of the people. This liberty of the people is an empty 
property, an improper property through which those who are nothing purport that their 
group is identical to the whole of the community.224 
 
As rhetoricians such as Michael McGee and Maurice Charland have argued, personae such as 
‘the people’ that claim to be equal and free are always, in a sense, masks that can be enacted in 
order to stake a disruptive democratic claim against those in power.225 These personae are 
“empty” because they don’t belong to any specific social actor (say, for instance the “really 
committed” activist or leader who attends protests, builds organizations, and creates effective 
counterhegemonies). In democracy, collective personae are an effective technique for anyone, 
even slackers, to dissent. Ernesto Laclau makes a similar argument about the nature of ‘the 
people’ in his account of populist reason, which overlaps significantly with the political logic of 
democracy.226 Laclau argues that we should “conceive of the ‘people’ as a political category, not 
as a datum of the social structure. This designates not a given group, but an act of institution that 
creates a new agency out of a plurality of heterogeneous elements.”227 Laclau goes on to note 
that “naming is the key moment in the constitution of a ‘people,’ whose boundaries […] 
permanently fluctuate.”228 Part of the fluctuation of the boundaries of ‘the people’ happens when 
various groups and subjects sign on or affiliate themselves with various demands being made in 
the name of a collective persona. For both Rancière and Laclau, there is no unified “will of the 
people” that pre-exists attempts to articulate that will and demonstrate a collective subject 
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through a persona. In spite of Jodi Dean’s deep criticisms of what she sees as pointless and 
passive resistance through digital media like petitions, she similarly acknowledges that the 
beginning point for communist politics is also the concept of ‘the people,’ who are sovereign and 
unqualified to rule — she agrees with Rancière that the people are “the rest of us” or “the part 
that has no part” in the ruling order.229 The assertion that ‘the people,’ as the whole that can 
never actually be present, constitutes “the necessary absence [that] is the gap of politics.”230  
 These theorists suggest that the persona of ‘the people’ is a mask, a sort of doxastic artifice 
that is assumed in order to generate a sense of democracy. Rancière and Laclau, however, agree 
with rhetoricians such as DeLuca and McGee that all democratic politics is conducted from 
behind such masks. There are no “real” people out there waiting in the wings because such a 
subject does not exist before the event in which it asserts itself. Protests and petitions in which a 
claim is made that ‘the people’ want corporations silenced may be conducted through the same 
doxastic media technologies that enable corporate marketing. In that sense, digital petitions are 
not so different than the persona of ‘the people’ itself, which is used by corporations to assert 
their status as a democratic subject. As such doxastic masks, digital petitions are not necessarily 
less effective ways of demonstrating the democratic subject position of ‘the people.’  
 If petitions fail to accomplish such a demonstration of the position of the demos, however, 
we may want to follow their critics in saying that they are not democratic and that they are 
politically obfuscating data farms whose primary function is to generate profit for political 
marketing consultants. The sections that follow describe a number of digital petitions created by 
various branches of the movement against corporate rights. I will argue that not all anti-corporate 
petitions are created equal; some of them are more effective expressions of democracy than 
 95 
others. While many of them fail to go beyond basic data farming, others provide a much stronger 
sense of expressing the event of democracy.  
 To illustrate how petitions can function to demonstrate the position of the demos, the part 
that has no part in the ruling order, I will first describe two group petitions (petitions signed by 
collectives rather than individuals) against corporate rights and then move on to analyzing 
individual petitions. The group petitions discussed in the first section illustrate some of the core 
democratic possibilities in digital petitions and the second section develops that analysis through 
additional comparative examples. The first section will discuss two digital group petitions 
against corporate rights and the way that they differentially express a democratic subject based 
on whether they prioritize including a wide range of organizations or prioritize establishing 
critical knowledge about the depth of the problems of corporate rights. Interesting, the group 
petition enunciated in the voice of ‘the people’ expresses a much stronger and deeper critique of 
corporate rights while the petitions that includes more “movement organizations” offers only a 
shallow critique of the way that corporations have claimed democratic doxai.  
 The second section discusses a number of digital petitions signed by individuals and 
compares them based on their content and how their features present (or fail to present) a 
democratic subject that is effectively critiquing corporate rights. I then argue that democratic 
doxai like the petitions of the people must be both critiqued for their failures and lauded for their 
contributions to fostering a sense of the appearance of the demos as the entity that itself is 
critiquing corporate rights. The tension between doxa and epistēmē can be productive enacted as 
dissensual democracy in both of these registers: the rhetoric of democracy movements and the 
register of scholarship about democratic movement rhetoric. 
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Group Petitions and the Critical Depth of Unified Enunciation 
 This section describes two different group petitions against corporate rights. Michael 
Strange helpfully suggests that “group petitions,” in which the signatories of the petitions are 
organizations rather than individuals, have specific features and potentials for building 
movement networks.231 At first glance, these types of petitions seem fundamentally different than 
petitions signed by individuals. But this distance is precisely what allows them to effectively 
demonstrate the core rhetorical potential of petitioning, a potential that also exists in individual 
petitions. Because their sole goal is to demonstrate a collective subject, they effectively illustrate 
how democracy happens through doxai like petitions of the people. Because the signatories of 
these petitions are groups, the democratic potential of petitions can be demonstrated without 
getting too bogged down in the question of what type of individual subjects (Interpassive? 
Slacker? Perverse?) sign them and the extent to which the real interests and will of those subjects 
are expressed in the petitions. The conclusions drawn from analyzing these group petitions will 
help specify the democratic potentials of individual petitions in the following section. 
 The two group petitions against corporate rights discussed in this section are hosted under 
the names “Move to Amend” (MtA) and “United For the People” (UFTP).232 Both MtA and 
UFTP critique corporate rights. I will argue that there are two ways in which MtA presents a 
more strongly democratic version of petitioning. First, MtA’s petition is articulated in the voice 
of ‘the people’ itself rather than simply in the voice of political leaders attempting to represent 
the interests of the people. Second, because the MtA petition is articulated in the voice of ‘the 
people,’ it is able to present a more thorough, unified and deep critique of corporate rights as 
well as a more trenchant vision for how the US Constitution should be amended to deny 
corporations rights. UFTP’s group petition is more weakly democratic because it attempts to 
represent competing perspectives on how the US Constitution should be amended and it cannot 
articulate the critique of corporate rights by using the “the people” as the referent of the we of its 
own enunciations. Together, these examples demonstrate how analytically prioritizing the role of 
 97 
collective personae in analysis of petitions helps to unpack the potential of such personae to 
demonstrate a sense of democracy. 
 In January of 2012, in conjunction with the second anniversary of the Supreme Court’s 
Citizens United decision, the twenty-five year old liberal-progressive Washington, DC lobbying 
organization People for the American Way initiated a new campaign website called “United for 
the People.”233 On its front page the United for the People (UFTP) website declares itself to be “a 
portal to access current campaigns, upcoming events, and relevant information for activists and 
institutions who wish to support the efforts to amend the Constitution to rectify our broken 
democracy.”234 The UFTP front page explains that although the organizations listed below have 
their differences of opinion, they are united in their conviction that the U.S. Constitution needs to 
be amended in response to Citizens United. Immediately following this self-description is a link 
to UFTP’s Statement of Common Purpose.235 This carefully worded Statement of Common 
Purpose avoids taking a stand on one of the most contentious issues within the movement against 
corporate rights: whether to specifically target corporate spending on election campaigns or 
critique all corporate constitutional rights and corporate personhood in general. The UFTP 
Statement of Common Purpose highlights the timeliness and galvanizing force of the Citizens 
United decision while acknowledging that campaign finance and corporate “speech” are not the 
only concerns of its member organizations. In doing so, however, it deliberately avoids claiming 
to be the enunciation of ‘the people’ themselves. Instead, “we the people” is a collective subject 
external to the group of organizations. What unifies these organizations is not that they are ‘the 
people.’ Instead they are unified by their shared critique of the legal concept of the corporation. 
They have some different ideas about how and why that concept should be transformed, but they 
agree on the urgent need for a change. Because the nature of the change cannot be specified by 
the group, the Statement of Common Purpose only outlines its most basic parameters: “‘We the 
People’ does not mean we the corporations.”236 
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 One of the organizations participating in UFTP is Move to Amend (MtA). Although UFTP 
has a more encompassing statement of common purpose, MtA’s website had more than seven 
times the average monthly unique visitors than UFTP’s site between October 2011 and October 
2012.237 MtA was officially launched the day the Citizens United decision was handed down, 
January 21, 2010.238 MtA calls for “an amendment to the US Constitution to unequivocally state 
that inalienable rights belong to human beings only, and that money is not a form of protected 
free speech under the First Amendment and can be regulated in political campaigns.”239 The 
organization describes itself as “a coalition of hundreds of organizations and tens of thousands of 
individuals committed to social and economic justice, ending corporate rule, and building a 
vibrant democracy that is genuinely accountable to the people, not corporate interests.”240 The 
goal of amending the U.S. Constitution to deny corporations rights is central to MtA’s existence. 
MtA also has a list of undersigned organizations, but unlike UFTP it is not a project housed by a 
parent organization. MtA is one of the organizations participating in UFTP that advocates 
strongly for the abolishment of all corporate constitutional rights, not just increased regulation of 
corporate political campaign expenditures.241 
 Both group petitions use the techniques of listing the names of individuals and 
organizations that affiliate with them. Move to Amend’s list of endorsing organizations is placed 
less prominently on its site than the UFTP list, but its list is twice as long.242 Many organizations 
(for instance, Code Pink, Backbone Campaign, and Coffee Party USA) appear on both lists. 
MtA’s list includes more small organizations (like Health Care for All Oregon and Mainstreet 
Moms), churches, and Occupy chapters. Some of the largest national organizations in UFTP that 
advocate for a more limited constitutional amendment that would only address corporate free 
speech rights, like Common Cause and Public Citizen, are notably absent from MtA’s list.243 
MtA’s site also contains a list of nearly 150 affiliate chapters, many of which bear the name 
“Move to Amend,” and many of which are Occupy chapters that affiliate themselves with 
MtA.244 Additionally, the MtA site contains a list of its 127 “initial signatories” who signed on to 
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the original “Motion to Amend” that was made public the day the Citizens United decision was 
handed down.245  
 While the MtA site contains a range of other resources for activists and its members, the 
UFTP site’s primary purpose is to present a group petition—there is little else that the site seems 
to attempt. On the UFTP site, ‘the people’ do not enunciate the critique of corporate rights; 
instead, they are the collective subject that will hopefully benefit by having their interests 
represented by those groups who have signed on to the group petition. UFTP’s narrow 
commitment to listing organizations and politicians who support its very general mission binds 
its statements only to them, which means that it has enunciative collective personae such as 
“organizations,” “public officials,” and “activists.” MtA, on the other hand, makes frequent use 
of the nationalist collective persona ‘the people,’ as the entity that is referred to by its 
enunciative we. For instance, the language of the “Motion to Amend” endorsed by its initial 
signatories reads, “We, the People of the United States of America, reject the U.S. Supreme 
Court's ruling in Citizens United, and move to amend our Constitution…”246 This means that the 
we enunciating MtA’s petition is the people themselves rather than organizations and leaders 
attempting to represent them. One way of putting this would be to say that UFTP doesn’t even 
attempt to adopt the doxastic mask of the democratic ‘people,’ while MtA embraces it 
completely. 
 This difference might not seem terribly significant on its own. But the difference between 
the collective personae referred to by the we of these two group petitions accompanies a strong 
difference in what they specifically advocate. Both sites include links to articles about corporate 
constitutional rights, Citizens United, and campaign finance amendments.247 The argumentative 
content of the articles, while commonly focused on critiquing corporate rights, diverges based on 
the question of whether corporate free speech rights or all corporate rights should be eliminated. 
The MtA articles range back to 2001 and tend to cover a broad range of background issues in the 
law and policy, while the UFTP articles begin in 2011 and focus on campaign finance.248  
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 These articles are not the only type of content gathered by these sites, although for the 
UFTP site there is very little else. The MtA site contains a glut of supporting material, most of 
which is hosted on the site itself and therefore gives the impression of being co-enunciated by the 
we of the group petition’s ‘the people.’ In addition to the articles mentioned above, which are 
part of the “Recommended Reading” page, the site has a “Links and Resources” page of books 
and documentary films.249 It also describes each of the proposed constitutional amendments and 
makes arguments about why its own amendment is better than the alternatives.250 These materials 
work together to present a strong sense of establishing a knowledgeable account of how 
corporations have illegitimately claimed democratic doxai and the effects of those claims. While 
the UFTP “Frequently Asked Questions” page contains little beyond a list of the proposed 
constitutional amendments,251 the MtA FAQ page is more than twice as long and delves into 
questions such as the difference between a democracy and a republic and how the rights of joint-
stock limited liability corporations apply to other organizations like unions and non-profit 
corporations.252  
 MtA offers a larger and more substantial body of material that explicitly critiques the basis 
for corporate legal rights.253 The site is devoted to supporting the central mission of amending the 
US Constitution to eliminate all corporate rights, not just mitigating the effects of Citizens 
United. MtA is engaged in a serious, deep-throated effort to question the legal basis of capitalist 
practice at its core in the voice of ‘the people,’ while UFTP advocates some adjustments in 
campaign finance law ‘for’ the sake of the people. Because UFTP’s primary mission is to 
represent a group of organizations that do not agree on how the US Constitution should be 
amended, it is able to include less substantive critical material. The result is that as UFTP’s 
petition is decidedly representational in a republican mode rather than being a democratic 
assertion of ‘the people’ themselves.  
 The techniques common to both group petitions demonstrate the doxai of collective 
personae while enunciating a specific critique of how corporations have claimed the doxai of 
rights. But because MtA’s critique is made in and through the demonstration of ‘the people’ 
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itself, it is able to claim a more fundamental and coherent position. In other words, MtA’s critical 
attempt to fundamentally disarticulate corporations from rights enables the re-linking of the 
doxai of rights to the collective persona that is demonstrated by MtA’s we as ‘the people’ itself. 
The difference between MtA and UFP’s group petitions indicates that petitions may accomplish 
a number of things, but they are not dissensually democratic without a substantive, unified 
critique of existing forms of rule that generates a sense that its enunciative we is the assertion of 
the presence of ‘the people.’ Without this element, a group petition can’t really be democratic; 
like United For the People, that petition will only be another attempt to represent the interests of 
others and fail to generate a dissensual democratic event in which the position of ‘the demos,’ the 
part that has no part or qualification to rule, is asserting itself against the ruling order. 
Individual Petitions; Slacktivism or Democracy? 
 There are dozens of other digital petitions against corporate personhood, Citizens United, 
corporate constitutional rights, and related issues. Most of them are petitions that gather 
signatures of individuals rather than groups. In this section I will describe the democratic 
dimensions of approximately fifteen petitions against corporate rights that circulated during the 
2012 election cycle. Although some of them are still active, some of these petitions were most 
certainly functioning as part of a larger data-gathering strategy for party-affiliated political 
organizations leading up to the election and are no longer active. While the techniques of the 
petitions vary, I selected them because of their shared critique of corporate legal rights and the 
way they attempted to contrast such rights with their own demonstration of democracy. These 
petitions did not just critique corporations but performatively claimed to actually be an instance 
of democracy. In many cases, that claim was supported by the way that petitioning techniques 
enabled the demonstration of a doxastic collective persona. In other cases, however, the petition 
failed to produce any sense that it was an instance of ‘the demos’ asserting itself, in spite of what 
the text of the petition claimed.  
 102 
 There are many variations in digital petitioning technology. For instance, among petitions 
against corporate rights, petitions are addressed to different entities; the language of the 
statement can be quite short, long, vague or specific; signatures are appended visibly or not and 
visibly counted or not; and the text of the petition may be immediately and individually sent to 
its addressee (much like a letter-writing campaign). This section will first analyze the role of 
collective personae in the petitions; second, it will argue that some petitions fail to produce a 
sense of democracy and therefore justify the concerns of critics such as Dean and Andrejevic; 
and third, I will argue that visibly counting signatures, displaying comments, and publicly listing 
signatory names generates a greater sense that the petition is a democratic event, enacted through 
doxai, and not just a data farm. Whether or not such petitions are democratic is not based on 
whether they represent the opinion or “will” of the individuals who sign. It is about the extent to 
which the petitions succeed in generating a sense that they are part of the emergent event of the 
appearance of a democratic subject such as ‘the people.’  
 As the analysis of group petitions above indicates, the extent to which a petition is able to 
generate a sense that such a persona refers to an emergent subject in turn reinforces the strength 
of its critique of corporations. This would presumably be the case in any petition—the more 
signatories, the more forceful the claim of the petition. But in the case of the movement against 
corporate rights there is an added layer of significance to the presentation of an emergent 
democratic collective subject. As we saw in the section above on group petitions, because the 
fundamental critical claim of the petitions is that corporations are not legitimate political 
subjects, the extent to which a petition presents itself and its collective personae as the demos 
directly supports the content of its critique of corporate legal rights. Much like in the era of 
abolitionist petitions documented by Zaeske, the core question of the movement against 
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corporate rights is precisely the question of who is entitled to speak as a political subject and who 
is the proper bearer of rights.254 Unlike these historic petitions, however, petitions against 
corporate rights do not simply attempt to assert the existence and capacities of democratic 
subjects—they also attempt to strip collective subjects of rights they already have. This dynamic 
requires a more specifically critical strategy than historic petitions. When these political 
questions come into play, enacting the tension between doxa and epistēmē contributes to 
dissensual democratic appearance of the demos. No matter how strong the critique of 
undemocratic doxai (like corporate rights) might be, that critique cannot itself be dissensual 
democracy unless it is enunciated in concert with others through democratic doxai. 
 The petitions discussed below were selected because they advocated a very specific goal: 
disarticulating the concept of corporation from legal personhood or rights. Many of these 
petitions funneled their critique of corporate rights through the language of constitutional law. 
The petitions were often located on the same page as additional text that explained or justified 
the petition text itself. Some of the petitions and their framing texts declare the need to 
“overturn” Citizens United,255 but most of them stated directly that the Constitution needs to be 
amended in order to remedy the damage done by Citizens United.256 A few of them took other 
approaches, like democrats.com, which addresses “Rove, the Koch brothers, and the rest of the 
GOP outside groups” by demanding that they disclose who is donating to support their political 
action committees.257 But for the most part, by identifying constitutional language as the crucial 
site of intervention, these groups called for a new definition of the specifically legal concept of 
the corporation. 
 There is an important implication of this rhetorical framing. The boundaries of this 
constitutionalist rhetoric also exclude certain types of collective personae from being the subjects 
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that are ostensibly emergent in the process of petitioning; it is difficult to imagine a petition 
appealing to the State signed, for instance, by ‘the multitude.’ ‘The people’ were predictably the 
persona that most frequently appeared in the petitions, given that they are the persona of the US 
Constitution itself.258 Other collective personae, however, appeared often as well: eligible 
voters,259 the public,260 the movement,261 the coalition,262 responsible businesses,263 the nation,264 
engaged citizens,265 towns,266 communities,267 and “everyone except Mitt Romney.”268  
 While the collective personae of the petitions varied, they shared two key dimensions; first, 
their common position in relation to “corporations”; and second, their status as the democratic 
subject emerging through the petition itself. A central element of the critical thrust of the 
petitions and the statements that frame them is dividing out literal and figurative definitions of 
“corporation.” One of the most common ways of doing so, of course, was to re-state that 
“corporations are not people,” “people are people,” and variations on that formulation.269 Some 
of these declarations were accompanied by analysis of the effects of corporate rights on human 
welfare and politics, most often in the context of Citizens United and its implications for 
corporate campaign expenditures. Corporate constitutional rights help corporations to “buy our 
political process,”270 hijack our democracy,271 generate an “unlimited flow of corrupting money 
into our elections,”272 cause the “interests of Main Street [to be] subverted in favor of the 
interests of Wall Street,”273 and “fundamentally [threaten] the integrity of our democracy.”274 
The majority of the effects of corporate rights were thus framed in terms of the damage they do 
to the political process, which was often understood as democracy itself. The petitions were often 
embedded in websites (such as the Move to Amend site described above) that contained 
documents supporting the general claim that corporate rights are bad for society and democracy. 
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 The corollary of the claim that corporations are harmful to whatever collective persona was 
in the petition (the people, communities, the public, etc.) was that those personae were assumed 
or argued to be ‘the demos’ itself. These collective personae can be understood as demotic 
collective personae in the sense that they are common concepts used to refer to subject acting in 
the position of the demos in democratic politics. The question that is most relevant, then, for 
addressing the issue of the democratic significance of digital petitions against corporate rights in 
a sense boils down to the question of whether doxai such as demotic collective personae used by 
the text of the petitions enable actual instances of the emergence of a subject that is the demos. 
 As we saw above, there are two ways to answer that question; one that critiques the 
democratic doxai of petitions and one that affirms the potential of democratic doxai to produce 
collective action. The first would identify the claims of petitions to enunciate the position of ‘the 
demos’ as mere instances of democratic rhetoric masking undemocratic data farming and the 
exploitation of the labor of the signatories. The other approach is to understand collective 
subjects of these petitions as emergent democratic events produced in part by the rhetorical 
technology of the petition itself. Rather than resolving this question definitively, I will argue in 
the next section that not all digital petitions against corporate rights are created equal; in fact, 
some are more democratic than others. The question is not whether they employ the doxai of 
liberal democracy. Instead, the question is whether they are able to effectively generate a sense 
that such doxai are being employed by an emergent collective subject that is the demos. 
 
 
Undemocratic Petitions 
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 Certain petitions are little more than ways of gathering data that can be funneled to larger 
organizations for fundraising purposes. Without the demonstration of the place of the signatures 
in a collective, these “petitions” fail to accomplish the basic task of demonstrating a democratic 
subject. For instance, the “petition” on the Public Citizen site did not provide any type of 
information at all about who had signed the petition, either before or after the act of signing.275 
There was no count of the number of people who signed, no list of names, no addresses, and 
nothing to generate any sense of the petition’s duration. The petition of the Campaign For 
America’s Future similarly provided no sense of who had signed it; the petition was addressed to 
the Securities and Exchange Commission and was structured more as a form for a letter-writing 
campaign.276 Common Cause’s “Amend 2012” petition, which was only available during the 
2012 election, similarly claimed that it would be delivered to “state legislators” but did not 
provide any information about who had signed.277 The Common Cause petition against corporate 
rights that has since replaced the election petition also provides no information about who has 
signed.278 
 These and other petitions I looked at closely operated like a combination of a letter-writing 
campaign and a membership drive for the hosting organization.279 While these efforts may call 
themselves “petitions,” the signing information is siphoned off in the opaque data-collection 
processes Andrejevic describes as being characteristic of so much “participatory” digital 
media.280 These “petitions” amount to little more than signing up for additional emails and 
requests for donations from the large, long-standing lobbying organizations that also sell the 
signatory data to various other political marketing firms. In failing to provide a sense of who has 
signed (either with names, dates, or even a total count) these petitions abdicate one of the two 
basic tasks of democratic dissensus, which is the appearance of ‘the demos,’ a collective subject 
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that is opposed to existing forms of rule. But further, these “petitions” are rather clear examples 
of precisely what Andrejevic and Dean find most problematic about the importation of 
interactive marketing techniques into ostensibly democratic politics. Even if we bracket the 
question of what signing such “petitions” indicates about the level of commitment of the 
individuals who sign them, it is still apparent that such “petitions” do little beyond build the 
donor/email database of the organization, whose primary mission is perpetuating itself. Such 
petitions, simply put, do not demonstrate any demotic collective persona; they merely claim to. 
In these cases the doxai of liberal democracy occluded the functioning of undemocratic 
institutional processes with questionable results and connections to any democratic politics. 
Democratic Petitions  
 There were also, however, petitions that actually displayed either a list of signatories 
and/or a numeric count of how many people had signed.281 While data from this second group of 
petitions is also undoubtedly stored and used by the petitions’ parent organizations, the display 
of participation in co-enunciating the critical content of the petition accomplishes something 
more. The petitioning techniques of counting signatories, displaying comments, and publicly 
naming signatories echoes the practices of the group petitions. These more robust techniques 
enable the demonstration of a more developed and specific democratic collective subject of 
enunciation. 
 Not only do these techniques generate a sense of a collective subject of enunciation, that 
sense is an important dimension of the content of the critique of the way that corporations have 
appropriated democratic doxai like rights. This is because for many of these petitions the 
enunciative demotic collective persona is a crucial foil for generating the sense that corporations 
are the static, fixed base of power for the institutionalized political order. The more forcefully the 
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demotic collective persona is demonstrated, the more effectively it can be leveraged against such 
institutionalized doxai as the rights of corporations. The actions of joining in, signing on, being 
counted, and ultimately co-enunciating the same critique of corporate rights enhances the 
critique itself by more or less proving the distinction between the literal referent of the demotic 
collective persona and the falseness of figuring corporations as speakers that enunciate the we of 
democratic politics.  
 There are two crucial aspects of a petition that enable it to generate the sense of the 
appearance of the demos, a collective democratic subject. The first is that it must generate a 
sense of its own emergence by noting the dates of signatures. The second is that it must be able 
generate a sense of many-ness, a large plurality of signatories together. Rancière argues that the 
emergent quality of the demos is central because democratic politics is always about setting up 
the event of a dispute between the demos and the ruling order. This means that a democratic 
collective subject is itself a process of demonstrating that subjectivity via mechanisms “through 
which politics comes into existence.”282 For this reason, he argues, “A political demonstration is 
therefore always of the moment and its subjects are always precarious.”283 Because the 
appearance of the demos is an event that happens, a petition must find a way to mark its own 
temporality and the emergence of the demos through signing. Although the sum of signatures on 
a petition produces a sense of a collective subject through what Jacques Derrida has called “a 
sort of fabulous retroactivity,” the impression that is produced is of an ever-emerging subject that 
is “having-been present in a past now, which will remain a future now, and therefore in a now in 
general, in the transcendental form of nowness.”284 The presence of something that asserts itself 
from the past into the future as an event that is currently now — this is emergence, which is the 
structure of the democratic subject demonstrated in its continual production through signing. 
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 This emergent collective subject of democracy has the appearance of many-ness so that it 
can plausibly stand in synecdochally for the whole or the all that can, of course, never be 
counted. Rancière argues that the relationship between the position of the demos and the whole is 
homonymous; “The demos is that many that is identical to the whole, the many as one, the part 
as the whole, the all in all.”285 The close link between the properties of emergence and many-
ness means that they are often found together, with signatures being appended with dates and 
times. This feature of petitions seems to be increasingly important to the way petitions appear in 
the movement against corporate rights. During the 2012 election cycle, for instance, the Move to 
Amend site provided a real-time counter of the number of signatures in the banner for its site, but 
did not list their names or provide a format in which signatories can leave publicly viewable 
comments.286 Since then, Move to Amend has transitioned to the NationBuilder platform, which 
lists signatories and the time that they sign.287 Some petitions note the date on which the petition 
was started.288 Others that list the names of all signatories, ascribe a date to each signature.289 In 
both cases, the attribution of a date to the petition generates a sense that the enunciations of the 
demotic collective personae are occurring or at least relatively current. These dates accomplish 
something more, however. They suggest that the critique of the corporation that each petition 
calls for is itself occurring. Not only is the we of the petition text an event that is an enunciation, 
referencing the temporality of the enunciations also suggests the event of the collision of 
democratic doxai that is coextensive with the event of the appearance of democratic subject of 
enunciation in and as the signatories. Because the petitions declare themselves to be the 
enunciations of the rightful source of democratic law, their enunciations generate the sense of 
constituting an ongoing transformative critique of corporate claims to the democratic doxai of 
rights. 
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Conclusion 
 What the above analysis demonstrates is that digital petitions, like their parchment 
predecessors, have the potential to help build collective democratic subjects. Democratic doxai 
such as ‘petitions of the people’ are a double-edged sword that cut against doxai while 
reproducing other doxai. Doxai can occlude and reinforce institutional politics that operate to 
perpetually consolidate political power in the hands of those who currently hold it. Democratic 
doxai can also, however, be taken up and enacted to leverage a substantial critique of existing 
institutions of the political order. The crucial difference between democratic petitions and data 
farming is that democratic petitions demonstrate the many individuals and groups that have 
signed on as ‘the people,’ ‘the movement,’ or some other collective persona. Without this visual 
demonstration of the position of ‘the demos,’ or the part that has no part in the ruling order, 
“petitions” are just another way to build a donor base for political marketers. In such cases, 
critiquing the rhetoric of “democracy” as merely doxastic is an appropriate technique for 
highlighting the problematic façade of democratic rhetoric. 
 Rather than evaluate the potential of petitions simply on the basis of whether they are able 
to accomplish specific goals, it is important to consider the role they play in movement-building 
and the ongoing processes of demonstrating democratic critiques of capitalist practice. Critics of 
democratic doxa have given us some important reasons to be skeptical of digital media 
technologies and their broad claims to revolutionize politics. Democratic political rhetoric like 
petitions, however, requires the masks of technologies and demotic personae in order to enable 
the emergence of collective subjects who are up to the tasks of the demos.  
 Additionally, however, I hope to have demonstrated in this chapter how the tension 
between doxa and epistēmē can play two roles in dissensus. The first, and perhaps clearer, is that 
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it plays a role within the substance of democratic movement rhetoric. As the movement against 
corporate rights enacts the doxai of ‘petitions of the people,’ it establishes a well-researched 
epistemic critique of corporate rights. As described in the previous chapter, Move to Amend 
especially generates a sense of critical epistemic depth as it collects various documents and 
arranges them on its website. Democratic movement rhetoric is made dissensual through the 
critique produced by acting out the tension between doxa and epistēmē. 
 Additionally, however, this chapter suggests that the tension between doxa and epistēmē 
can be enacted at the level of scholarship about movement rhetoric. Following the general 
critical path described in Chapter One as the province of theorists like Wendy Brown, a number 
of the critics of media technology referenced above see the enactment of democratic doxai as an 
opportunity to describe in greater depth the failures of those doxai to generate meaningful or 
lasting institutional change. This approach captures something important in the case of petitions 
against corporate rights; many of them seem to be completely irrelevant to the enactment of 
democratic politics. These failures, however, occur at the level of the political rhetoric and 
institutional organization rather than at the level of the motivation, will, or opinion-expression of 
those who sign petitions. Building democratic culture may require critiques of doxai, but such 
doxai are not opinions and leveling accusations of inadequate participation at petitioners defeats 
the broader goal of fostering democratic culture around issues of importance. 
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Chapter 4 
Disarticulating Undemocratic Doxai and Rearticulating the Demos in Books 
  
 Although the movement inevitably has leaders and strong individual voices, we have seen 
in the last two chapters that it is deeply and centrally important to its mission that it be able to 
articulate a strong sense of “speaking together” as the demos. Technologies such as digital 
petitions are able to produce that sense in part through their affordances. This chapter, however, 
describes the dissensual democratic techniques enacted in a more monovocal medium: books that 
position themselves as part of the movement against corporate rights. The books necessarily rely 
more heavily on their ability to evoke a sense of collective speech through the mechanisms of 
writing itself. The books demonstrate many of the same collective personae discussed in earlier 
chapters and many of the same critiques of corporate rights. They strive to give a sense of being 
part of the rest of the movement while engaged in the project of establishing a lengthy non-
fiction account of states of affairs grounded in the basic gesture of attempting to build knowledge 
for democracy. In the process of building such knowledge, they both critique and enact 
democratic doxai. As texts or anthologies of essays with one or two authors, however, these 
books demonstrate a particular variation on dissensual democracy that is more easily comparable 
to humanistic scholarly research and writing.  
 Although the dissensual importance of the basic gesture of critiquing undemocratic 
relations has been described in previous chapters, in these books we find a much more developed 
and specifically epistemic variation of critique based on making historical, researched claims. 
This more developed set of epistemic methods requires a fuller explanation of the potential of 
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such methods to operate dissensually while still accounting for the way doxai are enacted as part 
of epistemic claim-making. To provide such an explanation, this chapter explains how dissensual 
democracy is a specific way of dis/re/articulating doxai in the context of the logic of democracy. 
In the context of dissensual democracy, disarticulations and rearticulations of democratic doxai 
demonstrate the political potential of attending to the performative aspects of critique.  
 On the one hand, the movement’s attempt to critically disarticulate democratic doxai from 
the way they have been claimed by corporations, an attempt that often includes a critique of 
excessive capitalism and market logics. In that sense they also attempt to disarticulate collective 
personae such as “the people” from liberal state economic policies that privilege corporations. 
On the other hand, the movement also rearticulates democratic doxai such as the collective 
personae of “the people” or “the community” by enacting those doxai to present a democratic 
collective subject. Many elements of the movement, including some of the books discussed in 
this chapter, reference the Founding Fathers, the Constitution, the ideal of freedom, the power of 
the vote, and the importance of self-governance. The movement’s simultaneous deployment and 
critique of the doxai of liberal democracy complicate any claim about the democratic or 
undemocratic potential of liberal nationalist doxai in and of themselves. Instead, the dual 
critique/performance of such doxai points back toward how such democratic doxai in specific, 
and doxa in general, are articulated as part of a dynamic performance rather than a structure. 
 This chapter is in three main sections. The first section describes several ways that 
articulation has been theorized. These accounts of articulation generally share the perspective 
that the concept of articulation is a productive way to understand the contingency of discourses 
and the “struggle to fix meaning and define reality temporarily.”290 These varying accounts of 
the concept of articulation differentially emphasize the propositional content of articulations and 
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the performative demonstrations of articulations. Dissensual democratic types of articulation 
require more attention to the performative demonstrations of rearticulations of doxai. In the 
second section I will argue that demonstrations of the demos as we in democratic books should 
prompt greater attention to the ways that rearticulation can draw on doxai and generate a sense of 
collective enunciation. The third section describes how the books attempt to disarticulate 
corporations from democratic doxai and argues that articulation theory should recognize the 
force and potential of enacting the assumption that there is substantial difference between literal 
and figurative language. In other words, effective disarticulation may be best accomplished by 
muting ontological claims about articulation and performing a very different set of assumptions. 
Additionally, I will argue, enacting the assumption of a sharp divide between figurative and 
literal language is a strong mechanism for performatively rearticulating the subject position of 
the demos in dissensual democracy.  
Dis/Re/Articulation 
 Articulation is a concept that is often attributed to Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s 
extensive poststructuralist re-working of hegemony theory.291 Laclau captures the broad strokes 
of how the relationship between articulation and the classical concept of doxa is often assumed: 
“Common sense discourse, doxa, is presented as a system of misleading articulations in which 
concepts do not appear linked by inherent logical relations, but are bound together simply by 
connotative or evocative links which custom and opinion have established between them.”292 
Following Plato, Laclau argues, Western philosophy has pursued the project of attempting to 
purify concepts by slicing away or rupturing their doxastic articulations and crystalizing their 
true, rational, or essential meanings. Laclau and Mouffe respond that articulation is in the end all 
that there is; there are no concepts that are truly purified of their connotations and in fact, 
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antagonism expressed as articulation is the substance of politics itself. In this later work, 
articulation is defined even more clearly as “any practice establishing a relation among elements 
such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice.”293 The “structured 
totality” that results from arrangements of articulatory practices is a discourse much like 
Foucault’s sense of the term.294 Stuart Hall similarly theorizes articulation as a a non-necessary 
link between social forces and doxai, or what he has called popular ideologies in a roughly 
Althusserian sense of the term.295 While these positions on articulation have important 
differences, they share a commitment to understanding articulation as part of what Lawrence 
Grossberg calls a “constructionist” account of reality, which is that material reality is built out of 
such articulations.296 
 Describing articulation as discursive or ideological practices that construct reality has 
paved the way for understanding articulation as an activity that occurs as part of systemic and 
historical processes and that may involve but are certainly not determined by individual human 
actions. Some strongly Deleuzian ways of theorizing articulation come close to assuming that 
articulation is an element of an ontological process of becoming. For instance, Lawrence 
Grossberg pushes beyond the post-hegemonic concept of articulation described above to posit 
that which is articulated as “multiple, overlapping, competing, reinforcing, etc. lines of force and 
transformation, destabilization and (re-)stabilization, with differing temporalities and spatialities, 
producing a potentially but never actually chaotic assemblage or articulations of contradictions 
and contestations.”297 In this formulation, articulation is the joining of forces of change in 
various ways so as to produce an assemblage or arrangement of relations. This formulation is 
clearly a departure from understanding articulation as a set of practices, but retains Laclau and 
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Mouffe’s and Hall’s interest in hegemony and the way that nonhuman elements contribute to 
articulation. 
 One of the most interesting aspects of these post-hegemony and Deleuzian accounts is the 
way that they embrace articulation not only as a concept that describes the realities of power and 
politics, but also as a sort of method or strategy for engaging in politics. Cultural studies 
accounts of articulation emphasize this dimension of the concept most often as part of a 
commitment to “disarticulating” by critiquing articulations that appear natural and inevitable and 
describing how they are implicated in power and politics. Jennifer Slack, for instance, argues, 
“Politically, articulation is a way of foregrounding the structure and play of power that entail in 
relations of dominance and subordination. Strategically, articulation provides a mechanism for 
shaping intervention within a particular social formation, conjuncture, or context.”298 Critique 
qua disarticulation does not necessarily depend on a gesture of “unmasking” the reality behind 
doxai, although it sometimes proceeds that way. In contemporary cultural studies, 
“disarticulating” doxai more often proceeds by “mapping” how doxai support power relations 
through the contingent connections that could be otherwise. Much cultural studies scholarship 
pursues such mapping by describing articulations as “the basic processes of the production of 
reality, of the production of contexts and power (i.e., determination or effectivity).”299  
 The way that cultural studies scholarship re-names these forces (as biopower, modernity, 
hegemonic bloc, or territories, for instance) is precisely the critical attempt to foster their 
rearticulation. What underlies cultural studies’ concept of articulation is a commitment to 
determining the effects of relations within the larger assumption that those real relations are 
contingent and could be otherwise.300 In fact, when it comes to democratic doxai, cultural studies 
scholarship has often seemed to be more interested in disarticulating such doxai by mapping how 
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they have supported State-based economic, political, and social inequalities. The result has been 
an ongoing skeptical position in cultural studies circles toward democratic doxai and a de facto 
rejection of the possibility that such doxai could or should be rearticulated as part of a radical 
politics. 
 The cultural studies concept of articulation also theorizes scholarly production itself as an 
important element of not just disarticulation but of rearticulation. Slack discusses rearticulation 
by describing it as a sort of political “method” and says, “Determining when, where and how 
these circuits [of cultural practices] might be re-articulated is the aim of a cultural theorist’s 
theoretically-informed political practice.”301 Grossberg even more eloquently argues that 
articulation cannot stop with critical disarticulation, because articulations are 
 
…always rearticulated into other wholes; that is the very being of the relation of life and 
power. And if cultural studies intellectuals do not enter into this struggle, with all of the 
work (of analysis and imagination) that it requires, if they do not attempt to think through 
the realities of articulations and the possibilities of rearticulation, then cultural studies 
abandons the very sense of political possibility that drives it.302 
 
The looming question for cultural studies scholarship, as for many other types of politically 
engaged scholarship, is how such rearticulations can be accomplished. What does it mean to 
think through the political possibilities of rearticulations? Even more to the point, what does it 
mean to attempt to enact such senses of possibility?  
 For scholars, the most obvious way to answer this question is on the level of propositional 
description. Describing the world as it should be seen is the end point for too many scholars who 
draw on articulation theory to express their sense of political possibility. While this is an 
important place to begin figuring out how to rearticulate with a sense of political possibility, 
dissensual democracy engages in the activity of rearticulation in a way that goes beyond the level 
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of propositional description. Dissensual democracy attempts to performatively enact doxai such 
as collective personae to articulate self-governing collectives. 
 This sense of the term articulation — in which a collective articulates itself — plays on a 
sense of the term articulation that is much closer to a concept like enunciation or speech. This 
sense of the term articulation draws attention to the subject or entity that articulates rather than 
presuming that articulations are produced by forces, power, or other immanent relations such as 
becoming. Rhetorical scholars have developed a line of inquiry on the demonstrative capacities 
of articulation that promises to provide an effective supplement to articulation theory’s over-
reliance on the declarative and constative senses of articulation. These scholars, including 
Barbara Biesecker, Christian Lundberg, and Nathan Stormer, shift the emphasis in “articulation” 
from “joining” to “the action of putting into words,” an emphasis that then points toward 
questions about the subject position that is implied by rearticulatory “actions.” Stormer, for 
instance, draws on Judith Butler, Donna Haraway, and Kenneth Burke to theorize articulation as 
a set of activities that performatively produce bodies.303 For Stormer, thinking of articulations as 
performances “is to study how it is that certain bodies and languages gain centrality, how other 
connections added later become prosthetic to an otherwise integral entity.”304 In doing so, 
however, Stormer sidelines the question of how disarticulation operates as a way of critiquing 
doxa. Lundberg reintroduces the question of what is demonstrated by critical disarticulation.305 
For Lundberg, the act of interpretation carried out in materialist critique, for instance, 
demonstrates the “practices of enjoyment that representational failure engenders” for subjects.306 
He argues that the interpretive act of critiquing articulations is not exempt from the principles 
that produce psychic and affective drives more generally; critics are not objective, they are acting 
out the subject-position of the critical hermeneutic reader enjoying the act of interpretation.307 
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Biesecker, while disavowing hegemonic articulation as a method, still advocates for a type of 
radical rhetorical agency and subjectivity that “wills the subversion of the very principle that 
structures the existent regime.”308 Biesecker leaves open the question of precisely how such 
radical sublimation might be expressed, but she is willing to argue that it must have a 
“detotalizing and, thus, interruptive effect” that results from the way that such a subject generates 
the appearance of “a splitting within the order to being together.”309 Although there are 
significant differences in these rhetorical approaches to articulation, they share a common 
attention to the subject that appears in the action of performing critique. I will argue in the next 
section that this performative corrective is a necessary supplement to explain how re-articulation 
operates in dissensual democracy. 
 In the final section, as I describe the specific disarticulatory critiques of corporate rights 
made in the democratic books, I will address a more fundamental gap in articulation theory. 
Articulation theory rests on a general commitment to the assumption that there is no fundamental 
ontological difference between articulations and their descriptions, between doxa and 
knowledge, between disarticulations and rearticulations. While I have no plan to dispute this 
assumption, I will argue that there is a certain performative force to enacting the countervailing 
assumption. The democratic books written against corporate rights demonstrate the political 
potential of attempting to disarticulate based on the performative assumption that language has 
literal referents. Critiquing articulations as if there is a meaningful and substantial difference 
between doxa and epistemic representation enables not only disarticulating problematic doxai 
but also enables the production of a sense of the appearance of the demos as an interruption in 
the political order.  
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Performing an Articulated We 
 The past decade has seen the publication of a number of books that take up the critique of 
corporate rights in the name of building a democratic movement to transform the laws governing 
corporate composition and activity.310 Because these books strive so intently (and often 
awkwardly) to generate a sense of a collective subject of enunciation through the use of the first 
person plural pronoun, they are an excellent place to begin to unpack the performative aspects of 
how dissensual democracy rearticulates doxai. The first of these books, an anthology containing 
contributions from the members of the Program on Corporations, Law, and Democracy 
(POCLAD), was published in 2001. Ted Nace’s Gangs of America was published in 2003, and 
Lee Drutman and Charlie Cray’s book The People’s Business: Controlling Corporations and 
Restoring Democracy, was published in 2004. In the wake of Citizens United came the second 
edition of Thom Hartmann’s Unequal Protection in 2010, Ralph Estes’ Fight the Corpocracy, 
Take Back Democracy in 2011, followed by Jeffrey Clements’ Corporations are Not People in 
2012.  
 All six of these books demonstrate clear connections to the broader democracy movement 
opposed to corporate rights. The books additionally refer to one another as part of the same 
movement network. While they vary in the extent to which they take Citizens United as a central 
dimension of the political conditions that make their critique relevant, they are remarkably 
unified in their efforts to disarticulate corporations from democratic doxai. Additionally, these 
texts all consistently and widely employ the first person plural we as the voice of the text. These 
books are not void of the authorial I, but I is the decidedly less prominent first person pronoun. 
These books attempt to rearticulate democratic doxai by referring to their own enunciations in 
and as those doxai through the first person plural we. The we of these books is demonstrated 
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within the texts through naming, citation, and historical narrative. Ultimately, the we is the 
mechanism by which the rearticulation of democratic doxai accomplishes the production of the 
sense of the appearance of a collective subject that enacts the subject position of the demos. 
 The we of these democratic books can be slightly incongruous given how most of the 
books make no effort to shy away from the attribution of authorship to individuals. The books 
nonetheless attempt to articulate a collective subject of enunciation that goes far beyond the 
writerly we that might be found internally tracking the flow of a text with the reader (i.e. ‘As we 
saw in the first chapter…’). What are more significant are the uses of we that seem to refer 
beyond the reader of the text and mark the performance of a demotic collective persona as the 
voice of a democratic subject of enunciation in and as the argument of the text itself. Part of the 
way that doxai are demonstratively rearticulated while critiquing the doxai that enable corporate 
rights is through the a we that enunciates the critique. This we, as I argued in previous chapters, 
indicates what Émile Benveniste would call the performance of a collective subject.311 The use 
of the pronoun we enables the demonstration of a collective personae in ways that are similar to 
the technological performances discussed in earlier chapters. But the most important dimension 
of these claims to “we-ness” is that they rest on the presumption that the we of the text is the 
voice of the subject referred to by a demotic collective persona. For instance, in Corporations 
Are Not People: “The real people of America must overturn Citizens United and corporate rights 
and must assert the will of the people over the unchecked power of corporations. As in the past, 
we have the means and, I believe, the virtue to do exactly that.”312 
 The first sentence introduces the demotic collective persona: the (real) people. The second 
sentence adopts the voice of that demotic collective persona by declaring that we, the proper 
subject of political action declared in the first sentence, does indeed have both the means and the 
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virtue to act politically. This general formula is repeated intensively through all of these 
democratic books, sometimes with “citizens” or “communities” replacing “people” as the 
demotic collective persona. “The people,” however, is the demotic collective persona that 
appears most commonly, often with the addition of capitalization in the style of the Preamble to 
the U.S. Constitution, i.e.: “How do We The People take back our democratic institutions like the 
Congress from their current corporate masters?”313 Even when the interiority of an individual 
author is indicated by the use of the pronoun I, or reference is made to individualistically 
inflected activities like thought, the formula still manages to suggest that the voice of the demos 
is the voice of the text, as in the Preface to Defying Corporations, Defining Democracy: “It 
makes one think that anything is possible if only ‘We The People’ decide to put ourselves to the 
task.”314 The formula is sometimes used awkwardly in close proximity to a we that ambiguously 
straddles the writerly “we” and the voice of the demotic collective persona, for instance in The 
People’s Business (which lists two authors): “Before we discuss some potential strategies that 
We The People could adopt, we think it is important first to understand how, over the last three 
decades, a well-orchestrated corporate legal movement has successfully worked to establish an 
increasingly corporate-friendly jurisprudence.”315 Nonetheless, the we of these texts strives to 
produce the sense that the doxai of democracy (the collective personae of “the people,” in these 
examples) can be rearticulated to support the sense of a popular uprising against corporate 
political influence.  
 These texts, however, do not rely solely on the grammatical formulation identified above in 
order to demonstrate their participation in a democratic subject of enunciation. In addition to 
enunciating in the voice of such a democratic subject qua demotic collective persona, they also 
attempt to demonstrate their participation in a loosely linked series of specific actors who 
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together constitute a movement that is more or less synecdochally represented by the demotic 
collective persona. In effect, what these strategies entail is establishing what Laclau would call 
an equivalence between a series of names, a demotic collective persona, and the act of 
enunciation that demonstrates the we of the text.316 The books do this by specifying the 
continuity of their movement with a series of historical actors who were themselves 
instantiations of the same transhistoric demotic collective persona and whose narratives are 
easily recognizable as part of the doxa of American democratic history. This articulation of 
actors into a collective “movement” or “people” is additionally done by listing other individuals 
and organizations as allies and affiliates as well as by citing the writing of other individuals and 
organizations. After first describing how the books reference their contemporaries to articulate 
the democratic doxai of “the people” and a “movement,” I will turn back to how such collectives 
are in turn articulated as part of a transhistoric sense of democracy. 
 The articulation of multiple contemporary actors as a movement by listing the names of co-
enunciators is done widely in all of the democratic books and strongly recollects the “group 
petitions” described in Chapter Three. In Defying Corporations, Defining Democracy, the form 
of the anthology itself suggests a certain collective act of enunciation simply as a function of the 
plurality of authorship. Additionally, the introduction to Defying Corporations, Defining 
Democracy is undersigned by twelve individuals whose biographies appear toward the end of the 
book.317 The authorship of one of the final essays of the book is attributed to “POCLAD” itself, 
and several essays co-authored by the organizations’ members appear throughout the 
anthology.318 These instances of collective authorship help to generate a sense of the 
enunciations of the texts as collective projects. Additionally, however, many of the texts position 
their enunciative acts as extensions of the speech of individuals and groups who are not authors 
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in the book, including World Trade Organization (WTO) protestors in Seattle,319 The Women’s 
International League for Peace and Freedom,320 William Greider,321 Thomas Linzey,322 The 
Alliance for Democracy,323 The Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund,324 Democracy 
Unlimited,325 Alexander Mieklejohn,326 and other individuals and groups. Describing the 
continuity between these subjects and the enunciations of the book help to generate a sense that 
the enunciations of the text are specific instances of the demonstration of connection and 
solidarity with other organizations and individuals. For instance, in an essay on the WTO, 
Richard Grossman writes, “We in the U.S. have a responsibility to support efforts by activists 
from other lands to neutralize and abolish the WTO. So POCLAD is participating in and 
supporting efforts to raise hell in Seattle.”327 
 Fight the Corpocracy, styled primarily as a “how-to” guide to organizing and activism 
around corporate rights, is perhaps the most explicit attempt to systematically represent the 
strategies of other activists seeking to disarticulate corporations from legal rights, although this 
accounting is not done in and through a plural voice.328 The book in general, however, is framed 
in the first person plural as the voice of the demotic collective persona of The People; the 
opening section begins with the declaration that “We need to rein in the corporations. Undo the 
corpocracy. Restore a real democracy. We are the 99%. It’s our country, not theirs.”329 The book 
additionally contains an add-on “toolkit” document with a list of eighteen organizations, nineteen 
websites, and fifteen key publications that are listed as “Resources and Allies.”330 The general 
enunciative frame of the book in the first person plural, along with the technique of listing such 
allies and co-enunciators, points toward the plurality of activist organizations as those occupying 
the demotic collective persona of “the people” and “the 99%” that the book speaks somewhat 
awkwardly both as and to. 
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 Both The People’s Business and Corporations are Not People, which are styled less as 
“how-to” guides and more as accessible analyses of the history and law of corporations, contain 
lists of those entities who might be considered to be part of the we that is performed in and as the 
abstract demotic collective personae offered by the text. Corporations are Not People contains, 
toward the end of the book, almost as an appendix, documents entitled “Organizations and Links 
for Taking Action” and a “Recommended Reading” list that suggests the scope and content of 
the co-enunciators of the book’s first person plural pronouns and demotic collective personae.331 
The name of each organization is accompanied by a URL, followed by a brief disclaimer of the 
synecdochal nature of the list: “I have provided a sampling of possible resources here. There are 
many other groups – international, national, regional, and local.”332 The list is added ostensibly 
to connect the reader to a framework for involvement and action, but it also demonstrates the co-
enunciators of the book’s demotic collective personae and first person plural we. The People’s 
Business describes itself as a report of The Citizen Works Corporate Reform Commission and 
offers a list of forty-one Commission members who endorse the report/book.333 Additionally, the 
Notes section of The People’s Business is followed by a “Resources and Bibliography” section 
with list of the names of organizations and their street and web addresses and a selected list of 
books and other publications.334 These publications are not necessarily cited by the text – but 
they are also part of the demonstration of the demotic collective personae of the text. Although 
these lists clearly attempt to articulate a large network, they make little effort to refer to notions 
of plurality or difference that mark the rhetoric of “new” social movements or those inspired by 
concepts of the multitude. As part of the way they inhabit and enact the doxa of liberalism, these 
books tend to re-absorb such acknowledgements of plurality into the larger demotic collective 
persona they enunciate.  
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 This is what marks these efforts as attempts to rearticulate the doxai of democracy and not 
simply disarticulate such doxai, as post-operaist theories of Empire and multitude often do.335 
Instead of engaging in what Mouffe calls a politics of exodus that relies extensively or 
exclusively on disarticulating the doxastic senses of liberal democratic support for corporate 
involvement in the State, the books attempt to claim such doxai to support the movement.336 The 
rearticulation of such doxai through the grammatical we, lists of participants, and mutual citation 
generate the sense that such a collective is appearing. Although Unequal Protection does not 
contain such a “list document” supplementing and demonstrating the we of the text, the book 
contains regular mentions of other individuals and organizations who are part of the “growing 
movement” to restore “human personhood to its rightful place.”337  
 This sort of co-enunciation through citation and reference is a central dimension of the 
other books as well. There is nothing unique, especially in a quasi-academic or non-fiction 
literature, about the general practice of indicating a network of intellectual exchange, knowledge, 
and co-enunciation through reference and citation. In the case of these democratic books, 
however, such co-enunciation attempts to generate a sense that it is voiced by a common demotic 
collective persona that is closely tied to the evental we of the self-referential utterance. The 
authors of these books are reasonably hesitant to attribute the entire substance of their written 
argument to others in the network of activism that they are identifying. The unspecific and 
performative we, when referring itself to the demotic collective personae, enables the attribution 
of the book’s general purpose to an articulated range of co-enunciators, both living and dead, 
individual and collective, without making them directly responsible for the specific content of 
the text. 
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 These co-enunciators, especially those who are themselves collective and/or no longer 
living, are often cited as evidence of the way that the book’s critical disarticulatory goals are 
precisely the goals of a rearticulated “people” or other demotic collective personae. The range of 
co-enunciators articulated in these books in this role is startling. There are, however, some 
frequently referenced touchstones who reappear consistently. James Madison,338 Thomas 
Jefferson,339 Theodore Roosevelt,340 Thurgood Marshall,341 the Abolitionists,342 and the 
Women’s Rights Movement,343 for instance, reappear frequently in the pages of these books. 
Other doxastic democratic figures and movements occur less commonly, but sometimes in a 
more pronounced way. There are two general ways that these figures and movements are 
referred to – by describing their actions, ideals, and goals, or by directly citing their written 
enunciations. In both cases, the books attempt to generate a sense that these other entities are co-
enunciating doxastic exemplars or parts of the demotic collective personae that the we of the text 
also attempts to perform. In other words, both the book and historical entities are both a part of 
“the people” or “citizens.” The articulation of the books with the historical entities is 
accomplished by describing doxai that are shared by all.  
 When these books describe the actions, ideals, and goals of various co-enunciating entities 
that are unnamed or not living, they are performing the grammatical we of the text in a way that 
differs from directly listing the co-enunciators of the particular slogans and arguments of the 
book. Instead, the books attempt to demonstrate the features of their demotic collective personae 
by articulating the performative we of the text to entities that share their actions, ideals or goals 
in the most general way. For instance, Corporations are Not People, a book with strongly 
bipartisan aspirations (aspirations that are most certainly not shared by all of the books), dwells 
for quite some time on the first Earth Day in 1970. The book describes the people who showed 
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up to observe that first day and lauds them as the exemplar of the collective subject of 
enunciation in which the book participates: 
 
Twenty million Americans of every age and political party came out into the streets and 
our parks to celebrate the first Earth Day. They demanded a better balance between 
corporations and people and better stewardship of our land, water, and air. Look at the 
photos from this first Earth Day and you will see families with children, men in suits and 
ties and neatly dressed women, working- and middle-class Americans, people of all ages 
and races. These millions continued a longstanding American principle of guarding 
against concentrated corporate power that might overwhelm the larger interests of the 
nation.344 
 
This inclusive, prudent, homogenous group is presented as co-extensive with Corporations Are 
Not People’s grammatical we. Social difference is gestured at while simultaneously dismissed as 
subsidiary to a common sense of the larger political project. This section of the book goes on to 
declare of the environmental reforms in the 1970s: “The market did not do this. We did this by 
acting as citizens in a republic.”345 Setting aside the apparent failure to differentiate between a 
republic and a democracy, the clear sense of this declaration is that the environmental reforms of 
the 1970s were achieved by the same general demotic collective persona (in this case, “citizens”) 
that are possessed of the same doxai as as the subject that is articulated by the we of the book.  
 Defying Corporations, Defining Democracy generates a more strongly leftist sense of its 
demotic collective personae. Without the bipartisan aspirations of Corporations Are Not People, 
the many essays of the book are free to refer to a staggering range of historical left-leaning 
movements as co-enunciators of their grammatical we. Although some of the essays enunciate 
this we in and as members of very specific and contemporary activist efforts,346 many of them 
attempt to co-enunciate with historical movements more generally. These include Populism,347 
the Knights of Labor,348 Anti-Federalists,349the Indian Freedom Movement,350 labor organizing 
in general,351 Abolitionism,352 worker-owned cooperatives,353 and others. The introduction to the 
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book’s seventh section, an introduction without authorial attribution, is an excellent example of 
the way that the we demonstrated by POCLAD attempts to co-enunciate a demotic collective 
persona so large and transhistoric that it is capable of articulating a vast range of political 
projects: 
 
We the People have the responsibility to contest corporate claims to constitutional 
powers, to challenge judges who enable corporations to annihilate people’s fundamental 
rights including the right to self-governance, to defy legislators and mayors and 
governors and presidents complicit in corporate rule. Other species and other peoples 
around the world are waiting for us to do more than resist one corporate assault at a time, 
or regulate the planet’s destruction. We can assume the authority to govern. We can act in 
the spirit of the democratic colonial revolutionaries, along with Abolitionists, Populists, 
Suffragists, Wobblies, civil rights and environmental workers, gender and gay liberation 
activists, Native Peoples, ambassadors of other species and countless others in every 
generation who believed that all political power must rest in the hands of self-governing 
people, who struggled for “consent of the governed,” who refused to admit to the values, 
cultures and laws dictated by the propertied few.354 
 
“The People” here is perhaps aptly figured as a spirit of the democratic doxa of resistance to rule 
from above. The demotic collective persona of “the people” encompasses all of the listed 
historical movements. Much like in Corporations are Not People’s description of Earth Day, the 
historical movements refer the we of the demonstrative enunciation to a highly abstract or 
general sense of the demotic collective persona rather than confining the we to narrowly refer to 
the more specific named individuals and organizations that are listed. The effect is that the listed 
and named individuals and organizations are also referentially folded into the same highly 
abstract transhistorical demotic collective persona as one of many movements. The result is a 
sense that the specific critique of corporate rights in the books is also the rearticulation of 
democratic doxai in and as the appearance of the demos. 
 Movements and organizations are not, however, the only entities that are referred to by the 
we of these books’ enunciations. While organizations and movements tend to be described in 
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terms of their actions, ideals, and goals, other historical and contemporary entities are often cited 
as well. These entities, such as scholars, judges, court decisions, legislatures, laws, and 
municipalities, are often quoted directly. As academic writers know, citational practice can be a 
type of ventriloquistic co-enunciation when the perspective of the quoted text is being 
sympathetically adopted as it is reproduced. In the case of many of the quotations in these books, 
the positions and perspectives of various actors are reproduced in and as the enunciation of the 
we of the book. 
 For instance, the concluding chapter of Unequal Protection cites a passage from Thomas 
Paine’s The Rights of Man. After declaring that “Thomas Paine said it best: individual persons 
should be more powerful than any other institution,”355 Unequal Protection goes on to quote a 
passage from of The Rights of Man that concludes with this sentence: “The fact therefore must 
be, that the individuals themselves, each in his own personal and sovereign right, entered into a 
compact with each other to produce a government: and this is the only mode in which 
governments have a right to arise, and the only principle on which they have a right to exist.”356 
The quotation is immediately followed by this sentence, which is part of the text of the chapter 
itself: “We’ve figured out that Paine’s ideals and dreams, and those of Jefferson and Madison, 
Washington, and Adams – even allowing for their differences – have been stolen.”357 The 
implication here is that the ideals and dreams of Paine, Jefferson, and the rest are our hopes and 
dreams, timeless doxai that are shared by the individual persons who comprise the we of the 
book’s enunciative performance.  
 A less classically liberal (and oddly normalizing and medicalizing) version of this 
technique for rearticulating democratic doxai appears in The People’s Business as the book 
references The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power.358 The quotation, 
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citing Dr. Robert Hare, an expert on psychopaths, plays ironically on the idea that corporations 
are persons by listing the ways that corporations are like psychopathic persons; they are 
irresponsible, manipulative, grandiose, un-empathetic, asocial, remorseless, and superficially 
relational.359 Immediately following the quotation, the text of the book continues, “As a society, 
we tend to deal with psychopaths by putting them in situations where they can’t harm anybody 
else and by trying to rehabilitate them. We do not give them all kinds of rights and privileges and 
let them run rampant.”360 Although the collective persona of the we of this sentence is “society” 
rather than a type of democratic actor, the effect is similar. The text co-enunciates with D. Robert 
Hare, Joel Bakan, and “society” simultaneously. 
 All three of these specific techniques for rearticulating democratic doxai – listing co-
enunciators, identifying doxai shared by historical individuals and movements, and quoting 
concurring enunciations – are variations on the techniques for articulating the we of the 
democratic book. In each of these techniques, the pronoun we is extended through a 
demonstration that expands its potential referentiality beyond the author and the reader to a host 
of other entities. The goal of this expansive referentiality is to effectively demonstrate that the we 
of the books also refers to the demotic collective personae of the books – “the people,” 
“citizens,” “the community,” etc. As they critically disarticulate the doxai of democracy from the 
way they have been claimed by corporations, the books attempt to rearticulate such doxai as they 
present a collective subject that enunciates the critique. This set of techniques demonstrates how 
dissensual democracy requires techniques of rearticulation that do not simply depend on making 
critical propositional claims about doxai and what they refer to. As rhetorical theorists have 
argued, articulatory practices also demonstrate a subject that appears in and through the 
articulations. Attending to the subject that is demonstrated by such techniques points toward 
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productive possibilities for articulation theory more generally to adhere to its own demand that 
disarticulation be accompanied by rearticulation.  
 These techniques of articulating collective subjects through democratic doxai, however, are 
significantly bolstered by the disarticulatory critiques of doxai that these collected entities 
enunciate in common. The techniques of anti-doxastic critique used by these books and the way 
that they underwrite the way that the we demonstrates the demotic collective personae is the 
topic of the next section.  
Disarticulating Democratic Doxai 
 The various techniques of presenting a collective we through lists, mutual citation, etc, are 
very important to how these books rearticulate democratic doxai. There is, however, a certain 
extent to which their shared critique of corporations is the fulcrum of their ability to present an 
articulated collective. As Laclau and Mouffe, among many others, have argued in different ways, 
the presentation of an us is facilitated by opposition to a them.361 The fulcrum of the way these 
books attempt to include all of these entities in their demonstrative we is by drawing specific 
parallels between all of the entities’ shared critique of the way that corporations have 
appropriated democratic doxai such as “rights” and “personhood.”  
 Techniques for rearticulating doxai to present a unified movement are not quite enough to 
accomplish the presentation of a whole or unified collective enunciation that encompasses all of 
the listed, described, and quoted entities. Imagine, for instance, that the books were to “list” an 
entity such as Karl Rove’s Crossroads GPS that is widely assumed to support corporate rights; 
the mere act of listing such an entity would fail to demonstrate its participation in the 
performative we of the book. The lines between us and them are not entirely arbitrary, unlike 
what Laclau sometimes seems to argue.362 The only thing that can complete the unification of 
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these entities as us is their shared critique of how corporations have appropriated democratic 
doxai. This indicates that although the techniques of articulating a we are important for 
dissensual democracy, without sharing the goal of disarticulating specific doxai, such 
articulations would fail to achieve a sense of a dissensual democratic event. 
 Each of the books sets its own demotic collective personae up against the way that 
democratic doxai such as rights have been claimed by corporations. Corporate claims to the doxa 
of rights and the institutionalization of those rights in the law is the necessary shared object of 
critique for all the entities (historical and contemporary, individual and collective) associated 
with the demotic collective personae to gel together in and as a demos that enunciates 
collectively as we. In order to do that, however, the movement’s claims to doxai such as rights 
must be understood as more legitimate and true than the claims that have been made by 
corporations to those same rights.  
 Explaining the basis for such claims poses a problem for articulation theory in nearly all of 
its variations. Because articulation theory has developed specifically to move beyond an account 
of language as merely representing reality, articulation theorists generally take a strong position 
that the concept of articulation avoids making any such vulgar distinction between reality and 
representation. This is, of course, one of the flexible strengths of the concept of articulation. In 
the process of carefully questioning the difference between reality and representation, however, 
articulation theorists don’t always account for the articulatory force of performing critiques of 
articulation as if the distinction between reality and representation were meaningful. Paul 
Ricœur, an oft cited analyst of the rhetorical operations of suspicious hermeneutics like ideology 
critique, offers a nuanced perspective on the rhetorical capacities of interpretively dividing literal 
and figurative reference.363  
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 The act of interpretation, Ricœur argues, positions language relationally as either literal or 
figurative, and it is this act of distinguishing the literal and the figurative that allows the 
figurative dimension of discourse full access to its own referential capacities. So Ricœur writes, 
“If it is true that literal sense and metaphorical sense are distinguished and articulated within an 
interpretation, so too it is within an interpretation that a second-level reference, which is properly 
the metaphorical reference, is set free by means of the suspension of the first-level reference.”364 
The practice Ricœur refers to here is the interpretive strategy in which a given statement or work 
is described propositionally as containing referential capacities not in clear evidence prior to the 
interpretive act that splits the reference of the text. These levels of reference need not necessarily 
be described as literal and figurative. When they are, however, it is precisely the gesture of 
dividing them up as such which loosens or “sets free” one of the levels of reference and makes it 
available to be articulated to the logic of a causal origin that is responsible for its artifice. 
Through this procedure, the act of critique becomes more real or literally referential than the 
world of the metaphorical/fictional text or political discourse. 
 The critique of corporate rights leveled by these books has several dimensions that 
demonstrate why articulation theory, in all of its variations, should attend more closely to 
disarticulatory potential of critiquing doxai as if there were a genuine distinction between 
figurality and literality or doxa and epistēmē. The critique of corporate rights in these books 
often involves marking out the difference between literal and metaphorical legal language. It also 
often involves describing the empirical effects of corporate law and power so as to argue that the 
current legal and political status of corporations generates a variety of social and political 
problems, many of which could be ameliorated by disarticulating corporations from rights. These 
forms of critique proceed as if there is a genuine and important distinction between figurative 
 135 
doxa and the literally referential knowledge they are producing. This indicates, I will conclude, 
that specifically dissensual democratic forms of disarticulation require the performative 
assumption of a difference between doxa and epistēmē. After illustrating how these anti-doxastic 
disarticulatory strategies are used in these books, I will return to how they relate to the general 
task of demonstrating a demotic collective persona by enunciating a critical we. 
 One of the central slogans of the movement, “Corporations are Not People,” is the 
prototypical disarticulatory critique made by these books as they demonstrate the we of various 
demotic collective personae. The core assumption underlying the slogan is that the terms 
“people” and “person” do in fact have literal referents that are not corporations. This general 
pattern of critique, in which the figurative or illusory referent of a term is divided out from its 
literal or truthful referent, is most often used in Defying Corporations, Defining Democracy, 
Unequal Protection, and Corporations are Not People. In these books, distinctions between 
entities are made by describing the democratic doxai appropriated by corporations as obfuscatory 
rhetorical artifice. For instance, corporations are referred to as “legal fictions,”365 “artificial 
creations,”366 fictitious personifications;367 they use “bastardized democratic rhetoric.”368 
Corporate power “masquerades” as free speech,369 Citizens United is full of “metaphors,”370 and 
the general practice of equating corporations with persons is a “new metaphor,”371 “metaphorical 
clouds,”372 “false metaphor,”373 “fantasy,”374 “imprecise metaphor,”375 and generally the result of 
“the fallacy of excess metaphorical thinking.”376  
 These critiques go on to extensively describe how doxai have been misapplied and 
misappropriated to support undemocratic relations. Revealing how democratic doxai such as 
corporate “rights” are artificial enables the introduction of a narrative about the empirical effects 
of such doxastic artifice. Take for instance, this assertion about the effects of false doxai that 
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shape the law governing corporations: “If we accept the false metaphor of corporate money as a 
‘voice’ and the fantasy that big corporations are no more of a threat to our political life than big 
people, you can count on coal and oil corporations prospering and solar, wind, tidal, and 
geothermal energy corporations struggling.”377 The doxai of democratic “voice” that legitimizes 
corporate involvement in politics is described here as having potential empirical effects on 
energy production. While the metaphor of “corporate voice” is asserted to be false on its face, it 
is additionally argued that it should be rejected because of the effect it will have, presumptively, 
on the environment. In this case, and in many other instances across all of these books, corporate 
rights and legal standing are articulated with a variety of other social, political, and 
environmental impacts. These impacts are widely varied and numerous, including global 
poverty,378 corruption,379 toxic pollution,380 bad food,381 income inequality,382 declining 
employment,383 lack of health care,384 environmental destruction,385 corroded moral standards,386 
public health epidemics,387 and atrophied public education.388 Of course, the most significant 
impact of corporate legal rights that is described is on democratic participation and popular 
sovereignty, especially in the books published after Citizens United.  
 But beyond any of these specific descriptions of the problems, what these critiques have in 
common is the goal of disarticulating “corporation” from “rights” in the law. The assumption of 
a difference between the misappropriation of “ rights” and the empirical knowledge built by the 
critique itself provides the shape of disarticulation. Although we may agree that the way such a 
critique functions is ultimately processual or performative (i.e., that it is an articulation and not a 
representation) it conducts itself as if there is a meaningful and important difference between 
figurative or illusory doxa and truthful or knowledgable interpretive epistēmē.  
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 One of the central strategies for generating a sense of the urgent need for critical 
disarticulation is the common turn that each of these books make toward narrativizing the history 
of corporate claims to democratic doxai. Although each book describes a slightly different set of 
antecedents to the contemporary corporate claims to such doxai, they are united in their 
adherence to the practice of critiquing such claims through quasi-genealogical accounts of the 
court case in which such claims have been staked. Even Fight the Corpocracy, the text that is 
most styled as a “how-to” guide for activists and that contains the least critical and historical 
content, provides a narrative genealogy of corporate law. Fight the Corpocracy argues in very 
broad strokes, with references to a handful of large, state-directed corporations like the East India 
Company, the Jamestown Company, and the Massachusetts Bay Company, that corporations 
were originally chartered to serve specific public interests.389 That sense of the corporation, 
however, has been perverted as they have come to be understood increasingly as expressions of 
private interest. Several of the other books also begin their genealogies with some description of 
these early companies, noting their close ties with states and their specific, finite, and state-
defined purposes.390 The problem, Fight the Corpocracy argues, is that liberalized incorporation 
laws initiated by U.S. states as part of a “race to the bottom” in the mid-1800s, distanced 
corporations from state oversight.391  
 The liberalization of incorporation laws in the middle of the nineteenth century (which 
turned the previously complicated and political process of chartering a new corporation into a 
matter of filing paperwork and having it rubber-stamped) are noted by other democratic books as 
one of the key historical transformations in the law governing corporations. Both The People’s 
Business and Defying Corporations, Defining Democracy also argue that when states stopped 
carefully reviewing applications for corporate charters and revoking corporate charters, it was 
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the beginning of significant shift in how corporations were able to claim rights.392 According to 
this genealogical narrative, a more original and literal legal concept of corporation is the 
definition of corporations that preceded this change: as an instrument of the common good 
closely supervised by a State guided by a sense of that common good. This shift in the legal 
concept of the corporation from an instrument of the people to a natural expression of private 
interest in the 1800s was fed by several other incidents that are commonly noted by democratic 
books as part of their genealogies: The Board of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward 
decision, the historical rise of the joint-stock railroad corporations, and the Santa Clara County 
v. Southern Pacific Railroad decision. Each of these decisions depended on the misuse of 
democratic doxai to protect corporations.  
 Several of the democratic books argue that the 1819 Dartmouth v. Woodward decision was 
a significant landmark in the process of corporations appropriating the doxa of rights to protect 
their interests.393 When the state of New Hampshire attempted to take over the private college 
and turn it into a public university, the court decided that the college’s charter was governed by 
the Contract Clause of the Constitution and was thus an entity of private contract and not subject 
to state take-over. But even more than the Dartmouth decision, the democratic books tend to 
dwell on the Santa Clara decision of 1886. Unequal Protection devotes the entire first chapter to 
it, and Defying Corporations discusses it in at least seven of its essays.394 Corporations Are Not 
People addresses it with a substantial discussion, The People’s Business mentions it as the source 
of corporations’ Fourteenth Amendment protections, and Gangs of America also devotes a 
chapter to it.395 The story of the case, in which the court reporter declared that corporations are 
persons in a note that was subsequently cited as though it were an official decision, makes for 
excellent “debunking drama” in the sense that it reveals the extent of the contingency and 
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illegitimacy of corporate appropriations of doxai — how falsely such doxai represent the nature 
of corporations. It is clear that the Santa Clara decision had a significant impact on the extent to 
which democratic doxai have been codified in the law governing corporations and that 
Fourteenth Amendment protections have had significant effects on the flourishing of joint-stock 
corporations. These critical accounts of the Santa Clara case critique its effects by identifying 
the moments when democratic doxai were appropriated by corporations. By revealing the 
contingent circumstances of such appropriations, these historical accounts strive to disarticulate 
corporations and such doxai. 
 In the twentieth century, the democratic books most often argue that Lewis Powell and the 
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti decision have been key sources of corporate claims to 
the doxai of rights. Lewis Powell, a lawyer for the Chamber of Commerce who joined the 
Supreme Court in 1972, wrote a memorandum to the Chamber in 1971 entitled “Attack on 
American Free Enterprise System” two months before his appointment to the Court.396 This 
memorandum, which outlines a set of strategies by which the Chamber could expand the power 
of businesses in response to leftist attacks (for instance, the memo says, from marxist scholars 
like Herbert Marcuse) is described in four of the six democratic books.397 The significance of the 
memorandum is generally framed in terms of Powell’s significant role in the Supreme Court’s 
Bellotti decision.398 The Bellotti decision was one of the first in which the Court argued strongly 
for the free speech rights of corporations, and it is the primary precedent for the corporate free 
speech rights strengthened by Citizens United. Lewis Powell and the Bellotti decision he wrote 
are described by these books as among the most influential twentieth century sources of 
corporate claims to democratic doxai of rights. 
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 This brief description of how genealogies of the concept of the corporation are conducted 
by these democratic books is not comprehensive. It does, however, demonstrate their general 
strategy of critiquing contemporary legal doxa by building historical knowledge about how 
democratic doxai came to be claimed by corporations. The general thrust of this critical history is 
that corporate rights, whereby corporations are afforded Bill of Rights protections, are the result 
of deliberate, concerted, masked, and effective actions on the part of corporations and their 
supporters to illegitimately claim democratic doxai as their own. These deliberate, concerted 
actions have resulted in the creation of a vast network of rhetorical lies, operationalized through 
the law, that perpetuate a system of political and economic inequality and environmental 
devastation. Critical histories told by the books emphasize the contingency and historical 
variability of how democratic doxai have been articulated by corporations. The critical histories, 
however assume that such contingent articulations are not simply contingent — they are false 
representations of what corporations are.  
 The books strive to disarticulate by revealing the undemocratic origins of corporate claims 
to democratic doxai in the enunciations of privileged entities who are explicitly differentiated 
from the we enunciating the genealogical critique. It is this we that attempts to transform the 
doxastic legal concept of the corporation. This returns us to one of the central functions of the 
critical strategy of dividing references of democratic doxai such as rights as “figurative” or 
“literal.” One of the most significant and often-cited negative effects of the doxastic legal 
concept of the corporation is the way it disempowers “the people” or democracy itself. This 
critique is shared by all six of the democratic books. As Ricœur argues about the act of 
interpreting figurality cited above, by arguing that legal concepts have literal referents and 
positioning a set of them as merely figurative, these books enable the attribution of literal 
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referentiality to their own enunciations, including their efforts to articulate their own we through 
demotic collective personae. Corporations are not people; we are people. The books’ 
genealogical attribution of the origins of false attributions of rights to corporations to 
undemocratic entities such as Lewis Powell, Dartmouth College, or a Supreme Court clerk 
underlines the differentiation between truthful and false referents of democratic doxai and 
consolidates the genealogical critics as part of the enunciating we of the demotic collective 
personae. The various techniques of presenting a demotic collective persona referred to by the 
we of the enunciations of the movement show very clearly that this we need have no unified or 
previously existing referent in order to perform an attempt to disarticulate democratic doxai from 
corporations. These articulatory techniques are dissensual in the sense that they incorporate a 
collective critique of doxai supporting undemocratic relations that are simultaneously enunciated 
as a we that refers to a doxastic collective persona. The enunciating subject is not necessarily 
produced through procedures that are in themselves democratic, nor is it the result of a shared 
identity or common quality. Instead, the doxai that are targeted for critical rearticulation unify 
the movement and generate the opportunity for the demonstration of democracy.  
 The distinction between literal and figurative articulations of doxai marks out the 
difference between corporations and the we that refers to demotic collective personae as the more 
legitimate demos. The political field can then be developed in terms of oppositions that are 
iterations of the opposition between doxa and epistēmē: literal/figurative, truth/falsity, 
we/corporations. In other words, the assumption of a distinction between doxa and epistēmē is 
central to both the critical disarticulation and the rearticulation of democratic doxai. 
 
 
 142 
Conclusion 
 The concept of articulation has allowed important advances in describing the ways that 
discourses are assembled and become effective. As cultural scholars are fond of pointing out, 
however, there is a much stronger tendency in articulation scholarship toward disarticulating 
problematic discourses than toward figuring out how such discourses should be rearticulated. 
The movement against corporate rights points toward the importance of understanding dissensual 
democratic articulation and rearticulation as practices or even actions that contribute to the 
assemblage of collective political subjects. 
 What the books against corporate rights demonstrate, however, is that dissensual 
disarticulations and rearticulations of democratic doxai happen as iterations of the tension 
between doxa and epistēmē. Disarticulation is widely understood to be a variation on critique 
that presumes that articulated discourses underpin the social construction of reality rather than 
being in a representational relationship to that reality. This general rejection of ideology critique, 
wherein ideology is understood as doxai that misrepresent the real relations of power they mask, 
has moved beyond fashionability in critical scholarship and is now banal. The ontological 
explanations of reality, including articulations, that have replaced such types of critique therefore 
struggle to account for the ongoing political effectivity of enacting the assumption that there is 
an important difference between doxastic illusions and the reality behind them. Performing the 
assumption that democratic doxai misrepresent reality does not only play a role in the way that 
these books attempt to disarticulate the doxai of rights from corporations. It also is central to how 
they rearticulate such doxai to the political collectives they enact and attempt to argue for a 
political order that is legible within the doxa of democracy. 
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 Theorists who discuss the need for scholarship to rearticulate doxai in hopeful ways often 
find it easier to describe, as I have done in this chapter, how activists rearticulate doxai rather 
than attempting to do it themselves. One of my goals in discussing these books as examples of 
dissensual democratic dis/re/articulation is to establish a point of commonality between the 
articulatory techniques of these books, which often resemble scholarly works, and a scholarly 
approach to dissensual democratic articulation. The books discussed in this chapter conduct 
genealogies of corporate rights as part of a larger effort to reveal the contingency and artificiality 
of corporate claims to democratic doxai. The next chapter takes the genealogical disarticulatory 
approach of the books as a entry point for establishing a parallel genealogy of legal theories of 
the corporation.  
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Chapter 5 
Demonstrating Techniques of Critique: The Genealogy of the Legal Concept of “Corporation” 
 
 One of the central critical strategies of the movement against corporate rights is to describe 
how legal and political events in the past influence contemporary corporate claims to rights and 
other democratic doxai. The last chapter identified several key historical events that the 
movement often brings up in order to reveal the contingency of the doxastic articulations of 
“corporation” and how it has been produced undemocratically. These events include the shift 
from understanding corporations as public entities to private ones in the middle of the nineteenth 
century, facilitated by the 1819 Dartmouth College v. Woodward decision, the 1886 Santa Clara 
decision and its mistaken attribution of the rights granted by the Fourteenth Amendment to 
corporations, and the 1978 Bellotti decision, engineered by Louis Powell, which granted free 
speech rights to corporations. One of the central arguments that the movement makes to bolster 
its position, an argument that is also made by Wendy Brown (as well as Tea Party activists and 
proponents of the Defense of Marriage Act), is that law made by the Supreme Court is 
undemocratic in the sense that it is not made by officials who are elected and does not represent 
the will of the people.399 In the process of making this argument, the movement against corporate 
rights stakes a claim to be the true demos whose speech is the legitimate and democratic source 
of law. 
 While narratives of the historical court decisions listed above are often retold by the 
movement against corporate rights, the movement less often pays attention to a transformation in 
the legal concept of the corporation that happened around the turn of the twentieth century. This 
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change in how corporations were conceptualized in legal theory resulted not from specific court 
cases but from a change in how corporations were conceptualized in legal theory. The legal-
theoretical concept of the corporation changed as the result of the importation of a German 
philosophy of group life filtered through a historical account of the battle between authentic 
German law and Roman imperial law. Although many parts of the contemporary movement 
against corporate rights, as well as scholars of the law, have focused intently on “personhood” as 
the key democratic doxa articulated with “corporation,” attention to the legal-theoretical history 
suggests another important articulation of the historical concept of the corporation. In turn-of-
the-century legal theoretical approaches to the nature of corporate “personality,” what was at 
stake was the extent to which corporations are communities – because communities, as variations 
on “the demos,” are fully deserving of what are sometimes called personhood rights. Recent 
attention to the genealogy of the legal concept of person demonstrates precisely how flexible 
and, as Peter Goodrich puts it, “emblematic” the doxa of personhood is.400 There is little question 
that legal “personhood” has always been a sort of mask or artifice that is adopted for strategic 
ends. But the theoretical gesture by which that mask was claimed for corporations was one that 
required the assertion of their rightful claim to the mask, and to do that, they had to be 
understood as natural communities that existed prior to their use of the mask.  
 When the movement against corporate rights declares that corporations are not persons, the 
painfully clear response is a simple yes. No one is a legal person; legal personhood is a tool, a 
mask, doxa that accurately describes no one. Instead of critiquing doxa that is already admitted 
to be deliberately, patently, and obviously false, the movement against corporate rights should 
take aim at the more fundamental doxai that underwrite the corporate claim to rights. This is the 
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claim of joint-stock business corporations to be natural entities that exist prior to the law and that 
deserve the rights of any other community.  
 To make the case that the contemporary sense of the corporation is the product of its 
articulation with the concept of community, this chapter will begin by outlining the doxastic 
articulation of “corporation” as evidenced by the way the concept is used in the Supreme Court’s 
2010 Citizens United decision and legal commentary on that decision. The doxa articulated with 
the concept of corporation produces the contemporary sense of the concept, which includes how 
it is articulated to other concepts and how it tends to be brought to bear on questions and 
problems that arise. I will argue that the doxastic articulation of the legal concept of the 
corporation currently involves equating “corporation” with something very much like what 
Roberto Esposito and Lean-Luc Nancy describe as the dominant definition of “community”: a 
naturally existing entity that is ontologically prior to politics.401 This doxastic sense of 
corporation as community has resulted from an incorporeal event in the concept of corporation 
that happened around the turn of the twentieth century. This event, the importation of a German 
organicist concept of “corporation” into Anglophone legal literature and United States law, 
occurred in and through the institutions of legal knowledge, including universities, technologies 
of legal publication, and the courts. The event of this importation carried along with it certain 
articulated senses that persist in the contemporary doxastic concept of the corporation, including 
the sense that corporations are natural communities. For the movement against corporate rights, 
nothing could be more obvious than the fact that corporations are not communities. Take, for 
instance, the work of the Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund, which gives legal aid 
to small municipalities on the premise that they are precisely the “communities” that are the 
more legitimate bearers of rights than the corporations attempting to extract resources from 
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them.402 From this sort of perspective, the claim that corporations are “communities” could only 
be the expression of a deeply rooted ideology of capitalist economy as natural and immanent to 
social life. 
 The legal definition of corporations that was developed around the turn of the twentieth 
century was what Edward Schiappa identifies as a “real definition,” meaning that it that 
presumes to identify the essence of the thing named by the definition.403 In this way, it differs 
from most legal definitions. Schiappa points out that “legal definitions generally are self-
consciously lexical and prescriptive. That is, when a legal definition of X is set forth, there is no 
pretense that this is what X really is (a fact of essence).”404 Personhood, as mentioned above, is 
an excellent example of the flexibility and contingency of a legal definition that operates quite 
effectively in the absence of a “real” definition. Legal definitions, however, have not always 
been considered to be primarily or self-consciously lexical by those who develop them; in fact 
the distinction between natural law and legal realism could be marked by their differing 
approaches to the definitions of legal terms. For proponents of natural law, legal definitions must 
be “real” definitions that express the essence of the thing they name.  
 As Schiappa notes, the quest for a “real” definition inevitably wanders down a 
philosophical path.405 While this path does not necessarily lead, as Schiappa fears, toward a 
metaphysics of Ideal Forms, it does generally lead toward treating defined terms as concepts 
rather than simply as words with various definitions that are used differently.406 In the context of 
the law, it is even more self-apparently the case that “real” definitions are forceful and practical 
ways to achieve desired effects. This insight is the basis for the recent development of a 
Deleuzian approach to legal concepts that draws on Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s What is 
Philosophy? to argue that legal concepts are creative, expressive, and performative.407 For 
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instance, Alexandre Lefebvre and Edward Mussawir argue that legal concepts are created in 
context to accomplish certain effects, and as such they are “ways to engage creatively with the 
texture and medium of the law.”408 This work resonates with Jean-Jacques Lecercle and Paul 
Patton’s analysis of Deleuze and Guattari’s own philosophical vocabulary as conceptual, rather 
than metaphorical, while emphasizing that concepts are crafted rather than discovered. The 
relationship of such concepts to the world is not a representational relationship (wherein real 
definitions would attempt to refer accurately to Ideal Forms, as Schiappa fears), but a 
performative and creative empirical mapping. 
 This appropriation of Deleuze and Guattari’s work in order to develop the potential of legal 
concepts charts a middle ground between Schiappa’s strict binary between “real” and “lexical” 
definitions of terms and between the presumption of a deep divide between the theories of law as 
natural and as realist. Legal definitions are created and vary according to historical context, 
certainly, but the act creating them is an expressive one that relies on generating the sense that 
the definition is real. Generating that sense may, on occasion, depend on identifying the sense of 
the contingent events or “lexical” definitions of past usage and dissociating those usages from 
the real definition through the techniques of critique. The new Deleuzian jurisprudence 
recognizes the lexicality of legal concepts and how they are redefined as necessary in light of 
new events and problems. Lefebvre calls this process creative, while Mussawir calls it expressive 
and dramatistic.409 They both, however, argue that legal concepts are not representational and do 
not refer to a reality that is external to themselves. This gesture of opposing a dogmatic, real or 
representational theory of legal concepts to a creative, expressive, constructive, or lexical theory 
of legal concepts suggests a fundamental confirmation of Schiappa’s general point that legal 
definitions are lexical in the sense that they are always self-consciously drawing on competing 
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past variations in usage rather than asserting their ability to “really” capture the essence of a 
thing external to them. 
 Deleuzian jurisprudence, however, suggests a dynamic in concept-creation that disturbs 
Schiappa’s tidy binary, as well as their frame of comparison between “representational” and 
“creative” concepts. If we extend Deleuze’s insights on sense beyond the process of adjudication 
to jurisprudence itself, as Nathan Moore suggests we should, the question of whether definitions 
of concepts are about recognition or creation slips away and a larger dynamic of stability and 
change comes into focus.410 As Moore argues, “the condition of thought that a creative thinking 
must transform [is] the conditioned engendering of its own condition.”411 In the terms of 
Deleuze’s work in Logic of Sense, this would mean identifying the lexical senses of a concept in 
context on the way to generating the event of a sense of the concept.412 Generating the event of 
the sense of the concept, however, is more or less akin to offering a “real” definition of that 
concept; and so perhaps the real and the lexical definitions are not quite so strictly opposed. 
 This chapter attempts to generate the sense that corporations are not communities by 
mapping some of the definitions of the legal concept of the corporation as they have been 
articulated with democratic doxai. Generating such a sense of a concept through critiquing 
definitions is the method of conducting a genealogy of how a concept is articulated with various 
doxai. The goal of the specific genealogy of this chapter is to dissociate the legal concept of 
“corporation” from the doxastic persona of “community” by describing the contingent historical 
usages that led to the conflation of the two concepts in the first place. The assumption 
underwriting this genealogy is that the concept of the corporation does not transmit ideology by 
attempting to represent the reality of corporations; it is a sensible definition that can be 
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rearticulated, or recreated, by enacting the tension between stability and change at the heart of 
the concept of doxa and Deleuze’s concept of sense.  
 The goal of this critical account of the genealogy of the concept is to produce what Deleuze 
would call a new sense of how the legal concept of the corporation has been articulated with 
democratic doxai.413 The technique for producing this sense is to map the way that the 
contemporary concept of the corporation, in which corporations appear as whole, natural entities 
that have always existed, is the product of what cultural studies theorists call specific 
institutional and discursive articulations.414 Genealogies of concepts often (explicitly or 
implicitly) follow Michel Foucault’s famous adaptation of Nietszche’s dismembering of 
morals.415 In its post-Foucauldian instantiation, genealogy attempts to write the history of the 
present by describing the role of institutions and discourses in producing doxastic knowledge and 
power. For instance, Talal Asad’s genealogy of the concept of “ritual” takes up the question of 
how that concept came to be understood in the context of anthropological disciplinary 
commitments and institutional structures.416 Genealogies also often position themselves, like 
Cornell West’s genealogy of American pragmatism, as being “explicitly political, without […] 
being pejoratively ideological.”417 This genealogy of concept of the corporation maps the way 
that it results from an expressive event in a specific turn-of-the-century usage of the concept that 
included continental philosophy, freshly minted law reviews, the increasing emphasis on 
research in American universities, increasingly sociological approaches to jurisprudence, and the 
liberalization of incorporation laws. In the context of this state of affairs occurred an incorporeal 
event in the concept of the corporation, performed by Fredric Maitland, of calling corporations 
communities.418 
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 This chapter has five sections. The first section establishes two central parameters of the 
legal concept of the corporation: a distinction between the “real entity” and “concession” 
theories of the corporation and the personification of the corporation. This section concludes that 
the legal concept of the corporation roughly equates corporation with the concept of 
“community.” The second and third sections argue that the initial conflation of corporation with 
community occurred in the importation of a German organicist concept of the corporation around 
the turn of the twentieth century, and that this event of importation introduced, among other 
factors, not only a powerful variation in the concept of the corporation but also a framework for 
contesting the definition of the concept that relies on the distinction between literal and figurative 
definitions. The fourth section describes how the sense of the “community” concept of the 
corporation was produced not just in the content of the philosophy itself, but by legal publishing, 
universities, and the courts. The fifth section describes the political stakes of various concepts of 
the corporation and how the “real definition” of corporations imported by Maitland contains 
within itself an admission of its lexicality that can foster its own disarticulations. 
The Real Entity Theory of the Corporation 
 Since the 2010 Citizens United decision, United States legal periodicals have been bristling 
with articles on campaign finance, free speech, and corporate theory.419 Much like during the 
wave of controversial hostile take-overs and mergers in the 1980s, the glare of the popular 
spotlight on corporate actions has translated into increased legal scholarship on theories of the 
corporation.420 Neither the majority nor the minority opinions in Citizens United explicitly cited 
any justifying conceptual theory of the corporation, so law review articles have taken up the task 
of reading theories of the corporation into those opinions, even against the dissenting opinion’s 
explicit disavowal of the relevance of corporate theory to its claims.421 This legal scholarship 
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attempts to locate Citizens United within a three-part typology of corporate theory: the 
concession/fiction theory of the corporation, the real entity theory of the corporation, and the 
aggregate/nexus-of-contracts theory of the corporation. Each of these three theories of the 
corporation contain variations, but the general three-part schema has consistently been revived as 
a way of classifying speculative accounts of the essential nature of American limited liability 
corporations.422 Because the politics of the schema itself is precisely what I will be exploring in 
this chapter, I will only briefly explain these three at the outset. These theories of the corporation 
often attempt to define the collective persona of “the corporation” in contrast to the other 
definitions, and to the extent that they define by contrast, they are usually lexical.  
 The concession/fiction theory of the corporation assumes that corporations are the result of 
legal privileges like limited liability and perpetual life that are granted by the state; corporations 
are concessions of the state. The corporation is persona ficta, a fictitious person that conducts 
business and exercises limited rights as it is deemed by the state convenient or useful for it to do 
so. The real entity theory of the corporation contrasts most starkly with the concession theory. It 
assumes that corporations exist logically and temporally prior to their legal recognition. It is this 
pre-legal existence and the qualities they share with individual human beings that justify their 
natural claim to legal rights and standing. The aggregate/nexus-of-contracts theory assumes that 
corporations are collections of individuals who deserve the rights that those individuals also 
possess. In the contemporarily popular “nexus-of-contracts” variation, these individuals are 
specifically bound together by a series of smaller contracts.  
 This three-part typology is frequently repeated by legal scholars to justify and describe the 
practical implications of various judicial assumptions and long-term legislative and political 
trends in corporate law. Some scholars, however, have argued that the aggregate theory is 
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essentially just a variation on the real entity theory.423 While the real entity theory ascribes 
natural rights to corporate entities based on the way the totality exhibits certain characteristics 
prior to its legal recognition, the aggregate theory simply derives the same conclusion from 
considering the lump effect of the collected natures of the individuals who participate in the 
group prior to legal recognition. Another way of making this argument would be to say that 
while the real entity theory of the corporation attributes existence and rights to the corporate 
entity metaphorically, the aggregate theory does it synecdochally, and synecdoche is just a 
species of metaphor. In both the real entity and the aggregate theories, the law merely recognizes 
what exists before it: a unified or collected entity. The concession theory, in contrast, describes 
corporations as entities that are created by the law as it transmits a generative structure that 
allows them to take on existence through a governmentally defined form – most notably, a form 
that involves limited liability and perpetual life. 
 To a theorist who is accustomed to thinking about the political stakes of speculative 
definitions, the implications of these contrasting definitions of the U.S. business corporation 
might seem immediately apparent. There has been, however, some debate among legal scholars 
about how and whether any given theory of the corporation can be correlated with particular 
political positions on corporate rights and responsibilities.424 In the context of campaign finance 
law, scholars often argue for a strong correlation between the real entity and aggregate theories 
and an anti-regulation approach to corporations.425 This leads to an intense re-politicization of 
the concepts themselves that is increasingly apparent as it meshes with or fails to mesh with 
activist propositions about the nature of the corporation.426  
 As scholars argue for the political stakes of theoretical accounts of the corporation, the 
majority opinion in Citizens United, of course, gets most of the attention. Some legal scholars 
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have either argued or assumed that the majority decision demonstrates the “aggregate” or 
“nexus-of-contracts” concept of the corporation427. Others argue that the majority decision is 
implicitly underwritten by a variation of the “real entity” concept of the corporation.428 None of 
them, however, argues that the majority decision implies a “fiction” or “concession” concept of 
the corporation. The politics of this division in the concepts of the corporation – with the real 
entity concept supporting the expansion of corporate rights and the concession concept justifying 
limits on corporate action in the name of public interest – does not quite match up with the 
claims of the movement against corporate rights discussed in Chapter Three. Susanna Ripkin 
nicely summarizes the confusion when she argues that the movement’s attention to corporate 
claims to the doxai of “personhood” is misguided because it fails to recognize that legal 
personhood is always just a convenient fiction into which entities are placed by lawyers and 
judges in order to accomplish practical goals.429 According to the concession theory of the 
corporation, in which corporations result from the fictitious creation by the state of a generative 
structure for their action, “personhood” is wholly fabricated and should be granted based on 
whether it serves the public interest. Ripkin’s critique of the movement’s strategies, however, 
ultimately begs the question of how decisions are made as to what sorts of entities are placed in 
the empty container “personhood.” The movement argues that corporations are literally not 
persons and they trace the effects of giving them personhood rights and argue that those effects 
are bad enough to dictate a practical decision not to place corporations in the container persona 
ficta. The movement’s critical unmasking and mapping gestures happen in and through the 
development of “real” definitions of the corporation and its relation to the doxa of personhood. 
 The strength of the movement’s approach to critiquing the “personhood” of corporations, 
in spite of how personhood is generally acknowledged in the legal community to have no 
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necessary relation to a given set of qualities or characteristics,430 starts to become clearer once 
we take a closer look at how the pro-corporate “real entity” concept of the corporation actually 
operates in the Citizen’s United majority decision. Legal scholars have attributed the real entity 
theory of the corporation to Citizens United in two primary ways. First, they focus on the way 
the Court generally posits the existence of corporations prior to the law. According to this 
argument, the Court (in the majority opinion, concurring opinion, and dissent) describes 
corporations as real entities when it asserts that they exist as the result of a “natural tendency 
toward business association.”431 This, however, is a necessary but not sufficient condition of the 
real entity concept of the business corporation; after all, many entities (trees, other nation-states, 
dolphins, genetic material) exist prior to U.S. law but do not have free speech rights. The 
majority opinion also demonstrates its adherence to the real entity concept of the corporation by 
refusing to account for the genesis of corporations in a source that is external to them, i.e., the 
state (as in the concession concept) or individual shareholders (as in the aggregate concept). The 
real entity concept is reflected, as Reuven Avi-Yonah summarizes, in the claim that 
“Corporations stand on their own, independent of both the state that created them and the 
shareholders that own them.”432 
 The second way scholars find the real entity concept in Citizens United is when the 
majority opinion rejects the claim that corporations should be treated differently than any other 
class of speaker, or as one scholar put it, “the Court‘s rejection of disparate treatment on the 
basis of juridical status clearly indicates a real entity perspective.”433 By this reasoning, the 
Citizens United majority employed a real entity concept because it used the assumption that 
corporations were capable of being “treated disparately” and thus have a juridical status. In other 
words, because the Court was willing to figure corporations as a class of entities that has a 
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juridical standing in the eyes of the law, they must exist as entities prior to that recognition or its 
failures.  
 Steven Winter argues that the hinge of this argument is the Court’s use of the democratic 
doxai of speech and speaker: “The systematic conflation of speaker and speech is a rhetorical 
device that allows the Court and its defenders to have their cake and eat it too.”434 I would push 
this analysis a bit further to argue that it is not precisely the conflation of speech and speaker, but 
more specifically the majority’s myopic focus on the doxa of speech that is at the heart of why 
the decision generates a sense of corporations as “real entities.” In the Court’s effort to disavow 
the very question of what a corporation is and does, it focuses intently on how the Constitution 
protects speech itself, the production of all discourse about politics, regardless of “who” 
produces it. In so doing, the Court elides any possibility that the activity/object in question might 
be something other than speech. Calling it speech (rather than, say, money or buying) obviously 
puts it immediately into the category of a constitutionally protected act. But more significantly, 
calling it “speech” implies that there is a “speaker.” “Money” needn’t have a subject that 
produces it or causes it to circulate. The democratic doxa of “speech,” on the other hand, 
immediately suggests that there is a political subject who is the source, cause, and subject of it – 
a real entity that exists prior to the law and who has rights that must be recognized. 
 This articulation of corporations with speech is the core of why the Supreme Court’s 
majority decision seems to reflect the real entity theory: the decision says that corporations 
produce speech, which is not something they could do if they were merely a collection of 
contracts or a state-sponsored generative structure of law. In order to “speak” they must be 
unified, exist prior to the law, and retain some attributes of individuality that are important 
precursors to the human act of speaking – for example, will or interests. There is, of course, a 
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general recognition that corporations are collective entities and not individuals, but the 
attribution of the characteristics of individual human beings suggests that corporations are highly 
unified, singular entities that are capable of having a certain level of consistency of motive, 
quality, identity, or intention. Although the Citizens United majority opinion does not explicitly 
argue that the unity of the corporation is based on any one of these specific attributes, it is not 
necessary to select one of them (motive, identity, quality, intention) in order to see that the 
assumption of the majority of the Court is that the doxastic legal collective persona of 
corporation is roughly equivalent to the concept of community. 
  Community is a collective persona that has a number of different variations. In the 
political-philosophical lexicon community often appears as an entity (rather than a process, 
relation or obligation). Robert Esposito critically summarizes this object/entity concept of 
community as “that of the individual and totality; of identity and the particular; of the origin and 
the end; of more simply of the subject with its most unassailable metaphysical connotations of 
unity, absoluteness, and interiority.”435 The Supreme Court’s presentation of the doxastic 
collective persona of “corporation” as having the internally undivided identity of “speaker” is a 
version of this collective persona of community.436 By presenting corporations as speakers, and 
nothing more, the Court presents corporate community as a unity that expresses a human 
essence. This essence is “speaker,” which operates just as well as other versions of human 
essence, like will, competition, love, or strength, that have served as the basis for presenting 
other visions of the essence of human community. When such a vision of the essence of 
humanness is presented as the core of a community, Jean-Luc Nancy argues, all other processes 
are then described as being merely subsidiary to this supposed core essence of the community:  
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Economic ties, technological operations, and political fusion (into a body or under a 
leader) represent or rather present, expose, and realize this essence necessarily in 
themselves. Essence is set to work in them; through them, it becomes its own work. This 
is what […] might be […] named “immanentism,” […] encompassing both democracies 
and their fragile juridical parapets.437  
 
By avoiding any discussion of the composition and activities that go into campaign finance and 
intra-corporate relations, the Supreme Court’s majority opinion suggests that there is an essence 
to the concept of the corporation that explains all other dimensions of the community: speaking. 
It seems possible that an elucidation of what “speech” actually is, beyond the condition of the 
protection of the subject engaged in it, is likely to have severely complicated the presentation of 
a unified corporate communal whole in the Citizens United decision. But such a discussion was 
also lacking in the majority opinion. Presenting corporations as essentially “speakers,” without 
any discussion of what speech might be, figures them as communities of essence rather than 
process. As “speakers,” corporations are more or less organic social groups, undivided and 
constituted by their common essence, subjects before the law. 
 This conflation of “corporation” and “community” was no accident of rhetorical flourish 
resulting from the imprecise use of “speaker” and “speech.” The articulation of corporations with 
the demotic collective persona of “community” is the result of an event in the concept of the 
corporation that occurred around the turn of the twentieth century. The real entity, or community, 
concept of the corporation was articulated out of a deeply organicist, immanentist account of 
communal life rooted in the fertile soil of German nationalism and transplanted into Anglophone 
legal literature at a moment that was ripe for its flourishing. 
Fredric William Maitland and Otto von Gierke 
 In the second half of the twentieth century, several notable works of scholarship have 
attempted to tell the story of how the “real entity theory” found its footing in the world of 
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Anglophone legal scholarship.438 All of these assign a central role to Fredric Maitland’s 
translation of Otto von Gierke’s Political Theories of the Middle Age.439 The translated text was 
one fifth of Volume Three of Gierke’s unfinished Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht.440 The 
English language book begins with a thirty-nine page “Translator’s Introduction,” written by 
Maitland.441 The introduction is accompanied by twelve pages of analytical summary of Gierke’s 
text and twenty-five pages of Maitland’s notes and references on the introduction. The rest of the 
book consists of 101 pages of Gierke’s text accompanied by 95 pages of notes from Gierke. This 
means that Maitland’s introduction was nearly half the length of Gierke’s text itself, and the 
book as a whole gives the impression of being composed of two monographs, one of which 
happens to be about the other. In fact, Maitland’s introduction is often gratefully cited and 
referenced along with or even apart from Gierke’s text. While some Anglophone scholars were 
inclined to read Gierke in the original German, many seemed to adopt the attitude of Arthur W. 
Machen, who avoided tangling himself too deeply in the “mass of foreign lore” that Maitland 
had conveniently streamlined for him in the translation and further simplified in his 
introduction.442  
 The depth of Maitland’s involvement in the importation of Gierke and the subsequent 
development of the “real entity theory” of the corporation is significant for two primary reasons: 
The first, as Anthony Black points out, is that Gierke’s multi-volume history of the law of 
Genossenshaft (a term that could have been translated as cooperative, fellowship, association, or 
community) contained only two short chapters on the joint-stock corporation. Gierke, who was 
generally a committed socialist, was more interested in worker’s cooperatives, rural peasant 
groups, and guild-like associations than he was in the status and well being of joint-stock 
corporations.443 Maitland, unlike Gierke, was significantly interested in the relevance of Gierke’s 
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Genossenschaftstheorie for the development of a realist legal theory of the joint-stock business 
corporation, which in Maitland’s view was coming into dominance. In his introduction to 
Political Theories of the Middle Age, Maitland acknowledges that his framing analysis of the 
corporation is something of a departure from the content of the translated text (which said 
nothing of joint-stock business corporations specifically) and Gierke’s intent in that “much as 
has been said in this Introduction touching Corporation Law and German Fellowships has been 
intended to explain rather the context than the text of an excerpted chapter.”444  
 Although Maitland can hardly be faulted for wanting to insist on the contemporary 
relevance of his translation, the result of his strategy was to legally re-conceptualize the joint-
stock corporation as a type of “community,” which was the term that Maitland used liberally to 
translate a variety of Gierke’s German terms for groups. In Gierke’s original German, the law of 
Genossenschaft, or fellowship, took its place in relation to towns, guilds, associations, polities, 
churches, the general public, and a host of other collective entities. In Maitland’s translation and 
introduction, the political doxai of “community” rights and the sovereignty of the people came to 
stand in for the general force of all these types of groups in opposition to the principle of 
lordship, monarchical authority associated with imperial Roman law and the antique-modern 
legal associational form of universitas. Maitland’s significant claim was that contemporary joint-
stock business corporations were part of the demos: communities enacting the doxa of the 
people’s sovereignty. 
 This move to articulate corporation with community did not only occur at the level of the 
framing carried out in Maitland’s introduction. It was also carried out at the level of the 
translation of Gierke’s text itself. In the body of the translation, Maitland consolidated a version 
of “community” by using that one term to translate a wide variety of Gierke’s German terms. 
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Under Maitland’s pen, groups ranging from a type of village group to the broad medieval notion 
of the All Men were translated as communities. The use of the term across this range of 
collectives suggested that “community” was the term that signals precisely those entities that are 
temporally and logically prior to the law. Consider, for instance, the passage below from 
Political Theories of the Middle Age, translated by Maitland. This passage occurs several pages 
before the end of the book, as Gierke is attempting to summarize how medieval German 
conceptions of the popular basis of sovereignty persisted in jurisprudence below the surface and 
in the cracks of the consolidation of the Latin principle of lordship that provided the basis of the 
modern nation-state. Following each instance of “community” in Maitland’s translation are 
brackets the contain the original German term used by Gierke and an obvious term that could 
have been used to translate it:  
 
The Romano-Canonical Theory of Corporations, although it decomposed and radically 
transmuted the German notion of the autonomous life of communities 
[Gemeinwesend/communities] and fellowships, always insured to the non-sovereign 
community [Verbänden/associations] a certain independent life of its own, a sphere of 
rights within the domain of Public Law, a sphere that belonged to it merely because it 
was a community, and lastly, an organic interposition between the Individual and the 
Community of All [Allgemeinheit/Public at Large].445  
 
By “Romano-Canonical Theory of Corporations,” Gierke is referring to the practice of 
describing the legal status of groups as being derived from state power via a concession of legal 
right. The term “corporation” in this formulation encompasses a wide range of legal 
organizations, of which the joint-stock business corporation is only one. The English term 
“community” is used by Maitland four times in this passage to translate four different German 
terms. The first usage of community is to translate Gemeinwesend, which may be the German 
term that is best translated by the English “communities.”446 Gemeinwesend has connotations of 
physical presence, such as the hive life of bees or ants. The second usage of “community” 
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translates Verbänden, which could be translated as association, corporation, organization, 
society, federation, unit, or troop, but which has a connotation of collectivity that is organized 
around some common purpose and that is established deliberately as the result of shared goals 
rather than common substance. Maitland’s third usage of “community” does not translate any 
specific word used by Gierke; it is a way for Maitland to convey Gierke’s emphasis on the 
properness of the legal concept of Genossenschaft to the thing itself that it denotes; this may be 
the most notably interventionist use of “community” in this passage. The fourth usage of 
“community,” Community of All, is a translation of Allgemeinheit, a term that more easily could 
be rendered as general public, public at large, or everyone. 
 My goal in pointing out these instances in which “community” is used by Maitland 
instead of other possible English terms is not to take issue with the accuracy of his translation.447 
In fact, there is a strong argument to be made that Maitland’s artful simplification of Gierke’s 
vocabulary is actually more in keeping with Gierke’s core argument than the greater diversity of 
terms used by Gierke himself. The level of generality and unity in the English translation’s 
concept of “community,” however, almost certainly makes it much easier for “community” to 
unproblematically encompass the joint-stock corporation. The high level of generality and unity 
in the translation’s use of “community” additionally lends itself to the articulation of a concept of 
community as an absolute subject that embodies the essence of humanity and is therefore the just 
and legitimate ground of both sovereignty and law. By allowing the term “community” to 
encompass so many types of entities, it is almost inevitable that the term would take on a certain 
metaphysical sense born out of its apparent ability to unify all such entities. The existence of the 
joint-stock corporation then also takes on the sense of being a metaphysical community.  
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 Gierke’s metaphysics of community, however, were organicist. Gierke’s historical 
account of the laws derived from organic, embodied fellowships was part of a deeper nationalist 
project not just in his work but also in Germany more broadly during the late nineteenth century. 
Peter Caldwell argues that Gierke’s organicist theory of law was a significant influence on 
Rudolf Smend, a German legal theorist who strongly advocated for fascist forms of the state in 
the early twentieth century.448 Tropes of the body, life, vitality, purity, unity, and growth were 
central to both Gierke’s account of German fellowship and the more general German cultural 
milieu, so much so that, as Charles Turner notes, Gierke’s “emanationist account of social 
wholes is sometimes seen as anticipatory support for national socialism.”449 This evaluation of 
the relationship between Gierke’s advocacy for a natural German law and the position of the 
Nazi Party is echoed by James Whitman, who points out that the Nazis shared Gierke’s 
opposition to imperial Roman law.450 Gierke’s primary goal in writing the lengthy four volumes 
of Das deutsche Gennossenschaftrecht was to establish the historical basis of a native German 
community law that developed out of the medieval social groups. He argued that imperial 
Roman law had subverted this native law in many cases, and his general strategy was to mark out 
the distinctions between the German law of fellowship and the Roman law of universitas as they 
had intersected over time. The historical context for Gierke’s effort was the mid- to late- 
nineteenth century push to establish a new German Civil Code. Gierke actively participated in 
these efforts as an advocate for what he considered to be a Germanistic legal structure governing 
groups. Gierke wanted the Code to reflect as much as possible what he considered to be 
authentically German law.451 
 This means that much of Gierke’s discussion of German community law happened by way 
of contrasting it with the Roman law governing collective entities, both public and private. 
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Gierke identifies the origin of fiction/concession theory of the corporation in the Roman concept 
of the persona ficta, a fiction of legal personhood and its rights that was originally developed by 
Pope Innocent IV to describe the standing of collegiate or cathedral churches.452 In his 
“Introduction,” Maitland included an extensive discussion of the persona ficta concept of the 
corporation as it was derived from Roman law.  
 Maitland explained that the emphasis of German corporate law had been on the Romanist 
device of the persona ficta, but then “the joint-stock company, a new power in the theoretic as in 
the economic world, began to give trouble.”453 In other words, Maitland claimed that the 
appearance of real and powerful entities, joint-stock corporations, was the provocation for a new 
theory of how the law related to groups. The champion of the revival of fellowship law in 
Germany, according to Maitland, was Gierke and his Germanist colleagues, who struggled 
valiantly in the name of the “community” account of the Corporation: “The theory gradually 
took shape, especially in Dr. Gierke’s hands, and a great deal of thought, learning and 
controversy collected round it. Battles had to be fought in many fields. The new theory was 
philosophically true, scientifically sound, morally righteous, legally implicit in codes and 
decisions, practically convenient, historically destined, genuinely German, and perhaps 
exclusively Germanistic.”454  
 The significance of this embattled frame for the theory itself, as an expression of the 
political conflict over the essential character of the German state, cannot be overstated, although 
it has been frequently overlooked by legal scholars who implicitly adopt its frame without noting 
that the competition between concepts of the corporation was itself produced by Gierke’s 
framing of the dialectical conflict between Romanism and Germanism.455 Because of his 
involvement in the construction of the German Civil Code, Gierke had a strong sense of the 
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political articulations of various theories of collective life and their very practical implications.456 
But beyond his attention to the ways that legal concepts related to his own specific political 
context, Gierke also had a strongly Hegelian sense of the way that dialectical struggle between 
the principals of fellowship and lordship, the common and the hierarchical, the German and the 
Roman, played out within the realm of ideas.457 For Gierke, and also in Maitland’s 
“Introduction” to Political Theories of the Middle Age, concepts and theories are themselves 
personified and engaged in warfare and organic development.  
 In other words, Gierke’s real entity concept of corporation was both naturalistic and 
completely reliant on its opposition to a foreign, Roman, fictitious theory of corporation. Not 
only were the fellowships he was tracing back to the Middle Age themselves part of the organic 
development of the German people, his own concept of fellowship, given that it was, as Maitland 
said, “philosophically true,” “scientifically sound,” and “genuinely German” was itself the 
organic expression of German law itself.458 This proclivity to see concepts as the expression of 
political conflict would play an important role in the way that the “community” concept of the 
corporation was taken up as the “real entity theory” in Anglophone legal literature. 
Gierke Among the Anglos: The Species of the Corporate Community  
 This section will map the transformations in Maitland’s Gierkean concept of corporate 
community as it traveled through the Anglophone legal literature. The community concept of the 
corporation, or the “real entity” theory, relied heavily on the way it was historically framed by 
Maitland and Gierke as being the result of the epic conflict between authentic medieval German 
community law and the convenient legal fictions of Roman imperialism. With a push from 
Maitland, Gierke’s concept of community mutated in several directions, two of which are 
important for the legal concept of the corporation today. It was in the Anglophone reception of 
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the community concept of corporation that “community” became equated with the literal reality 
of what corporations are, and that the concession theory was sidelined as being a theory of the 
corporation that took figuration too seriously. In other words, in the Anglophone struggle to 
work within the dialectical frame provided by Maitland’s translation and introduction of Gierke, 
theories of the corporation were reduced to the literal and the figurative. From a contemporary 
vantage point we might argue that both concepts of the corporation, as well as the frame that 
divides them, are lexical, but the creative process of differentiating them relies on the assumption 
that one concept is more literally representative of actual entities than the other – in other words, 
the action of differentiation is based on the presumption that one definition is “real” while the 
other is merely “lexical.” The result, of course, are articulations of the concept of corporation 
with a variety of doxai that happen through the activity of enunciating real definitions but that 
vary considerably in their usages. As the Deleuzian legal theorists mentioned above argue, the 
legal concepts themselves shift and change in the process of enacting definitions. 
 The opposition between “reality/fiction” or “literality/figuration” was adapted, however, as 
the distinction between “nature/artifice.” Part of this adaptation of the reality/fiction conceptual 
dyad to the nature/artifice dyad was the integration of concepts of the corporation with a 
taxonomic idiom based on biologistic, psychologistic and structural functionalist explanations of 
social life. As Anglophone legal theorists took up the community concept of the corporation, the 
dominant way of describing the joint-stock business corporation, which was entirely consistent 
with Gierke’s analysis, became as a species of the genus “social group.” This taxonomic pattern 
of describing a corporation as a species deepened the metaphysical implications of the 
community concept of the corporation. After describing how Gierke’s dialectic between Roman 
and German law morphed into a discussion of the relationship between reality, fiction, literality, 
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figurality, I will describe how a taxonomic logic re-made the distinction in terms of 
“nature/artifice.” 
 Maitland hedged around Gierke’s organicism in his introduction to Political Theories of 
the Middle Age; subsequent references to Gierke in Anglophone legal theory reflected Maitland’s 
hesitation to endorse an unequivocally organic vision of breathing, eating, corporate entities with 
limbs, organs, parents and offspring.459 Even Maitland, however, tentatively suggested that the 
organic realism of Gierke and the Germanists was quite a powerful concept; “Those therefore 
who have been striving for the 'organic idea' have not been fighting for a mere phrase; and now 
the term 'Organ' stands in the Civil Code of Germany. That is no small triumph of Realism.”460 
His hesitation to fully embrace organicism as a doctrine, however, did not prevent Maitland from 
extrapolating various essences of humanity as the animating principles of corporate/community 
life. Maitland and many of his readers in Anglophone legal circles were ready to entertain the 
proposition that corporations possessed a variety of human attributes like will, bodies, guilt, and 
life.461 The post-Gierke concept of corporation/community produced a sense of the corporation 
as a natural political actor through the ongoing use of tropes of individuality in theoretical 
discourses about the corporation. Maitland suggested, for instance, that the possession of a group 
will was precisely the characteristic that separated a mere business partnership from a business 
corporation:  
 
For example, we are obliged to ask precise questions concerning the inferior limit of 
group-life. Where does it disappear? That is no easy question, for the German Partnership 
goes near to disengaging a group-will from the several wills of the several partners; but 
on the whole we hold, and can give detailed reasons for holding, that in this quarter the 
line falls between our partnership and our joint-stock company.462  
 
While some might call the attribution of “will” to a collective entity a merely rhetorical gesture, 
Maitland presented the “Realist” defense of such attributions as part of an effort to:  
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Give scientific precision and legal operation to thoughts which are in all modern minds 
and which are always displaying themselves especially in the political field. We might be 
told to read the leading article in to-day's paper and observe the ideas with which the 
writer 'operates': the will of the nation, the mind of the legislature, the settled policy of 
one State, the ambitious designs of another: the praise and blame that are awarded to 
group-units of all sorts and kinds.463 
 
The tendency to describe corporations using organicist and personified language was not unique 
to Gierke, but it was certainly entrenched by the adoption of his work.464 Much of the rhetorical 
force of Gierke’s organicism dropped out of legal theory under pragmatic American lawyerly 
pens that were unaccustomed to writing of Spirit, destiny, origins, and organisms. But enough of 
it was preserved to generate a healthy, vital, willful concept of the joint-stock business 
corporation that was on the same moral, scientific and legal ground as other entities with group 
personalities. Maitland’s reading of Gierke validated, with a few reservations, an organic, 
personified and nationalist concept for theorizing the nature of joint-stock corporations, a 
concept that expressed all the pathos and nostalgia of swelling late-nineteenth century Romantic 
German nationalism. The community concept of the corporation figured the battle for this 
conceptually personified identity as co-extensive with the battle for the recognition of the Volk 
itself; the “community” concept of the corporation was given all the rhetorical resources of The 
People and the philosophical battle over the definition of the concept “corporation” was itself 
given a political stake as an extension of that dialectical battle in the realm of ideas. 
 Underlying these defenses of the new “realist” theory of “corporate personality” was the 
persistent call to defend group personality and group will as something more than or other than a 
positive fiction. The community concept of corporation and its roots in the medieval law of 
Genossenschaft was developed by Gierke in a way that was so tightly bound up with its 
opposition to the Romanist concession/fiction theory that Anglophone adherents of the 
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community concept tended to express their loyalty to the new theory through the same dialectical 
frame. In one of the few accounts of Gierke’s importation, Ron Harris points out that this frame 
of the conflict between the real community entity and the fiction/concession concepts of the 
corporation was a frame that did not exist in the Anglophone legal theory prior to its derivation 
from Gierke’s work: “What was transplanted was also the clash between real entity theory and 
grant theory. It was not only a single theory that was transplanted but also the notion of bipolar 
discourse.”465 While theoretical accounts of the corporation certainly existed in the Anglophone 
legal literature prior to the importation of Gierke, they were not understood according to a 
typology, much less the typology of “reality theory” and “fiction theory” that developed out of 
the importation of Gierke.  
 The post-importation Anglophone literature was consumed by the question of the 
distinction between reality and fiction and the many permutations and definitions of both terms. 
A comment by Arthur Machen is highly representative of the central gesture made by the initial 
Anglophone proponents of the community concept of the corporation:  
 
A corporation is an entity – not imaginary or fictitious, but real, not artificial, but natural. 
It existence is as real at that of an army or of the Church. This is the element of truth in 
the reality theory of corporate personality which, originating in Germany, has 
commanded wide acceptance not only in that country but also in France and Italy.466 
 
This statement demonstrates the common articulation between general literary or rhetorical 
fiction and the specific fiction or concession concept of the corporation that was the necessary 
Romanist foe of the Gierke/Maitland community concept of corporation. The question was 
muddled, however, by the fact that any supposed fiction/concession theory of the corporation 
would basically posit that corporations were entities that were really created by legal grants from 
the state, and therefore also assume that the entities resulting from the State’s concession were 
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real and not false. Acknowledging such nuance while maintaining the distinction between the 
competing concepts of the corporation through the terms “real entity theory” and “fiction theory” 
was challenging to say the least. Consider the vigorous and yet obscure efforts of George F. 
Deiser, which I quote at length for the reader’s entertainment as much as for the way it supports 
my argument:  
 
The law has been playing with such a fiction for centuries, in the course of which, the 
fiction, instead of disappearing, as it so conveniently does for the mathematician, has 
increased in girth and height, and has maintained its ghostly existence, in the face of the 
anathema of the philosopher and the fiat of the judicial decree. In an evil day the law, like 
the hospitable Arab, who permitted his camel to shelter his head within the domestic tent, 
gave shelter to an imaginary person – the persona ficta, – then an infant, seemingly of 
little promise and of precarious tenure of life. It has repaid the hospitality of the law, even 
as the camel rewarded his master – by making the legal household permanently 
uncomfortable. The law, awakening to the peril of housing so sturdy an unreality, has 
smiled uneasily, and said, "You are but a fiction – you do not exist, really," and then, 
apparently on the principle of Christian Science, has tried to ignore its existence. But the 
persona ficta will not be ignored. He is a corporation, a collective person, a legal fiction, 
a convenient factor in legal reasoning, but, real or fictitious, he emerges uncannily from 
every fiat of extinction, much after the fashion of Antaeus who, cast to earth, renewed his 
vitality.467 
 
Deiser, while attempting to capture the strength and persistence of the legal fiction of corporate 
personhood, generates a strong sense that it is the corporation itself that is persistently real apart 
from and even prior to the law that supposedly generated it. The result is that it is entirely 
unclear what the difference between “the law” and the “legal fiction of corporate personhood” 
might be. When combined with a floridly metaphorical defense of organicist language in legal 
theory, the confusion over what the distinction between the “reality” and the “fiction” actually 
was provided endless grist for enterprising early nineteenth century legal theorists like Deiser 
who wanted to try their hand at unravelling the post-Gierke puzzle of “corporate personality.”  
 The result was that attempts to define “corporation” actually began to also require 
definitions of “reality,” “fiction,” and iterations of those concepts that were also opposed to one 
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another in the process: most notably the literal and the figurative or the natural and the 
artificial.468 What remained consistent was that these terms were used to suggest the differential 
opposition between the concepts of the corporation as well as the relation between the law and 
what was external to it.  
 The result of efforts to define “reality” and “fiction” in the context of “corporate 
personality” led to the admission that fictions can be real, but it also had another important 
effect. This effect was that the “reality” of corporate personality, which was argued to exist prior 
to the law, also required recognition or accurate representation by the law. In this way, early 
twentieth century discussions over the nature of corporate personality were enmeshed in a 
broader jurisprudential debate between natural law and positive law.469 Adherents to the 
Maitland/Gierke community concept of the corporation often argued that corporations were not 
just real but natural, and that the task of the law was to literally or accurately represent them 
rather than artificially fictionalize them.470 But this was not an argument that was made expressly 
in favor of a course of legislative action; it was framed in ontological terms as a statement about 
the very nature of the law in relation to corporate entities. As a result, the law was increasingly 
treated as itself a mid-level sociological theory. 
 This pattern was deepened by the way Maitland and others drew connections between 
Gierke’s metaphysical organicism and popular scientific theory. Maitland’s introduction to 
Gierke’s text suggested that Darwin’s investigation into variations in organisms over time was an 
appropriate model of historical inquiry into the law and its species of group-entity: 
 
For, when all is said, there seems to be a genus of which State and Corporation are 
species. They seem to be permanently organized groups of men; they seem to be group-I 
units; we seem to attribute acts and intents, rights and wrongs to these groups, to these 
units. Let it be allowed that the State is a highly peculiar group-unit; still it may be asked 
whether we ourselves are not the slaves of a jurist's theory and a little behind the age of 
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Darwin if between the State and all other groups we fix an immeasurable gulf and ask 
ourselves no questions about the origin of species.471 
 
The origins of the genus “community,” of course, are precisely what Gierke’s text sought to 
describe, although the attribution of a scientific typology was Maitland’s. The classificatory 
schema for explaining and describing “group-units” or communities was contagious. Much of 
the Anglophone interest in the community concept of corporation followed this taxonomic logic 
by identifying joint-stock corporations as one of a set of social groups that the law might or 
might not recognize. Some of these followers of Maitland, like George Wharton Pepper, 
restrained themselves to commenting on the need for the law of corporations to take greater heed 
of economic science’s taxonomy of economic entities.472 Others, such as Machen, broadly 
compared corporations to armies, churches, or schools.473 These encompassing claims about the 
very nature of human social life were often expressed with a great deal of relish in the 
philosophical task. One can almost picture a bespectacled Jethro Brown, an early adopter of the 
Gierkean concept of the corporation in 1905, reclining in his leather wing-backed chair and 
ponderously pronouncing, “The inquiry is one which leads us on from the subject of corporations 
to the wider subject of human association in general. Of this wider subject it is necessary to 
speak for a moment.”474 Harold Laski, a legal theorist with one foot in political philosophy, went 
so far as to boldly assert a link between the nature of joint-stock corporations and the very nature 
of society itself, writing that: “Men are social beings in the sense that no undertaking can be 
carried out to any large extent without some kind of social cooperation. Societies in which 
individuals would act singly do not exist; all societies are based on the fact that their members 
act together.”475 Laski, drawing heavily on Maitland and Gierke, argued that it was crucial that 
the law embrace sociological perspectives on associative life if it hoped to effectively legislate 
for joint-stock corporations: 
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Certainly no lawyer dare neglect the phenomena of group life, even if on occasion he 
denies a little angrily the need for him to theorize about them. For man is so essentially 
an associative animal that his nature is largely determined by the relationships thus 
formed. The churches express his feeling that he has need of religion. His desire for 
conversation and the newspapers results in the establishment of clubs. The necessity of 
social organization gave birth to the state. As his commercial enterprise began to 
annihilate distance, the trading company came into being. It would not, one urges, be 
over-emphasis to assert that in every sphere of human activity associations of some kind 
are to be found. They are the very life-breath of the community.476  
 
This passage demonstrates the fine line that was walked by pragmatic Anglophone legal theorists 
as they attempted to embrace organicism by way of the scientific taxonomy of group life. Laski 
enumerates the various types of human association: churches, clubs, the state, trading company. 
All of these associations, however, are rooted in man’s essential nature as an associative animal; 
this animal nature essence is the life-breath (very near to the spirit) of community. The reality of 
the community concept of corporation is expressed by associating it with what is natural in 
man’s essence, a nature that enables the movement guiding the development of the community 
concept of corporation. 
 Describing the corporation as a naturally existing entity was further accomplished by some 
theorists through explicit calls for a close integration of the law with the burgeoning social 
sciences. William Martin Geldart, for instance, argued like many others that corporations should 
be considered within the “the scale of social organisms below the State” such as churches, 
universities, social clubs, and cities.477 For Geldart, however, this consideration was and should 
be an important result of the responsibility that the law had to take into account a range of 
disciplinary perspectives, some of which were quite new: “The question is at bottom not one on 
which law and legal conceptions have the only or the final voice: it is one which law shares with 
other sciences, political sciences, ethics, psychology, and metaphysics.”478 This type of reference 
to interdisciplinary perspectives on the question of the nature of corporation was a gesture to the 
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newly forming social sciences and a rash of interest during that time-period in theories of group 
life. While legal theorists rarely cited them directly, many of the post-Gierke “real entity” legal 
perspectives on the nature of group-life, collective will, and group mentality or personality were 
deeply resonant with works then circulating by theorists like Herbert Spencer, Sigmund Freud, 
Max Weber, Émile Durkheim, Gustav Lebon, Gabriel Tarde, and Charles Horton Cooley. There 
was even a tendency amongst post-Gierke legal theorists (as there is, perhaps, today among some 
legal scholars) to express a certain level of discomfort with what they saw as the failures of the 
law to match the more rigorous insights of social science when it came to the complexities of 
group life. Paul Vinogradoff, for instance, lamented that “attempts to subject matters of 
conviction and collective mentality to rigid rules of legal continuity are bound to result in 
irrational compromises.”479 Vinogradoff, struggling valiantly against such irrational 
compromises, drafted taxonomic lists and attempted to mark out criteria for differentiating types 
of corporate entities.480  
 The result of treating corporations as properly the object of social scientific knowledge 
allowed the community concept of the corporation to be understood primarily as a theoretical 
concept or “real definition” that accurately represented an existing class of entities. The result 
was that while pragmatic Anglo legal theorists carefully avoided conceptualizing joint stock 
limited liability corporations as being “natural” in the sense of being biological organisms, they 
were still “natural” communities in which popular sovereignty resided prior to its expression in 
the law. This perspective on community/corporation and popular sovereignty was only possible 
after the transition from the reality/fiction framing of concepts of the corporation through the 
literal/figurative dyad and into the natural/artificial dyad. After tracing out the problems with the 
reality/fiction frame and moving themselves into the natural/artificial frame, most of the 
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adherents of the Gierkean concept of corporation admitted that artificial state concessions played 
some role in the development of joint-stock business corporations, but that ultimately these 
corporations were “natural” phenomena. Jethro Brown, for instance, concluded that this was so 
because of the way that joint-stock corporations fundamentally “grew” instead of being “made”: 
“The question then arises, since both 'natural persons' and corporate persons are real, what 
epithet we should employ to distinguish them. The term ' artificial' is less objectionable than the 
term 'fictitious,' but it must be rejected because the development of normal group personality is 
essentially growth not manufacture.”481 In Brown’s case, as in the case of many others, the 
dialectical frame set forth by Gierke and Maitland was somewhat unsatisfying but nonetheless 
highly productive in all of its iterations. 
 What this genealogy of the importation of the concept of the corporation demonstrates is 
first, that defining joint-stock business corporations as communities was done by a “real 
definition” of corporations to articulate them with organicist political doxai such as community 
and will. Second, however, those articulations were expounded upon by contrasting them with 
purportedly “lexical” or artificial definitions of the corporation. In many ways, this history of the 
“real” definition of the corporation enacts Schiappa’s worst fears about the potential of real 
definitions to move toward metaphysical claims. But this is only half the story. The other half is 
that the “real definition” could be created only by including a sort of “lexical” supplement that it 
was dissociated against. The result has been the preservation of both the “real” and the “lexical” 
concepts of the corporation and the narrative of dialectical competition between them that plays 
out in the most contemporary legal scholarship on “theories of the corporation.” The organicist 
definition could only be articulated along with its dialectical frame. 
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 What Deleuzian legal theorists such as Lefebvre and Mussawir help to clarify however, is 
that the articulated sense of the concept of the corporation was produced not just in the content of 
the definitions but also in the expressive performance of those definitions as part of institutions. 
The next section explores how the sense of the “real entity” or “community” concept of the 
corporation was produced through its expression in such institutions as an evental change. 
Legal Periodicals and Gierke’s Importation  
 The initial importation and development of the community concept of the corporation into 
Anglo jurisprudence was coterminous with important developments in legal publishing 
technologies and universities’ understanding of their own missions. These two factors, combined 
with the general impetus to define corporations as naturally occurring entities, allowed the 
community concept of the corporation to take on the sense that it was part of building scientific 
knowledge about the world, and that the law was in many ways a branch of such an endeavor. As 
American universities moved further toward a German model that increasingly prioritized the 
production of knowledge over pedagogy,482 a quasi-sociological theory like the community 
concept of the corporation was increasingly attractive.  
 The quasi-sociological sense of corporations discussed in the last section occurred largely 
through the medium of new legal periodicals like the Harvard Law Review, the American Law 
Register, the Yale Law Review, the Columbia Law Review, and the English Law Quarterly 
Review. Periodicals like this had their genesis in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
during precisely the period during which the community concept of the corporation was coming 
into focus.483 These periodicals were the current “new media” of the legal profession and the 
discussion of corporate personality that centrally featured Maitland and Gierke’s variation on the 
concept of the corporation was one of the hottest topics in their pages. The popularity of 
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“corporate personality” was fueled by the more frequent circulation of legal periodicals and 
added to the sense that the Maitland/Gierke community concept of the corporation was the 
cutting edge of a new breed of “scientific” legal research. The sense was so strong that one 
scholar asserted: “it is difficult indeed for an American lawyer writing upon the subject of 
corporations to avoid declaring himself” for or against the community concept of the 
corporation.484  
 The initial formulations of the real entity concept of the corporation did not take place in 
such periodicals, but as these periodicals published articles on the topic, part of the sense of the 
importation resulted from the way it crossed into the new publishing medium. Maitland’s 1900 
translation of Gierke was a slim volume published by Cambridge University Press. It was 
preceded by the less-often cited 1897 treatise on The Legal Nature of Corporations by Ernst 
Freund, published by the University of Chicago Press, a treatise that also drew on Gierke but that 
provided a more practical and doctrinal approach to the nature of the corporation than Maitland’s 
legal historical framing.485 Both of these texts were books, however. The uptake of the 
community concept of the corporation occurred as these books were cited in the new circulation 
paths of law reviews that were freshly enabled by both increasingly inexpensive printing 
technology and the sponsorship of universities that were fashionably interested in demonstrating 
the capacities of their faculty to produce knowledge and not just teach students.486 Academic 
journals in general were a central feature of the broader movement to envision the new 
knowledge-production role of the university and so “universities and learned societies created 
numerous journals to contain the new scholarship, which could not be absorbed (and in many 
instances would not have been accepted) by then-existing commercial or learned periodicals.”487 
The result was that the sense of the real entity concept of the corporation derived from Gierke’s 
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conservative history of the German metaphysics of community took on the air of a 
groundbreaking scientific discovery, hot off the presses.  
  Law reviews strove to appeal not only to scholars but to the harried practitioner of the law 
attempting to keep up with broad collections of new developments in their area of practice.488 A 
less academic type of periodical called a law report had previously served this purpose, but with 
the rapid dispersion of the U.S. population resulting from the railroad and the telegraph, the law 
reports were no longer able to sufficiently condense the piles of detailed news on changes in the 
law into coherent summaries that were useful.489 What was needed was a form of legal writing 
that was both current and conceptual, up-to-date and of the moment while also summarizing and 
systematizing. The academic law review helped to fill that niche. 
 The sense of newness, innovation, and discovery of law reviews was augmented by their 
editorial policies, their writing styles, and the way they were being taken up by legal 
communities in the early twentieth century. First, law reviews sponsored by universities were 
frequently, as now, edited by students rather than faculty.490 At the time of their inception, it lent 
law reviews a sense of being vaguely controversial or edgy; even the faculty at Harvard were not 
universally in support of what is now thought of as their history-making, path-breaking law 
review.491 Part of law reviews’ specific association with youth and innovation at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, was a new concise and conversational style of legal writing that was a 
significant departure from the more arcane, elaborate and stuffy style of legal treatises.492 Very 
few of the early law review articles on the community concept of the corporation contained 
substantial case summaries or analysis, especially by today’s standards of legal research. They 
nonetheless benefited from the general impression of currency provided by the medium in which 
they circulated.  
 179 
  All of these factors – the movement of American universities toward a stronger focus on 
research, the newness in the technology and writing style of law reviews, and the ease with 
which Gierke’s account of community translated into a sociological theory of the corporation – 
contributed to the incorporeal event in the legal concept of the corporation. This sense was 
greatly enhanced by the central, indispensable feature of the new community concept of the 
corporation discussed above: it was almost always described as being in a struggle with the 
“fiction/concession” theory of the corporation. It was this conviction that the concepts 
themselves were part of a dialectical, historical struggle that generated a strong sense that the 
new theory of the corporation mattered, that it was politically and historically significant, and 
that the effects of the “debate” between the two versions of the concept of the corporation was 
itself the expression of a vital encounter between the law and the contemporary state of affairs 
wrought by burgeoning corporate influence. 
The Community Concept of the Corporation: Political Articulations 
 Over the past century, there has been substantial discussion amongst legal scholars about 
whether the community concept of the corporation has any consistent or necessary political 
implications. Recent legal scholarship, as discussed above, has attributed the expansion of 
corporate rights to the “real entity” or community concept of the corporation, especially in the 
context of Citizens United. But not all legal scholars have been equally confident that any given 
concept of the corporation has necessary effects on corporate power and politics. In 1925, toward 
the end of the furor over Gierke’s work, John Dewey famously argued that any given concept of 
the corporation could be used to various political ends when given the proper spin.493 In 1989, 
one legal historian even argued that during the early twentieth century the progressive and 
scientific “real entity theory” of the corporation was propounded by legal theorists who were 
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sympathetic to efforts to prosecute corporations for torts and crimes, meaning that it facilitated 
putting limits on the powers of joint-stock corporations.494 This perspective, however, is an 
outlier; most scholars seem to agree that the community concept of the corporation has greatly 
enhanced corporate power and rights.495 Including corporations in the class of entities that can be 
legally prosecuted also involved describing them in such a way that they could also be granted 
rights – like the right to buy and sell property, equal protection, due process, and, eventually, free 
speech. The post-Gierke “real entity theory” of the corporation in turn-of-the-century 
Anglophone legal theory had important features that organized and validated arguments in favor 
of the expansion of corporate power and rights.496 As discussed above, the two most common 
and essential characteristics of the articulation of corporation with community are first, that it 
describes corporations as unified wholes that exhibit characteristics of individual human beings 
like embodiment and will; and second, that it describes corporations as entities that exist prior to 
their recognition by the law. There is agreement among many legal scholars that the ascription of 
these characteristics to corporate entities has substantially facilitated their acquisition of 
constitutional rights historically reserved for natural human beings497. For instance, the landmark 
1977 campaign finance case First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti that served as the primary 
source of precedent in Citizens United also describes corporations as “speakers.”498 Legal 
scholars have explored the positive and structuring influence of the community or real entity 
concept of the corporation in a litany of other cases that expanded corporate rights and powers.499  
 On what basis do these scholars claim that the articulation of corporation with community 
facilitates the attribution of rights and powers to corporations? There is, of course, a relevant 
larger question about the relationship between legal theory and the determinations of the courts – 
but the question is relevant to all discussions about the relationship between jurisprudence and 
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the exercise of the law. In more specific discussions about corporate rights, there seem to be 
three general ways of positioning the relationship between the conceptual account of the 
corporation and its political effects. The first, and perhaps the strongest, is most effectively 
propounded by Horwitz, who argues that the community concept of the corporation legitimated 
developments in corporate law and power around the turn of the twentieth century.500 In this 
account, legal theory was able to describe what was happening in the common law as a sort of 
metaphysical necessity, ex post facto. For Horwitz and others who understand legal theory as 
justifying transformations in the common law of corporations, the articulation of corporations 
with the political doxai of community is something very much like what marxists would call an 
ideological expression of changing forms of production and property ownership. 
 The second way that legal scholars explain the relationship between the community 
concept of the corporation and the expansion of corporate rights and powers is as a type of 
rhetorical correlation. In this type of explanation, the doxai of personification and naturalization 
are uncovered in cases that expanded corporate rights, but neither is necessarily caused by the 
other. The rhetorical devices simply accompanied the rights of human beings to the abstract 
entities, which in turn had political implications for the powers of corporations.  
 I would like to argue, however, that the community concept of the corporation has political 
implications because it had been imported within a ready-made oppositional framework that 
facilitates the expression and simplification of political conflict. Very few of the historians of the 
legal concept of the corporation attend to the way that the thematic frame of dialectical 
opposition between the various theories of the corporation was itself the result of the importation 
of Gierke’s community concept of the corporation.501 One of the few who has noted it, Ron 
Harris, argues that while there had been theories of the corporation, both implicit and explicit, at 
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work in Anglophone legal literature and judicial decisions prior to Gierke’s importation, 
explaining them according to a typology and, even more importantly, as being in oppositional 
struggle with one another, was an important innovation in the sense of the concept of the 
corporation. Although for Gierke, the central historico-political conflict was between Roman 
imperial law and the natural German community law of the medieval period, this historical 
specificity of that conflict largely dropped out in the United States. What remained, as John 
Dewey noted, was the sense that concepts of the corporation were in competition, and that the 
conceptual competition had political stakes.502  
 In other words, the political implications of articulating corporations as a natural 
community are given by the fact that it is understood dialectically and as part of a framework of 
competing articulations of the nature of corporations. The concept may have little or no 
determinate political significance, but it has historical and rhetorical political significance that 
has accrued as it has been opposed to the pro-regulation fiction/artificial concept of the 
corporation. The political force of the articulation of corporation with the doxa of community is 
only produced by understanding the that articulation as being contingent and embattled. Gierke’s 
organicist Gennossenschafttheorie used a reality/fiction thematic frame for contesting the theory 
of the corporation, so that frame can be re-introduced to map out the political implications of 
either articulation of the corporation.  
Conclusion 
 The importation and articulation of Otto von Gierke’s “community” concept of the 
corporation into the Anglophone legal literature around the turn of the twentieth century was 
important for several reasons: First, it generated a variation in the collective persona of the 
corporation wherein corporations were conflated with communities and given rights based on 
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that conflation. Second, the importation consolidated the position that corporations were natural 
entities that exist prior to the law and that the role of the law was simply to recognize their 
rights-bearing existence. Third, the importation of the community concept of the corporation 
introduced an embattled, dialectical frame for interpreting the political significance of theories 
and concepts of the corporation, which encouraged the practice of understanding these theories 
as closely related to political issues that corporations were involved in. 
 This genealogy of how the corporation was articulated with the political doxai of 
community suggests that the specific interplay between conceptual dyads of fiction/reality, 
figurative/literal, and artificial/natural played an important role in that articulation. These dyads 
are still present in the contemporary efforts to define the nature of corporations and can provide 
important rhetorical resources for political actors attempting to disarticulate corporations from 
their legal rights. Even though the “real entity” definition of the corporation persists, retaining 
Gierke’s sense of the concept as divided against a “fiction” concept of the corporation enables 
the continued emphasis on the political stakes of jurisprudential concepts that underwrite the law. 
The rhetorical gestures that constitute the various concepts of the corporation are not uniquely 
suited to jurisprudence; they are articulated in political claims that corporations are “tools” of the 
public good, etc. Additionally, the branch of the movement discussed in the next chapter 
indicates, community is a demotic collective persona that is quite effectively demonstrated by 
distinguishing the “natural” and the “artificial.” The ongoing conflation of corporation and 
community that occurs in the legal concept of the corporation means that an effective critical 
strategy may be to further attempt to disarticulate the corporation from the democratic doxai of 
community.  
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 The “real definition” of the corporation as a naturally existing entity ontologically and 
logically prior to the law seems to be a concept that operates according to a logic of 
representation. Mapping the contingency of the articulations of the concept, however, suggests 
that the claim that corporations are natural or real before the law requires the simultaneous 
introduction of the position that they are not. Similarly, the goal of the genealogy of the 
articulation of the concept of the corporation presented in this chapter is to produce a sense that 
the concept of the corporation is really not the same as community. This points toward the 
regressive demonstration of epistemic sense-making as a technique of critiquing articulations of 
doxai. 
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Chapter 6 
Founding Democratic Law: Community Rights and the Critique of the Corporate State 
 
 When branches of the movement against corporate rights enact collective personae as the 
subject position of the demos, their actions are often underwritten by the assumption that the 
State is an institution that can more fully represent the true demos, which is composed of natural 
human beings. This sense of the democratic potential of the State is quite essential to the more 
liberal branches of the movement that seek an amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Not all 
branches of the movement against corporate rights take amending the U.S. Constitution as their 
goal however. This chapter discusses how the Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund 
(CELDF) opposes corporate rights as part of a rejection of the possibility that state and national 
government can ever be as democratic as local politics. 
 CELDF is “a non-profit, public interest law firm providing free and affordable legal 
services to communities facing threats to their local environment, local agriculture, the local 
economy, and quality of life.”503 CELDF is involved with critiquing corporate rights and 
attempting to block the activities of for-profit corporations in small townships and 
municipalities. They argue that state and federal level regulatory systems are flawed and can 
only foster the legitimization of the infliction of corporate harm on local communities. Because 
of the failures of regulatory systems such as the Environmental Protection Agency, they argue, 
communities need to re-assert their right to self-govern and legislate against various corporate 
actions.504  
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 CELDF has uneasy ties to other branches of the movement against corporate rights. 
CELDF has declared that it does not endorse activism that focuses narrowly on “overturning” 
Citizens United or amending the U.S. Constitution.505 There are two primary reasons for their 
refusal to support the strategy of amending the Constitution. The first, they point out, is that 
corporate influence on politics was a deep and persistent problem prior to Citizens United. And 
second, they argue, amending the Constitution would still do little to foster the practices of 
community self-governance that are vital to sustain actual democracy. In other words, CELDF 
takes the general position that processes of national representative governance are not and can 
never be truly democratic. So, says CELDF, “we must become revolutionaries, not 
reformers.”506 Instead of attempting to restore a democratic system that never existed, they 
argue, we should be trying to build one from the ground up by creating a “new community civil 
rights movement” that does not involve “asking for permission” from authorities.507 Building 
such a movement, of course, is precisely what CELDF is claiming to do by facilitating 
“grassroots organizing that will grow community by community, lawsuit by lawsuit, local law by 
local law; pressing outwards to eventually change state law and then federal law.”508 Rather than 
amend the U.S. Constitution by invoking the rights of “the people” to do so through their elected 
representatives, CELDF argues, communities should assert their sovereign right to create the 
laws that govern their places, activities, and natural environment.  
 CELDF’s rejection of state and national government as a viable forum for democratic 
politics, even constitutional politics, mirrors a divide in critical theories of democracy that was 
discussed in Chapter One. Jacques Rancière, for instance, sees constitutional language as 
providing the doxai that enable the enactment of the democratic subject position, but also seems 
to assume that democracy must act against the modern national state “police order.”509 Wendy 
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Brown draws on Sheldon Wolin to take a similar stance on the relationship between democratic 
subjects and state institutions.510 Giorgio Agamben perhaps goes a step further by arguing that 
ideal political collectivity — which he variously characterizes through the personae of 
community, singularity, humanity, and others — would involve nothing whatsoever like a State 
because such politics, “will no longer be a struggle to conquer or to control the state on the part 
of either new or old social subjects, but rather a struggle between the state and the nonstate 
(humanity), that is, an irresolvable disjunction between whatever singularities and the state 
organization.”511 Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt have also spent a great deal of energy 
forwarding the position that imperial State institutions cannot and should not be the target of 
political transformation because the modern State can never be fully democratic.512 Negri and 
Hardt forward this position in part through a critique of “the people” as the sovereign subject 
whose authority provides the foundation of the modern State. Instead, they famously argue, the 
multitude is the collective subject that will generate the events of a new, unruly non-state 
politics. There are elements of the anti-corporate movement that embrace this perspective in that 
they seem relatively uninterested in attempting to reform national State institutions, especially 
the United States federal government. Occupy protestors, for instance, have on occasion voiced a 
strong critique of corporations and their rights while simultaneously refusing the option of 
fielding candidates for elected office or making specific legal and policy demands, arguing that 
demands confer legitimacy on authorities.513 The stance of “pure critique,” without demand, has 
made Occupy an attractive and supportable movement for intellectuals who similarly disavow 
the democratic potential of State institutions, especially as they are currently configured. As a 
result, Occupy’s refusal to put faith in current forms of representative government and its 
alternative aesthetic techniques of demonstration have been well-described.514  
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 From these perspectives, democracy is an event that occurs against or apart from the State. 
I have argued in previous chapters that such events can be produced through democratic politics 
that oppose the State as it is currently configured by corporate influence without rejecting the 
modern State form tout court. CELDF, however, does turn away from national State politics 
almost completely as it broadly assumes that amending the U.S. Constitution to deny 
corporations rights, no matter how many rights, could not plausibly result in a meaningfully 
more democratic state.  
 CELDF, however, also works through the law and attempts to institutionalize democracy at 
the level of local politics while codifying a critique of larger and more powerful state institutions 
that have been corrupted by corporations. This hope that the institution of the law might be an 
effective tool of democracy seems to be something of a departure from the general rejection of 
the state articulated by theorists such as Agamben or Hardt and Negri. In fact, the hope that 
institutionalizing democratic doxai in the law could be more democratic suggests a sympathy 
between CELDF’s methods and some of the other theories of democracy discussed in Chapter 
One. Although proponents of deliberative democracy, for instance, agree that democracy inheres 
in civil society rather than in the State, for such theorists of the public, democracy can be 
established in semi-permanent institutions that enable the development and expression of 
opinion, debate, and identification. Chantal Mouffe holds out a similar hope for semi-permanent 
democratic institutions, although she theorizes a stronger role for affective relations in the 
processes of agonistic engagement than deliberative theorists typically posit.515 Mouffe even 
goes so far as to criticize post-operaismo theorists such as Hardt and Negri for their willingness 
to advocate a politics of “exodus” from the State and other ostensibly representative 
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institutions.516 Advocates of deliberative democracy and agonism see an important role for the 
State as a site of reform and change. 
 CELDF charts a unique democratic path that both rejects the State and attempts to use its 
tools to found more democratic political collectivity. They seem to chase the possibility that 
institutions may foster and facilitate the event of democracy, understood as the appearance of the 
demos through doxastic collective personae. The local resolutions, movement genealogies, 
digital petitions, and critiques of democratic doxai discussed in previous chapters strive for a 
reform and revival of the democratic potential of the national State and other institutions. The 
hope that political representation can be democratic if it is less corrupted by corporate power and 
greed animates the goal of amending the Constitution for groups like Move to Amend. The 
assumption behind such hope is that representative institutions such as universal suffrage and the 
free press are able to accomplish the task of accurate political representation by clarifying public 
opinion and enabling meaningful elections.  
 CELDF’s approach to corporate rights, however, is to help local municipalities draft 
ordinances that deny corporations all legal rights within the town limits while simultaneously 
asserting the sovereign right of the community to make law within those borders. In what 
remains of this chapter, I will argue that CELDF’s community rights ordinances demonstrate 
how dissensual democracy, which is both a critique of undemocratic representation and the event 
of the appearance of the demos, might be institutionalized and even codified. CELDF rejects 
existing federal and state institutions and the way that democratic doxai such as “rights” support 
undemocratic relations through the State. They also, however, attempt to codify direct 
democratic self-rule by instituting new law based on the rights of communities rather than 
individuals. CELDF understands democracy as a critical, anti-institutional event while 
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simultaneously attempting to build democratic institutions. CELDF pursues this goal by 
simultaneously critiquing and enacting democratic doxai such as “rights” and collective personae 
while attempting to codify their version of those doxai and the critique as law.  
 It is this final element of CELDF’s ordinances that departs profoundly from the approach 
of other branches of the movement against corporate rights such as Move to Amend: attempting 
to codify an ongoing critique of corporate rights in the law itself. Amending the U.S. 
Constitution to deny corporations rights would make codifying such a critique irrelevant; 
corporations would no longer have such rights. At the local level that CELDF works at, however, 
the continued presence of corporate rights in state and federal law makes the codification of 
critique also necessary.  
 This chapter will develop a two-part account of how CELDF’s understanding of 
democracy incorporates both dissensual critiques of the State and the founding of democratic 
law. In the first section I will describe how CELDF’s community rights ordinances codify a 
critique of how the doxa of rights has been claimed by corporations through State institutions. In 
the second section I will describe how CELDF attempts to ground a new democratic law based 
on the doxai of community rights. These two aspects of CELDF’s community rights ordinances 
ultimately demonstrate the possibility the doxa of rights and community can institutionalize 
dissensual democracy through founding political collectivity. CELDF’s ordinances strive to 
codify dissensual democracy in a way that enables the perpetual reappearance of the demos that 
critiques corporate rights. This involves codifying democratic doxai in ways that position such 
doxai as the ontological ground of political collectivity — but not as doxai, instead as true and 
tangibly existing natural and biological “community.” At the same time, the ordinances also 
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codify the gesture of critiquing the undemocratic way that those same doxai protect and 
consolidate the power of corporations through State institutions. 
Community Rights Ordinances: Institutionalizing Doxai to Produce Democratic Events 
  CELDF’s primary strategy for enabling stronger democratic self-governance is to help 
draft and pass rights-based local ordinances.517 These ordinances are different from the local 
resolutions discussed in Chapter Two in that the ordinances carry the force of law, while the 
local resolutions discussed earlier amount to a mode of demonstration or protest carried out in 
the space of a local government meeting or referendum. The ordinances are laws facilitated by 
CELDF that assert the rights of local government bodies, including the right to self-govern, right 
to water, rights of natural communities, rights of ecosystems, civil and political rights, etc. These 
ordinances are often pursued by local governments as responses to specific problems. Most 
recently, the primary issue has been the removal of natural gas through hydraulic fracturing 
techniques (also known as fracking).518 Additionally, however, CELDF has helped to draft and 
pass similar ordinances in response to a variety of other issues, including factory farming, toxic 
waste disposal, oil drilling, hard rock mining, water use, development policy and clean 
elections.519 Many of these community rights ordinances have yet to be tested in actual legal 
battles. They are also expanding their work into the law of other countries — for instance they 
participated in drafting Ecuador’s 2008 constitution, which codifies the rights of nature, the right 
to food, and the right to “Free, intercultural, inclusive, diverse and participatory communication 
in all spheres of social interaction” and the right of access to airwaves and information 
technologies, among other rights. CELDF has also been working with the Australian Earth Laws 
Alliance to explore different strategies for protecting community rights and the rights of nature in 
Australian communities. Their approach to “rights” speaks to broader concerns about the 
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relationship between community citizenship and national citizenship in the context of 
environmental and ethnic international porousness and seems likely to be increasingly relevant 
for the ongoing development of legal approaches to environmental protection. 
 In the US, CELDF has been facilitating the passage of local ordinances asserting 
communities’ rights since 1998.520 Because of the failures of state and national regulatory 
systems, CELDF argues, communities need to re-assert their right to self-govern and legislate 
against corporate actions on the local level.521 Their move to begin assisting communities to 
“draft legally binding laws in which they asserted their right to self-govern” came after years of 
fruitlessly attempting to enforce inadequate state and federal environmental regulations that were 
too permissive to corporations.522 One of the central problems with existing environmental 
regulations, they argue, is that they generate a shield whereby corporations cannot be held liable 
for the damages they inflict on local communities as long as their actions adhere to the letter of 
the regulatory laws.523 Additionally, CELDF argues, longstanding corporate constitutional rights 
guarantee Commerce Clause protections as well as protections based on the First, Fourth, Fifth, 
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.524  Because of these legal protections, they argue, any 
successful efforts to more effectively regulate the actions of corporations should bypass state and 
federal regulatory frameworks and directly confront corporate claims to rights with the 
sovereignty of local governance. In other words, critiquing corporate rights is central to 
CELDF’s strategies for preventing and abating damage to humans and ecosystems. 
 In the United States, about 160 of CELDF’s community rights ordinances have been 
passed, primarily in small towns in rural areas, although a few larger municipalities and counties 
have also passed them, the largest being the City of Pittsburgh.525 Although many of these 
ordinances have been effective at preventing corporate activities they are designed to stop, some 
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of the community rights ordinances have yet to be tested in actual legal battles, and some have 
been overturned in litigation. Others simply fail to pass in popular votes. One of CELDF’s 
opponents called the ordinances “misleading, legally meaningless language,”526 while an industry 
blog calls CELDF and its allies, “old-time pool hall hustlers, operating without consciences and 
taking in naive local officials who are led to believe they have previously unimagined powers to 
overrule every law standing in their way.”527 
 These ordinances do is provide a legal structure that facilitates the event of the appearance 
of the demos, understood expansively as a “community” that includes natural entities as well as 
the residents of the town. The ordinances institutionalize a sort of foundational claim to an 
essential political collective that possesses rights, but in such a way that claiming those rights 
involves critiquing corporate influence on state and federal law. The ordinances, in other words, 
are democratic mechanism that offers what Rancière would call the subject position of the demos 
through the collective persona of “community” that can be enacted only through a critique of 
existing power relations.  
 CELDF provides open online access to its archive of forty to fifty model local 
ordinances.528 To formulate this analysis, I closely read sixteen of the model ordinances. I 
selected ordinances from different time periods to get a sense of how they have changed and 
remained consistent as well as ordinances addressing a variety of public issues. Language that 
consistently appears in some of the older ordinances is replaced by other types of consistencies 
in the later documents. In spite of these variations, however, there are certain types of clauses 
that re-appear in nearly every document. These clauses demonstrate how the performances and 
critiques of democratic doxai in the ordinances enable dissensual democracy and organize an 
effective relation between democratic events and democratic institutions. There are two types of 
clauses that reoccur consistently and are significant in how they demonstrate the potential of 
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democratic doxai to operate both as the object of critique and the operational foundation of 
political collectivity. The first type of clause critiques corporate rights. The second type of clause 
contains what I call a “statement of sovereignty” that declares the rights of the collective entity 
passing the ordinance. Together, these two types of clauses illustrate how the doxai of rights and 
the persona of community can be institutionalized in such a way as to enable the performative 
event of democratic collective subjectivity through critiques of broader and more established 
state institutions. 
Codifying Critiques of Corporations 
 The critique of corporate rights is a persistent and central feature of the text of the 
community rights ordinances drafted by CELDF for local governments. This critique is 
articulated in the ordinances in part through a type of clause that re-appears almost without fail in 
every ordinance. The clause contains a very explicit critique of the nature, rights, and roles of 
corporations in the municipality that is passing the ordinance. This type of clause both critiques 
the doxastic legal concept of the corporation and asserts, as the fundamental law of the 
community, a new definition of the legal concept of the corporation. To set up this definition, the 
ordinances often begin with a statement that frames the necessity of revoking or altering 
corporate legal rights by describing the effects of the doxastic legal concept of the corporation. 
For instance, an ordinance passed in 2011 by Mountain Lake Park, Maryland, which was 
designed to effectively regulate the extraction of natural gas through fracking, states: 
 
Meaningful regulatory limitations and prohibitions concerning Marcellus Shale natural 
gas extraction, along with zoning and land use provisions, are barred because they 
conflict with certain legal powers claimed by resource extraction corporations. The 
Mayor and Town Council recognizes that environmental and economic sustainability 
cannot be achieved if the rights of municipal majorities are routinely overridden by 
corporate minorities claiming certain legal powers. The Mayor and Town Council also 
recognizes that sustainability cannot be achieved within a system of preemption which 
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enables those corporations to use state governments to override local self-government, 
and which restricts municipalities to only that lawmaking specifically authorized by state 
government.529 
 
 This statement, and others like it in all of the ordinances, specifically critiques the impact 
of defining corporations as rights-bearing entities and argues that corporate rights are one of the 
central causes of the town’s failure to achieve “environmental and economic sustainability.” By 
describing rights and legal powers as being merely “claimed” by corporations, the statement 
highlights the contingency and artificiality of such claims as mere doxa that has been 
institutionalized at the level of state and federal government. 
  Some of the substance of these failures is described in the passage of the ordinance 
immediately preceding this one, which describes how fracking “violates the rights of residents 
and neighborhoods” and endangers “their health, safety, and welfare by allowing the deposit of 
toxins into the air, soil, water, environment, and the bodies of residents within our Town.”530 
These negative effects of the doxastic legal concept of the corporation, which allows 
corporations to “claim certain legal powers,” are the source of these negative effects. 
 To that extent, the ordinance goes on in the third section of the “Findings and Intent,” the 
ordinance must be written and enacted such that it “removes certain legal powers from gas 
extraction corporations operating within Town of Mountain Lake Park, and nullifies state laws, 
permits, and other authorizations which interfere with the rights secured by this ordinance.”531 In 
this way, the route to counter-effectuating the negative effects of the doxastic legal concept of 
the corporation is to remove the legal powers given to corporate entities by state and federal 
regulatory and permitting processes. 
 But how is this counter-effectuating accomplished? In a nutshell, it is accomplished by 
the fiat of the ordinance itself, which proceeds to re-define the legal collective persona of the 
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corporation as a matter of law. To begin with, the “Definitions” Article of the ordinance 
describes several terms, including natural gas, extraction, and town. Included among these is 
“corporations,” which are defined broadly to include a range of business entities.532 Additionally, 
the ordinance states “‘Person’ shall mean any natural person.”533 After declaring the extraction of 
natural gas to be unlawful, the ordinance then goes on to makes statements of prohibition 
“necessary to secure bill of rights’ protections.”534 There are three full sections, the bulk of the 
prohibitions, dedicated to critiquing how the doxa of rights has been undemocratically 
appropriated by corporations and redefining corporations as non-rights-bearing entities. These 
sections declare that, 
 
Corporations engaged in the extraction of natural gas shall not possess the authority or 
power to enforce State or federal preemptive law against the people of Town of Mountain 
Lake Park […]. No permit, license, privilege or charter issued by any State or federal 
agency, or Board to any person or any corporation operating under a State charter, or any 
director, officer, owner, or manager of a corporation operating under a State charter, 
which would violate the prohibitions of this Ordinance or deprive any Town resident(s), 
natural community, or ecosystem of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by this 
Ordinance, the Maryland Constitution, the United States Constitution, or other laws, shall 
be deemed valid within The Town of Mountain Lake Park.535 
 
In effect, these sections declaratively strip corporations who engage in natural gas extraction of 
their rights, authority, permits, and licenses. The rights of the community, including the 
ecosystem, are asserted against the rights of any “limited partnership, limited liability 
partnership, business trust, or limited liability company” and their representatives.536 Severing 
“rights” from “corporations” and other legal business entities constitutes a significant shift in the 
legal definition of the corporation as well as a profound critique of state and federal 
governmental authority, as I will describe below. 
 This ordinance, like many others that CELDF has facilitated, attempts to go far beyond 
merely severing the rights granted to corporate business entities by state and federal judicial 
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precedent. It additionally attempts to invalidate the very basis for the legal organization of any 
given corporation itself if that entity engages in natural gas extraction as prohibited by the 
ordinance. While this type of ordinance has yet to face a rigorous test in state or federal court, its 
goal is unmistakable: by declaring that “no permit, license, privilege or charter” of anyone who 
violates the rights of the community in Mountain Lake Park “shall be deemed valid,” the 
ordinance declares any and all corporate charters themselves to be facially invalid according to 
the law of the town.537  
 The implications of such a declaration are not immediately apparent from reading the text 
of the Mountain Lake Park ordinance. Older ordinances available in CELDF’s archive, however, 
often spelled out in detail exactly what elements of a corporate charter were objectionable and 
therefore invalid. The primary target of the critique of the doxastic legal concept of the 
corporation levied by CELDF and the towns that adopt its ordinances is a critique of corporate 
limited liability. The difference between a business partnership and a limited liability corporation 
is that the owners and investors of a limited liability corporation (the type of corporation that is 
typically referred to by the word “corporation”) cannot be held personally liable for the damages 
inflicted by the corporation or for the corporation’s debts. This corporate legal form insulates all 
of the owners and employees of the legal entity from prosecution for wrongs committed by “the 
corporation.” If the corporate charter and the authority that grants it (for instance, the State of 
Maryland) are effectively deemed invalid, then such employees and owners would be suddenly 
liable for the actions of the entity. 
 This, anyway, seems to be the goal of CELDF and the towns that adopt ordinances based 
on its models and advice. The goal is illustrated by the ordinance passed by the Tamaqua 
Borough in Pennsylvania in response to problems cause by the disposal of toxic sewage sludge 
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within the town limits. The “Findings and Purpose” section of the ordinance explicitly states that 
part of the problem it seeks to address is that “It is also recognized that limited liability shields 
prevent financial recovery (and accountability) for damages caused by business entities because 
limited liability insulates the persons managing the corporation from harms caused by their 
decisions.”538 In addition to defining the corporation as the Mountain Lake Park ordinance (and 
nearly all of the others) does, the Tamaqua Borough ordinance contains the following passage in 
its “Civil Rights Enforcement” section: 
 
Section 12.1: Any person acting under the authority of a permit issued by the Department 
of Environmental Protection, any corporation operating under a State charter, or any 
director, officer, owner, or manager of a corporation operating under a State charter, who 
deprives any Borough resident, natural community, or ecosystem of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by this Ordinance, the Pennsylvania Constitution, the 
United States Constitution, or other laws, shall be liable to the party injured and shall be 
responsible for payment of compensatory and punitive damages and all costs of 
litigation, including, without limitation, expert and attorney’s fees. Compensatory and 
punitive damages paid to remedy the violation of the rights of natural communities and 
ecosystems shall be paid to Tamaqua Borough for restoration of those natural 
communities and ecosystems.539 
 
This section in effect states, like the Mountain Lake Park ordinance described above and nearly 
all the CELDF ordinances, that permits and charters granted from authorities (such as state and 
federal governments) that are not the Tamaqua Borough have no legal standing if the persons 
using those legal tools violate the rights of the Tamaqua community. It goes on, as emphasized in 
the italicized fragments above, to state clearly and unequivocally that the implication of 
invalidating those permits and charters is that the persons typically protected by the grant of 
limited liability that comes with the corporate legal form will instead be personally liable for 
those damages. 
 Needless to say, this is an almost a flat-out dissolution on the local level of the authority of 
state government to charter corporations. Some of the ordinances in CELDF’s archive even go so 
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far as to declare that those persons who grant permits for environmentally devastating corporate 
activities can be held liable for the damages resulting from the permitted activities. For instance, 
the ordinance passed by the Town of Barnstead, New Hampshire declares  
 
Any employee, agent or representative of any State or federal Regulatory Agency, 
Commission or Board who issues a permit, license, privilege or charter to any person or 
any corporation operating under a State charter, or any director, officer, owner, or 
manager of a corporation operating under a State charter, which would violate the 
provisions of this Warrant Article or deprive any resident, natural community, or 
ecosystem of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by this Warrant Article, the 
New Hampshire Constitution, the United States Constitution, or other laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured and shall be responsible for payment of compensatory and 
punitive damages and all costs of litigation, including, without limitation, expert and 
attorney’s fees.540  
 
According to this passage, persons employed by the state agency responsible for granting permits 
to corporate entities for business activities could be sued for damages to ecosystems. This 
declaration goes far beyond critiquing the attribution of rights to corporations and drives toward 
questioning the authority and legitimacy of the State itself. Not only does it declare that 
employees and owners are liable, but agents of the State are not protected from liability for 
corporate actions. The Barnstead ordinance additionally attempts to undo the rationale for certain 
types of retaliatory legal action that corporations might take against the town by declaring that 
“Within the Town of Barnstead, corporate claims to ‘future lost profits’ shall not be considered 
property interests under the law, and thus, shall not be recoverable by corporations seeking those 
damages.”541 The ordinance simultaneously attempts to undo the basis for corporations to bring 
suit against the town while laying a new legal framework for the extraction of benefits from a 
variety of actors responsible for environmental, economic, and health effects of the doxastic 
legal concept of the corporation. 
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 The CELDF ordinances argue that the democratic doxai of rights cannot be attributed to 
corporations; instead, rights are more legitimately held by entities like “communities,” “human 
beings,” and “nature.” Additionally, the ordinances map how corporate claims to rights-based 
doxai have been codified in state institutions to produce undemocratic relations. These efforts 
codify a substantive critique within the law itself. This critique extends well past corporations 
themselves into the processes of governmental regulatory agencies. In doing so, the ordinances 
critique doxai specifically as their institutionalization fails to accurately represent the true, 
natural subjects of rights while calling into question the legitimacy of the State. Both the CELDF 
ordinances share the critique levied by the books, petitions, and resolutions in favor of amending 
the U.S. Constitution in that they all agree that “rights” are democratic doxa that has been 
improperly applied to corporations. 
 Like political theorists such as Agamben or Hardt and Negri, CELDF differs from the more 
liberal and national branch of the movement in that it generally rejects the premise that political 
doxa such as rights can ever be genuinely democratic at the level of state and national 
government. But the rejection of this premise does not simply lead CELDF to focus its efforts on 
local politics. Nor does it lead to a rejection of the doxa of rights in general, as it might for post-
operaism. As the clauses describe above demonstrate, the rejection of the possibility that state 
and federal government can ever be democratic leads CELDF to codify critiques of joint-stock 
business corporations and the State itself in the law as the perpetual other of community rights. 
These critiques of institutionalized democratic doxai must be enunciated by communities 
themselves as their own law.  
 One does not need to claim in rhetorical theoretical terms that institutionalized doxai such 
as “rights” are actually and finally inaccurately applied to corporations or that some doxai have 
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more proper referents than others in order to grasp the rhetorical force and political potential of 
such a claim. A democratic performance of the critique of doxa that operates as if such a 
distinction were true enables the production of the event of dissensual democracy. When doxai 
are codified in State institutions, critiques of the representative failures of doxai enable the 
production of a sense that the State itself fails to represent the true and legitimate totality of its 
subjects. Although these ordinances themselves attempt to codify the same doxa of rights with 
reference to a new class of subjects — communities and natural entities — the ordinances 
contain a critical mechanism whereby claiming rights must always be against established state 
and corporate entities. A critique of state-based democratic doxa is built into the codification of 
democratic self-governance.  
Founding Political Community With Rights 
 CELDF’s ordinances are not simply statements of protest (although they are that). They are 
also the law itself in the towns where they are passed. As part of establishing new law that 
attempts to delegitimize existing State authority, they demonstrate how democratic doxai such as 
rights and collective personae can be institutionalized as part of founding a sovereign political 
entity. The gesture of founding is similar to the demos appearing through protest and 
demonstrations, but rather than being the event of the appearance of the demos, the ordinances 
also an attempt to create a foundational mechanism that will enable the perpetual reappearance of 
the demos. This section will describe how the doxai of rights and collective personae operate in 
the clauses of CELDF’s ordinances that assert and enact this foundational political collective.  
  Personae such as “community” and “the people” have been critiqued by theorists such as 
Jean-Luc Nancy, Antonio Negri, and Michael Hardt or in rhetorical studies by Maurice Charland 
as conveying an overly unified and seamless vision of political totality that does not sufficiently 
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account for difference within political collectives.542 As we have seen previously, however, 
Rancière has a good argument about how such personae, as doxai, can be enacted as part of 
democratic events rather than simply being institutionalized to support undemocratic relations. 
Rancière argues, along with rhetorical scholars of movements, that collective personae are roles 
or masks that can be inventionally adopted to produce democratic events and stake collective 
claims to self-governance.543 Referring to “the community” or “the people” as a unified totality 
is part of how the ordinances create a mechanism for the diverse constituents specifically 
included in that totality to stake claims to rights in instances of democratic events. 
 These ordinances, however, enact such personae in a slightly different way than the civil 
organizations or protests assumed by Rancière and rhetorical scholars of movements might. 
Because these ordinances claim to act in and as the law itself that is grounded in sovereign 
authority, they are not only protests but also enact a sort of “founding claim” to political 
community. As such, they must negotiate a variation on what I discussed in Chapter One as 
Rousseau’s paradox of politics — which comes first, a democratic people or the laws that codify 
democracy? 
 Bonnie Honig, drawing on Jacques Derrida, approaches Rousseau’s paradox of politics in a 
way that attends to both the performative and constative dimensions of “founding claims” of 
political collectives in a way that suggest fruitful ways of thinking about the role of doxastic 
collective personae in such claims.544 She argues that foundational or essentialist political claims 
(for instance, that sovereignty is rooted in a unified, total, and natural “people”) are not as 
problematic as they might appear to be on face. For Honig, the foundations of political 
collectivity are necessarily secured by a constative claim about an absolute that grounds that 
collective.545 At the same time she acknowledges that such “founding constatives” are made 
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powerful and operational by their performative elements, which can always be critically revealed 
as contingent occlusions of historical processes. To that extent, Honig’s argument about the 
importance of essential or even ontological claims to political collectivity and their performative 
qualities suggests that even at the level of the law that founds the modern State, such constative 
claims to unified sovereign political collectivity operate according to the dissensual dynamic of 
doxa discussed in Chapter Four. 
 Some of CELDF’s promotional materials, model ordinances, and educational seminars 
claim to speak as and for the people. However, communities are the entities that CELDF claims 
to be assisting much of the time. The use of the collective persona of community facilitates one 
of the central goals of CELDF, which is to legally establish the rights of nature. The collective 
persona of community, unlike the people, is flexible enough to encompass a range of living 
entities beyond human beings. In the CELDF ordinances, the persona of community establishes a 
synecdochic equivalence between the concept, the names of its instantiations, and a series of 
additional entities. The ordinances further establish a specific relationship between the Town of 
X that enunciates the ordinance, the people of the Town of X, and the community, which is not 
co-extensive with the Town of X or the people in it.  
 The cornerstone of the relationship between these entities is a short passage I call a 
“statement of sovereignty” that can be found in many of the ordinances, especially the ones that 
address environmental problems. This passage, which changes remarkable little from ordinance 
to ordinance, reads as follows546: 
 
The Borough of North Plainfield shall be the governing authority responsible to and 
governed by the residents of the Borough. Use of the "Borough of North Plainfield" 
municipal corporation by the sovereign people within the Borough's boundaries to make 
law shall not be construed to limit or surrender the sovereign authority or immunities of 
the people to a municipal corporation that is subordinate to them in all respects at all 
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times. The people at all times enjoy and retain an inalienable and indefeasible right to 
self-governance in the community where they reside.  
 
This passage begins by marking out the distinction between the municipal government of North 
Plainfield and the residents of North Plainfield – a sensible and unmysterious distinction that is 
usually understood based on the assumption that the government should synechdochally 
represent the residents. The next sentence, however, abandons “residents” and takes up “the 
sovereign people” within “the Borough’s boundaries” and a contradiction begins to take shape 
along the outlines of Rousseau’s paradox of politics. In the CELDF ordinances, however, the 
paradox is expressed in terms of territory and place – the “boundaries” of the Borough define the 
people who are sovereign. This version of the paradox sets up an oscillation between the people 
and the place as the two entities that mutually define each other and the municipal corporation 
called “Borough of North Plainfield.” The boundaries of the legal entity “The Borough of North 
Plainfield” delineate who the sovereign people are, just as the “sovereign people” are the 
founding source of the legal entity that defines the boundaries. The people and the bounded 
territory are the two entities that mutually define each other and the municipal corporation also 
called “Borough of North Plainfield.” The final sentence of the passage resolves the question of 
which entity is the Borough (the people or the territory?) by conflating people and place in and 
as community. The rights of the people are not located in their status as individual persons, 
residents, or citizens. The rights are derived from “the community where they reside,” an 
ontological entity that encompasses both people and bounded territory. By positing an 
ontological political collective, the community, the ordinances enact a doxastic collective 
persona to resolve the paradoxical tension at the heart of political founding. 
  Not only does the turn to the collective persona of “community” resolve the paradox of 
politics in this instance, the statement of sovereign authority enables the perpetual reassertion of 
the written law’s protections and rights as being from and for a range of entities that might 
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potentially be included in “the community” that grounds any given municipality. The ordinances 
rarely limit themselves to this relatively brief statement of sovereignty. Most of the ordinances 
include additional, more descriptive statements of the specific rights of entities. For instance, in 
addition to making statements about the inalienable and fundamental rights of human residents, 
many of the ordinances outline a series of rights held by other entities as well, including the right 
to water, the right to exist and flourish, and the right to a sustainable energy future. For instance, 
in addition to making statements about the inalienable and fundamental rights of residents, the 
Borough of Wilkinsburg ordinance outlines a series of rights held by other entities as well:  
 
(a) Right to Water. All residents, natural communities and ecosystems in Wilkinsburg 
possess a fundamental and inalienable right to sustainably access, use, consume, and 
preserve water drawn from natural water cycles that provide water necessary to sustain 
life within the Borough.  
 
(b) Rights of Natural Communities. Natural communities and ecosystems, including, but 
not limited to, wetlands, streams, rivers, aquifers, and other water systems, possess 
inalienable and fundamental rights to exist and flourish within the Borough of 
Wilkinsburg. Residents of the Borough shall possess legal standing to enforce those 
rights on behalf of those natural communities and ecosystems.  
 
(c) Right to a Sustainable Energy Future. All residents, natural communities, and 
ecosystems in Wilkinsburg possess a right to a sustainable energy future, comprised of 
the production and use of energy from renewable fuel sources.547  
 
While the wording of the statements of the rights of nature varies somewhat between ordinances, 
the phrase “natural communities and ecosystems” is found in all of them that assert such civil 
rights. Some of the ordinances explicitly define “natural communities” as “wildlife, flora, fauna, 
soil-dwelling and aquatic organisms, as well as humans and human communities that have 
established sustainable interdependencies within a proliferating and diverse matrix of organisms, 
within a natural ecosystem.”548 While we can imagine that “ecosystem” has a technical definition 
that could be brought into play, it is almost certain that the term “natural communities” (like the 
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term “person”) is broad enough to perpetually be re-litigated to include additional entities. This 
means, in effect, that the ordinances extend the right to “exist and flourish” to a large and 
undefined class of entities.  
 The word “natural” modifies “community” in the statements of rights above, but it seems 
hasty to make too much of this modification in light of the position of “community” in the 
statements of sovereignty. “Community” is clearly something that residents reside in as well as 
being the ground of the enunciation of the rights of a variety of entities. As members of a 
community, these entities possess fundamental and inalienable rights. By posing community as 
the resolution of the paradox of sovereignty as well as a bearer of rights, the ordinances set up a 
framework for the indefinite inclusion of a variety of entities in the we of the community. 
 The enactment of the doxastic collective persona of community, however, is still deeply 
and fundamentally dependent on the critique of the doxastic legal concept of the corporation at 
the heart of the CELDF ordinances. Most of the ordinances contain a provision whereby the 
rights enunciated by the ordinance are “self-executing and these rights shall be enforceable 
against corporations and governmental entities.”549 The ordinances presume that the rights they 
enunciate are enforceable only against certain entities that would violate them, i.e., corporations 
and their supporters in government. This means that the critiques of how “rights” doxai have 
been institutionalized at the state and federal levels is the inextricable core of the demonstration 
of community. Much like the demonstrative techniques of the more liberal and national branch 
of the movement, the CELDF ordinances cannot demonstrate the demos without the critique of 
the institutionalization of democratic doxai. The critique of such doxai enables the demonstration 
of other doxai, including collective personae, by generating a framework within which such 
doxai can be enacted. 
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Conclusion 
 While these ordinances attempt to create mechanisms for the production of democratic 
events by enacting doxai such as rights and collective personae, they also are attempting to 
substantially and permanently change how those doxai are institutionalized in law. There is an 
acknowledgement in CELDF’s approach that democracy requires the event of the appearance of 
the demos through doxastic inventional resources like rights discourse and collective personae. 
But there is also an awareness in this approach to democracy that it is important to critique 
undemocratic institutionalizations of doxai in the State. The institutions that CELDF would like 
to see established, however, would not be equally open to all types of entities. At the core of 
their understanding of democracy is the assumption that democratic rights must be exercised 
against corporations and larger State entities. Their critique of democratic doxai as they are 
institutionalized at these levels is inextricable from their assertion of the rights of communities, 
which are inevitably local, place-based entities that are almost romantic expressions of the land. 
While the ordinances’ critique of corporations links them to the rest of the movement against 
corporate rights, defining the the demos as inclusive of natural entities and tied to the immediacy 
of locality sets CELDF apart from other branches of the movement that continue to hope for the 
possibility of amending the US national constitution to better represent the people. The full 
practical environmental consequences of CELDF’s community rights ordinances remain to be 
seen. There are two important conclusions, however, that can be drawn from this analysis.   
 The first is that doxa should be persistently and rigorously conceptualized not simply as a 
set of inventional resources for democracy OR as the material that hides and produces 
undemocratic institutions like existing state and federal governments. As with other branches of 
 208 
the movement against corporate rights, CELDF’s ordinances demonstrate how the political doxa 
of rights is both the object of critique as well as an inventional resource for democratic action.  
 The second conclusion flows from the first. CELDF’s ordinances suggest that democratic 
doxai have the potential to be institutionalized or even legally codified in ways that facilitate the 
ongoing production of dissensual democratic events. CELDF’s work demonstrates how 
democratic doxai have dissensual potential not only as part of protest politics and building civic 
organizations. Collective personae and doxai such as rights also have the potential, as Honig 
argues, to facilitate dissensus at the level of founding claims to institute legitimately democratic 
law. Although CELDF shares many of the deep critiques of the basis of the modern State that 
have been developed by theorists such as Agamben and Hardt and Negri, they also envision the 
potential of the law to found new institutions capable of including a diverse range of entities. 
Democratic doxai, they hope, can be codified in ways that enable the ongoing production of the 
event of democracy within such institutions. The goal of institutionalizing dissensus echoes 
Mouffe’s hope that continued engagement with the State, rather than a politics of pure exodus, 
might foster meaningful democracy. 
 
 209 
Conclusion 
 
 The core question I have addressed in previous chapters is the question of the role of doxa 
in democracy. Democratic doxai, including the notions that the people are sovereign, citizens 
have the right to free speech, and political community exists prior to and justifies the law, are the 
material that stitches together political discourses and actions into sensible wholes and make 
them appear natural. For critics of existing power relations, these sensible wholes can be deeply 
problematic and in need of interruption. Attempts to interrupt the appearance of such doxai by 
making propositional claims about where they come from, what they do, and even what they 
hide are what I have called critique. Such critiques are not exclusive to the realm of intellectual 
work. They are also found in a variety of types of political activism that attempt to debunk and 
demythologize taken-for-granted assumptions. 
 The past decade has seen a shift away from critique in many academic quarters that were 
previously sympathetic to the project of critical discourse analysis. Bruno Latour’s 2004 essay 
which asks “Has Critique Run Out Of Steam?” captures some factors that have led to the decline 
of critique as an intellectual method. Critique, Latour argues, needs to pass out of fashion—after 
all, even his uneducated neighbors are doing it now. At the core of Latour’s critique of critique 
lies a pattern that is shared by many other trend-setting refusals to continue “unmasking” and 
“debunking” doxai such as corporate claims to rights and citizenship. These refusals, like 
Latour’s newest and most improved models of how science really functions, rely on the gesture 
of opposing doxai (in Latour’s case, the way critique has become so common) with its other, 
whether that other is epistemic— or perhaps even ontological. Many think it is no longer 
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necessary or desirable to pick apart doxai, their effects, origins, and misrepresentations. 
Nonetheless, the projects of providing newer, more accurate, more poetic, more truthful, more 
object-oriented, more vitalist, more relational, and more materially focused research proceeds 
apace. This research, some of which is quite interesting and important, cannot help but reproduce 
the gesture that is fundamentally at the heart of the modern scholarly endeavor: it presumes that 
there is fault with certain doxai and performs the gesture of interrupting those doxai with its own 
account.  
 Given that this is the case, even scholarly projects that seem to disavow gestures of critique 
seem to attempt to undo doxai as part of making their own claims relevant. The gesture of 
counteracting doxai with knowledge is simply the foundation of what modern research is and 
does. Although I have not attempted the Sisyphean task of developing the parameters of this 
problem in its full scope, a recognition of what I take to be these circumstances of modern 
research has led me to more specific considerations of how it is relevant to the way democratic 
doxai operate as part of political action and what it means to critique such doxai. 
 This study, of course, is limited specifically to the way that critique can and does operate in 
the context of democratic politics opposed to corporate legal rights. Although the dynamics of 
critique may operate in other ways in other contexts, this study can only claim to describe the 
way that critique operates as part of dissensual democracy in this particular movement. In that 
specific context, the core problem is that political representation based on the principle of 
popular sovereignty is always partial, incomplete, and able to be critiqued as being such because 
of the claims it must make to represent the demos fully. Democratic political representation is 
always a failed attempt to depict the demos, a political whole, in all of its variety and internal 
difference. The only way that depicting the demos and the foundations of politics can be 
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accomplished is incidentally, in and through democratic doxai like collective personae. This 
means that there is always room to critique how such doxai fail to establish democratic politics; 
“rights” for instance, can never be perfectly realized, “the people” can never be fully and 
perfectly represented, and “equality” can never be achieved. And yet such political doxai are 
enacted as through they were deeply meaningful and capable of structuring political relations and 
actions. Democratic doxai are both used and abused persistently and with great effect; unpacking 
their failures to support democratic relations and enacting their hopeful political potential are 
both approaches that structure ongoing political and scholarly projects. 
 In the more specific terms of corporate influence, there is a divide in politics and 
scholarship between two projects. First, there is the project of advocating against corporate 
involvement in politics, against the way that institutionalized democratic doxai continue to 
support corporate power in the State, against the ways that corporations claim the doxai of 
responsible citizenship, against the ways that media are dominated by corporate interests, and 
against the forms of life that are produced by corporate claims to democratic doxai. The second 
project claims that the doxai of citizenship, rights, democratic representation and democratic 
protest still contain the potential to counteract the worst abuses of corporate power. For this 
project, democratic doxai are thought to have been used positively by social justice movements 
to enact real and meaningful change and continue to contain the potential to do so. 
 The efforts of both CELDF and Move to Amend seem to be motivated by the hope that it is 
possible to create a democratic State — that the doxai of democracy could be institutionalized in 
such a way as to provide for ongoing democratic governance without the need for anti-State 
protest. Both CELDF and Move to Amend, however, are themselves more akin to protest 
movements than they are to such an actual institutionalization. In the case of Move to Amend, 
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the goal of amending the constitution is fairly distant; in the case of CELDF, it is because the 
local political ordinances they enact are similarly far from having an impact on state and federal 
government. In this distance between their forms of political protest and the State institutions 
that are not changed by their efforts lies an important question about what democracy is. Is 
democracy something that can be established as a government, or is democracy something that 
necessarily happens in response to the failure of any existing State to be fully democratic? The 
position that I have generally taken in this study is that democracy is the event of protest against 
undemocratic relations that have ossified in the State or other undemocratic institutions. 
 Although this position seems to me to be the most consistently defensible definition of 
democracy, it does suggest several additional questions that are quite important. If democracy is 
the act or event of protest against undemocratic institutions such as the State, then it is difficult to 
advocate for any particular substantive vision of democracy. As I argued in my initial analysis of 
Rousseau’s paradox of politics in Chapter One, without such a substantive vision of the 
democratic State, the critique of undemocratic relations becomes hollow—contingent and 
difficult to sustain over any amount of time. Is this, however, a problem? It is my contention that 
it is not. Democracy has more force and potential as a mechanism of renewal and change than it 
does as a system of governance. Those who reject the political potential of working through the 
State miss out on the possibility that various governments could function better than they do (for 
instance, the State could more effectively curtail the abuses of corporations rather than enabling 
them). But having a vision of a democratic State operates first and foremost as a formal 
mechanism for critiquing the way that government always fails to represent those who it claims 
to represent: the people, the community, the demos. 
 213 
 Granted, my definition of democracy is more formal than substantive. By discussing 
dissensual democracy, however, I hope to offer a particular formal version of democracy that is 
always necessarily engaged with some substantive issue in political and governmental 
institutions. While democracy may simply be the assertion that the people should rule itself, 
engaging in epistemic, critical dissent against an existing ruling order requires a specific 
substantive critique on the policy level. In this work I have offered a formal definition of 
democracy, but I hope to have made a substantive, critical contribution to providing a sense of 
what is actually required for greater democracy to occur— a serious reconsideration of the 
relationship between for-profit corporations and the State. 
 There are those, of course, who will argue that one or the other of these positions on the 
doxai of democracy provides a better model for ongoing processes of political action and power. 
Rhetorical studies, with its ecumenical stance toward the manifold processes of persuasion and 
their historical manifestations, probably tends overall toward embracing more formal positions 
on democracy defined primarily by whether democratic doxai are involved in any given political 
action. Critical cultural studies, with its attachments to Frankfurt School attitudes, historical 
materialist explanations, and highly conceptual aesthetic approaches to politics, probably tends 
overall toward critiquing undemocratic relations based on a vision of democratic collectivity that 
is presumably realize-able. The problem of my study of political opposition to corporate rights 
has been that both of these approaches seem compelling and they both seem to capture 
something vital about the role of democratic doxai in politics. Democratic doxai justify and 
occlude undemocratic relations, but they also enable the enactment of genuinely democratic 
action and collectivity. The “rights” that are claimed by corporations are democratic doxai that 
enable capital to influence and even control the shape of the modern State. Other doxai, however, 
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enable a range of critical, even radical political actions that strive to undo that influence and take 
back politics and even government for more open and emergent forms of democratic action and 
collectivity.  
 One approach to this problem would be to state that the significance and potential of 
democratic doxai depends on the processes and powers that they support and that such 
evaluations must always be made in specific instances. Democratic doxai, we could say, are 
simply rhetorical mechanisms among others that have little normative significance in themselves. 
The position that I have offered is not strictly at odds with this basically Sophistic evaluation. I 
agree that dissensual democracy is more or less a technē, a sort of democratic political art that 
can be effective as part of a larger set of techniques.  
 One of the great difficulties with Rancière’s approach to democracy is that he seems to 
want to have his cake and eat it too when it comes to the question of whether democracy is 
formal or substantive. On the one hand, he offers a robust formal definition of democracy as the 
part that appears as having no part in the ruling order. On the other hand, all of his examples of 
such a part appearing are drawn from the classes of pre-existing subjects that he clearly thinks 
have been misrepresented by the ruling order: workers, the poor, etc. Can anyone claim the 
position of the demos, regardless of their qualifications? Can corporations?  
 This internal inconsistency in Rancière’s work may mean that he ultimately must fall by 
the wayside for dissensual democracy to more fully develop. Dissensus, I have argued, requires 
critiques of doxai as part of a dynamic tension that also centrally involves making epistemic 
claims. The very act of identifying any particular bit of sense, whether it be good or common, is 
the epistemic gesture that produces the event of making sense of the doxasticity of some 
previously solidified sense. Doxai, in other words, are only identifiable as such in the context of 
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a juxtaposition with their others. Although Aristotle may have pioneered the art of building 
knowledge about doxai based on the pretext of discerning the available means of persuasion, the 
neo-Aristotelian art of rhetorical criticism is itself a performance of the epistemic gesture that 
contrasts itself with such doxai.  
 My approach to the problem of democratic doxai (should they be critiqued or should we 
appreciate how they enable political action?) has been to describe them as two sides of the same 
dissensual coin. But beyond that, the gamble of this analysis has been that understanding the 
substance of that coin as the performed tension between doxa and epistēmē will help to unpack 
the way that dissensual democracy can happen across a spectrum of political strategies and 
discursive norms to unify a movement. Dissensual democracy, as an approach to the problem of 
the role of doxai in democracy, does two things. 
 First, dissensual democracy advances techniques for both explaining and producing (i.e. 
articulating) political collectivity. Describing political collectives as events that involve specific 
techniques for critiquing and demonstrating doxai suggests that it is possible to produce such 
events as well as identify them and describe their parameters. While rhetoricians inclined toward 
political theory have demonstrated a significant interest in various theories and concepts of 
political collectivity, many of their descriptions halt at the step of explaining the theoretical 
rhetoricity of such concepts. Alternatively, some of them elect to explain the sociological 
processes involved in already existing collectives. Theorizing political collectivity as an event 
produced by a set of techniques avoids simplifying rhetoric as merely emphasizing the textuality 
of theory or turning it into a small component of a larger sociology. Dissensual democracy is a 
technē, a practical art that can be both learned and taught as well as explain collective political 
action. This emphasis is also an important corrective for the way that scholarly theorizations of 
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“articulation” disregard techniques and methods of articulation as a result of their interest in 
explaining articulations on an ontological plane. 
 Second, dissensual democracy approaches the problem of doxai in democracy by offering 
specific prescriptions for how critiques of doxai can contribute to the production of democratic 
political collectivity. By providing interpretive tools for identifying the tension between doxa 
and epistēmē in movement critiques, dissensual democracy enables scholarship to more 
effectively develop critical research projects that contribute to such efforts. If scholarly critique 
targets the same doxai as movements (albeit with different epistemic approaches and even 
different motivations), it may prevent some of the worst instances of critical scholarship spinning 
out into the obscure irrelevance of political exodus. Dissensual democratic scholarship, I hope to 
have shown, need not fully embrace all enactments of democratic doxai in order to contribute to 
substantive political goals set by those outside of academic circles. 
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APPENDIX: GLOSSARY 
 
Anti-doxastic: The critique of existing relations, entities, meanings, definitions or other 
structures that are positioned as being fixed, stable, or common. A central dimension of 
doxasticity that is assumed by anti-doxastic critique is that it defines relations, entities, 
meanings, etc., as being stable doxa. 
 
Articulation: Enunciative act of joining through saying. Articulative joining through saying 
happens both performatively and propositionally. 
 
Collective Persona(e): Concepts that refers to collective entities, such as “group,” “the 
government,” “church,” “community,” “working class,” “corporation,” or “the masses.”  
 
Critique: The enactment of the tension between doxa and epistēmē. 
 
Democracy: The rule of the demos by itself. 
 
Demonstration: That which is shown in a saying. Democratic demonstration is the performative 
event of the appearance of the demos. 
 
Demotic Collective Persona(e): Concept(s) such as “the people,” “the community,” or “the 
movement” referred to by the we of an enunciation. For instance, “the people” is the 
collective persona that refers to the first person plural entity enunciating the preamble to the 
Constitution of the United States.  
 
Dissensual Democracy: Democratic action that both enacts and critiques democratic doxai. The 
demos is demonstrated by enunciating a critique of democratic doxai through a we that 
refers to a demotic collective persona. 
 
Doxa: Common material available to be enacted while being propositionally or performatively 
opposed to epistēmē. Also, the sense of things produced by such an enactment. 
 
Democratic Doxai: Specific democratic commonplaces, topoi, values, personae, and 
assumptions that, when enacted, generate a sense that democracy is happening. 
 
Doxastic: Adjectival form of doxa. 
 
Epistēmē: Anti-doxastic proposition about the state of affairs that generates a sense of being a 
valid representation of that state of affairs. 
 
Technique: The boundary between knowledge of an art and executing that art; knowledge that is 
not of an object, but is rather of a way of doing something or a practice that enables a 
probable outcome. 
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